THE INFLUENCE OF ARISTOTELIAN THOUGHT ON CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA: A STUDY IN PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSMISSION

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
under the Faculty of Philosophy

Columbia University
1964

ABSTRACT: The Influence of Aristotelian Thought on Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Philosophical Transmission. By Elizabeth Ann Clark

The Aristotle known to Clement of Alexandria, a Christian theologian of the late second and early third centuries, was not the same Aristotle known to us. Clement was not familiar with most of the Aristotelian treatises we possess, nor was he greatly indebted to the "Platonic" Aristotle of the lost dialogues, as Werner Jaeger's studies might have led us to expect. In many cases, Clement's knowledge of Aristotelian teachings appears to have come from non-Aristotelian writers or through popular manuals and compilations. Although his theology was not affected at a very deep level by Aristotle's writings, Clement found Peripatetic philosophy useful in two ways: in combatting Gnostic groups, especially on ethical and epistemological issues, and in correcting the anthropomorphic concept of God among pagan converts to Christianity.

Clement knew the commonplace definitions of Aristotle's logic and possibly was familiar with the logical writings themselves. He used the physical doctrine of the causes, as interpreted by Hellenistic philosophers, especially Philo of Alexandria, to

explain the relation between his unmoving God and the Logos, the organon of creation. The eclectic concept of the Platonic Ideas as the thoughts of a divine mind contains Aristotelian elements. Clement identified these Ideas in the mind of God with the Logos, and the Logos becomes for him the archetype of created things, in whose image man was formed.

Clement was not familiar with the teaching of the *De anima*, but he did not accept the Platonic psychology either. He rejected the theories of recollection and the pre-existence and natural immortality of the soul. Clement incorporated several Aristotelian principles into his epistemology, such as sensation as the basis for knowledge and the denial of an infinite regress in knowledge. Aristotle's first undemonstrated principles are identified with God and the acceptance of such principles is called "faith".

Aristotle's influence on Clement stood out most clearly in ethics, and Clement's paraphrase of a long section of the *Nicomachean Ethics* indicates that he had first-hand knowledge of this work. Clement discussed the good life, happiness, and friendship in Aristotelian terms. The doctrine of the mean he correlated with the action of the simple believer, the Stoic ideal of *apatheia* with the true Gnostic.

The Peripatetic concept of the "threefold goods" was used against Gnostics who deprecated the material world. Clement was especially dependent on Aristotle for his discussion of volition and he made use of the Aristotelian division of injuries. Like Aristotle, Clement retained an appreciation for the Socratic explanation of sin as ignorance, but explored more thoroughly the problem of sin through moral weakness when the correct universal principle is not lost. Clement's interest in the subject of volition stemmed from a need to counter the Gnostic argument that those who "knew" lived in a realm beyond good and evil in which they were not subject to praise and blame.

That Aristotelian doctrine could be employed to champion a "true Gnosticism" against a false one or to combat anthropomorphism among the ranks of the simple, demonstrates a use peculiar to Clement's situation and era.

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The edition of the works of Clement cited is that of Otto Stählin: *Clemens Alexandrinus* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, vol.I,1905, vol.II, 1906, vol.III, 1909). *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schrifteller der Ersten Drei Jahrhunderte*,vols. 12, 15, 17. A fourth volume of Clement (vol. 39 in the same series) appeared in 1934 and contains an index of names and terms. A new edition of *Stromateis* i-vi, revised by Ludwig Früchtel, appeared in 1960.

The abbreviations used for the works of Clement are as follows: Str.=Stromateis; Paed.=Paedagogus; Pro.=Protrepticus; Qds=Quis dives salvetur. The numbering is that given in the Stählin edition.

All classical works, including those of Aristotle, are cited from the editions and translations of the Loeb Classical Library unless otherwise noted.

All translations of passages from the Church Fathers are mine unless otherwise noted.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Adolph Harnack's History of Dogma is based on the presupposition that "dogma in its conception and development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel."[1] Harnack was not convinced that such a development had been a good thing. Dogma represented a decline from a primitive Christian teaching which Harnack pictured as "something simple and sublime," "eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God."[2] The "simple and sublime" teaching was expressed in the combination of ideas: God the Father, providence, the position of men as God's children, and the infinite value of the human soul.[3]

Although the historian's estimate of Harnack's method remains high, no critical researcher of the mid-twentieth century can cherish the supposition of a pristine Christianity which became corrupt in the first five centuries of this era. We know that the Biblical documents themselves are complex literary products reflecting the community's appraisal of the life, work and teachings of one Jesus of Nazareth. The method of form criticism in Biblical scholarship has left us with very few sayings which we can attribute with much assurance to Jesus himself. In brief, we do not know what the purity of Biblical doctrine, so dear to Harnack, could have been. We are not left with Harnack's question, how did the original teachings of Jesus become corrupted, but rather with the query, how did the events of whatever happened within the early Christian community affect the main currents of Graeco-Roman thought?

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[1] Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. from the third German edition by Neil Buchanan (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1895), Vol. 1, p. 17.

[2] Adolph Harnack, What is Christianity?, trans. T. B. Saunders (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 8.

[3] Ibid., p. 68.

The Fathers of the church must not be scorned as perverters of a pure Christianity but should be viewed as missionaries who wrote for and about the pagan world, using the concepts and language of Greek philosophy in which they and their readers had been trained. The Apologists and Alexandrian theologians performed the amazing task of "baptizing" pagan thought so that it could be used in the service of Christianity. The only valid way of studying the history of early Christian thought is to begin with the intellectual life of the world into which Christianity came.

Aristotle, we shall show, certainly did not exert a primary influence on the thought of Clement of Alexandria. There are certain parts of Aristotle's philosophy, however, which Clement found useful in a Christian environment. He himself tells us that he studied under several different philosophers[1] before he assumed his role as instructor of

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[1] Str. i,1,11,2.

Christian baptismal candidates. His philosophical training did not represent a merely incidental part of his life or thought. Clement's language is that of Greek philosophy in which the original meanings have been widened to include Christian connotations. The content of his thought cannot be separated from the form in which he expressed it. These are the attitudes toward the study of church history which have governed the writing of this thesis.

Anyone who would undertake to explore such an improbable topic as the Aristotelian influence on Clement of Alexandria[1] must make it clear at the outset what developments in scholarship have made the topic worth consideration and the degree of probability with which such influence can be asserted. First must be examined the revolution in Aristotelian scholarship in the past half-century and the extent to which this thesis depends on the results of the revised understanding of Aristotle's influence during Hellenistic times. Next we must consider Clement's evaluation of Aristotle and his followers and briefly review previous studies which considered Aristotle's works as a philosophical source for Clement. Lastly we must indicate the ways in which Aristotelian ideas were available to Clement for use in his role as a Christian teacher.

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[1] See the note at the end of this chapter for a discussion of Clement's life and writings and a review of the scholarship dealing with the chronological sequence of his works.

In 1897, Eduard Zeller, the noted historian of Greek philosophy, wrote that throughout Aristotle's entire works "there is hardly to be found a single notable alteration of teaching or terminology... All is in exact correspondence... There are no scattered products of the different periods of a life." The whole represents "the ordered execution of a work planned when the author, having come to a full understanding with himself, had gathered together the philosophic fruit of a life."[1]

This view of the unity of Aristotle's writings was challenged by Werner Jaeger. As early as 1912, Jaeger in his Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles had pointed out that Aristotle's Metaphysics was not the literary work or textbook which it had been assumed to be, but was a collection of school "logoi," treatments of subject matter, which evolved in Aristotle's school in fourth century Athens.[2] In 1923, Jaeger published what has become perhaps the most influential work of twentieth century Aristotelian scholarship, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. Jaeger traced the development in Aristotle's thought from the period when he was still greatly under the influence of the Platonic Academy, through a transition period during which the Platonic ideas in their transcendental form were rejected, to the final stage of a more scientific, naturalistic emphasis. Jaeger stressed the importance of the Platonic dialogues, which are lost to us except for fragments, in demonstrating the "Platonic" period in Aristotle's thought. The criterion used for dating the works as early or late was Aristotle's acceptance or rejection of the transcendental elements so characteristic of Plato's thought, especially the concept of the ideas. Thus the Metaphysics was seen as containing two treatments of the nature of metaphysics, the first an older, theological interpretation as represented by Book Lambda, and the second, a more general presentation of being rather than just that being which is unmoved and transcendent.[1] Likewise, the ethical works were dated as to their stages of rejection of the theory of ideas: the lost Protrepticus represented late Platonism, the Eudemian Ethics revealed the divorce of ethics from metaphysics, and the Nicomachean Ethics showed the later stage of Aristotle's scientific interests.[2]

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[1] Eduard Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. B.F.C. Costelloe and J.H. Muirhead from Zeller's larger Philosophy of the Greeks, I, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897), p. 156.

[2] A brief review of this earlier book is found in Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), p. 31.

Jaeger's theory about the development of Aristotle's thought was the starting point for further research. One of the most significant books was Nuyens' L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote,[3] in which the author set forth a chronology of Aristotle's works based on various approaches to the doctrine of the soul. The Platonic conception of the soul as a substance in the dialogue Eudemus was taken as early, and the teaching in the De anima, that the soul is the form of a living body and that no function of the soul except perhaps the intellect can be seen as separated from the body, was taken to be late. Intermediary stages represented the overcoming of the early soul-body dualism.[1]

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[1] Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of his Development, trans. Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), pp. 218-219.

[2] Ibid., pp. 231-234.

[3] French edition. Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1948.

The theses of Jaeger and his followers have not been universally accepted. Ancient testimony as well as modern criticism seemed to be against the developmental hypothesis. Both Plutarch and Proclus had spoken of Aristotle as criticizing the idea-theory in the "exoteric dialogues" as well as in the treatises known to us.[2] And the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius' account, according to which Plato says that Aristotle had kicked him, as foals do their mothers when they are born,[3] had supported the idea that Aristotle was always anti-Platonic.

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[1] Nuyens' conclusions are discussed in James Walsh, Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 69-74, and in R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L'Éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1958), Vol. I, p. 33*.

[2] Valentine Rose, editor, Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta, 3rd edition (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1886), frag. 8, pp. 26-27. According to Ingemar Düring, [Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia V (Göteborg: 1957), p. 355], Plutarch knew the Aristotelian dialogues and the Protrepticus, as well as a number of the treatises known to us.

[3] Diogenes Laertius, Lives, v,2.

In modern times, Jaeger's thesis concerning Aristotle's early Platonic period has been rejected by such scholars as Ingemar Düring. Düring has pointed out that we have no grounds for saying that Aristotle first held to the Platonic ideas or to the immortality of the soul, for the dialogues which Jaeger has used as testimony represent the opinions of several speakers and do not necessarily represent Aristotle's own views.[1] We cannot find a single ancient author, claims Düring, who says that Aristotle ever defended the theory of ideas until we come to the disciples of Ammonius Hermeiu who lived several centuries after the beginning of the Christian era, and we have nothing from Aristotle himself which tells us in unambiguous words that he believed in Plato's two-world doctrine.[2] For the ancients, Düring holds, the Aristotelian dialogues contained a variety of opinions on a subject, and the treatises, Aristotle's own opinions.[3] The idea that the dialogues _qua_ dialogues are more "Platonic" than the scholarly works is a "modern invention" based on the Neo-Platonic commentators.[4]

Düring has shown that the stories of Aristotle's rupture with the Academy and foundation of his own school are distorted pieces of propaganda. In Aristotle's day, the Lyceum was a public gymnasium where any master could teach; it was Theophrastus who was the head of the first real Peripatetic "school."[5] A certain Hermippus, at the end of the third century B.C., wrote a biography of Aristotle in which he wanted to show that Aristotle was a philosopher in his own right and had founded his own school. For this purpose, he used a tale circulated by Aristoxenus[1] that when Plato was in Sicily in 361/360 B.C., some strangers had started a school in competition with the Academy. This story was later told of Aristotle, and Hermippus, intending to praise the Stagirite's ingenuity, put together the pieces of the tale and said that Aristotle had seceded from the Academy while Plato was still alive. He, rather than Speusippus, should have been head of the Academy after Plato, but he had been away on a civic mission at the time of Plato's death. When Aristotle returned, he founded his own school in the Lyceum.[2] Thus, according to Düring, the legend of Aristotle's break with the Academy _after_ a Platonic period took its start, to be developed in the lives of Aristotle written centuries later by Neo-Platonists.

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[1] Düring, _Aristotle_, p. 437.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 331.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 437.

[4] _Ibid_., p. 442.

[5] _Ibid_., pp. 260, 57-58.

The importance of Jaeger's work for our study is not found so much in the application of his criteria or conclusions in themselves, but in the great awakening his research brought to Aristotelian scholarship. If it were possible that Aristotle's thought went through a process of development and that some stages of this development were represented in works no longer known to us, the question could be asked, what writings of Aristotle were known to the thinkers of later antiquity? Was the Aristotle they knew the same Aristotle that we know?

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[1] Fritz Wehrli, editor, _Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar_ (Basel: Benno Schwabe, 1945), Vol. ii, frag. 64.

[2] Düring, _Aristotle_, p. 465. Düring has collected the remains of the biography by Hermippus from the writings of Athenaeus, Didymus, and Diogenes Laertius.

These questions plunge us into the problem of the scanty information we possess about what befell Aristotle's works between the time of his death until the first century B.C. From Strabo[1] and Plutarch[2] we learn a sad tale concerning the fate of Aristotle's writings. At Aristotle's death, his successor Theophrastus inherited his library. At Theophrastus' death, the books were turned over to his heir, Neleus of Scepsis. Neleus' heirs were "ignorant persons" who eventually buried the books during a raid and later sold them, in a decayed condition, to Apellicon of Teos.[3] Apellicon brought the texts to Athens and from there, Sulla took them to Rome as part of the spoils of war. In Rome, they were republished and used by Tyrannio and Andronicus of Rhodes. We know that Tyrannio was literary advisor to Atticus and later was in charge of Sulla's library. It was probably through him that Cicero's circle was so interested in Aristotle. Andronicus' edition of the works of Aristotle and his commentaries were composed between 40 and 20 B.C.; thus Cicero shows no knowledge of Andronicus' edition.[4] Strabo uses the above story to explain why the Peripatetics after Aristotle were not familiar with many of Aristotle's works; the few they did know were of the "exoteric" kind, including the dialogues.

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[1] Strabo Geography xiii,1,54.

[2] Plutarch Sulla 26.

[3] Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists v, 214 d,e, relates in a citation said to be from Posidonius, that Apellicon, when he professed the Peripatetic philosophy, bought up Aristotle's library and many other books, for he was "very rich."

[4] Düring, Aristotle, pp. 421,362.

This picturesque tale has not been universally accepted. Many accept the conclusion of the story, that the Aristotelian treatises were not known publicly before the first century B.C., but would place the treatises in the private library of the Lyceum rather than in the cellar described in the story.[1] This thesis makes it more probable that the works in question were recovered in readable form and had not completely disintegrated. The research of P. Moraux has shown that the oldest catalogue we possess of Aristotle's works can be traced back to Ariston of Ceos, head of the Lyceum around 200 B.C. The list offers proof that most of the works which according to legend had been buried at Scepsis were in existence at Athens at the time the catalogue was edited, although the Nicomachean Ethics is not included among the copies of books in Ariston's library.[2] Older scholars had also believed that most of the extant corpus had been in existence during the period when supposedly the books lay buried. Zeller was convinced that of the works available to us, only the Parts of Animals, Generation of Animals, Movement of Animals and some minor anthropological tracts cannot be proved to have been in use.[1]

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[1] Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), pp. 25-26.

[2] P. Moraux, Les listes anciennes des ouvrage d'Aristote (Louvain:1951), cited in Gauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique,I, pp. 59*-60*.

There remains the problem of when the dialogues and other works began to disappear. Zeller thought that only the treatises survived the first century A.D.[2] This opinion is contested by at least two testimonies. Alexander of Aphrodisias, writing around 200 A.D., must have been familiar with the Aristotelian dialogues, for he noted the differences between them and the treatises, which he thought contained Aristotle's true views.[3] Moreover, a catalogue of books desired,which dates from the third century A.D., mentions the Eudemus, so it would seem probable that this dialogue was in existence though perhaps not easy to obtain at that time.[4]

Whether we accept or reject the details of the stories about Aristotle's writings, we can be certain that Aristotelian studies enjoyed a renaissance in the first century B.C. Cicero, defending the position of Philo of Larissa, speaks of Aristotle as almost the outstanding figure in philosophy.[5]

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[1] Zeller, Aristotle I, pp.146-152. If Zeller's opinion is correct, we might ask why Cicero said in Topica i,3, that no Greek philosopher could read Aristotle.

[2] Zeller, Aristotle I,p. 63.

[3] Alexander, in Elias Commentary on Aristotle's Categories 24b33; frag. 3 Testimonia, in Richard Walzer, ed., Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1934).

[4] This catalogue has been edited by Medea Norsa in Agyptus, II(1921), p. 16, cited by Jaeger, Aristotle, p. 39.

[5] Lucullus 43,132.

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He asks why Antiochus of Ascalon has not accepted the logical teachings of Aristotle, "who is assuredly unsurpassed for acumen and finish."[1] The scene of De finibus is set in the library of Lucullus, to which Cicero has come to borrow some commentaries of Aristotle.[2]

All this evidence points to the probability that both Aristotle's dialogues and his treatises were available to philosophical readers from at least the first century B.C. to some point in the early centuries A.D., certainly until after 200 A.D. There is no reason to doubt that in the period from 185 to 205 A.D., when Clement was composing his works, both the dialogues and the treatises of Aristotle were available for first-hand reference. We will show in later chapters that it was not necessary and in some cases not even likely that Clement had direct contact with the Aristotelian writings. Indeed, the fact that Clement's express picture of Aristotle is neither very complimentary nor very accurate suggests on the one hand that Clement may have learned Aristotelian ideas and arguments from sources which he would not consider Aristotelian, such as Middle Platonic and Stoic philosophers, and that on the other hand, sources which we would not consider to be Aristotelian, such as the De mundo, he did.

Before we present the rather unfavorable comments which

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[1] Lucullus 46,143. One wonders if this comment might refer to Aristotle's dialogues which reputedly were written in a more elegant style than the treatises.

[2] De finibus bonorum et malorum iii, 3,10.

Clement makes about Aristotle, we must list the "positive" evidence that Clement knew something of Aristotle's writings: namely, that there are at least twenty-one passages in Clement which various scholars consider to be testimonies about or fragments of the works of Aristotle. These passages indicate that Clement had access either to Aristotle's works themselves or to compilations which contained his opinions. The content of the passages, however, deals with historical and scientific information and has little or no relation to any "influence" of Aristotle's philosophy which we might suspect. These fragments must be listed for the sake of completeness.

1. *Paed*. ii,1,18,3: Those who bury their minds in their bellies are like the fish called ass, which Aristotle says alone of all creatures has its heart in its stomach. (Rose, frag. 326, attributed to the work *On Fish*)

2. *Paed*. iii,12,84,1-2: Aristotle does not allow people to laugh in front of their slaves nor should a wife be kissed in their presence. (Rose, frag. 183, attributed to the work on *The Union of Man and Woman*)

3. *Str*. i,14,60,3: The expression "Know thyself" is ascribed by Aristotle to Pythia. (Rose, frag. 3, attributed to the work *On Philosophy*; Walzer, frag. 3 of *On Philosophy*)

4. *Str*. i,14,61,2: Aristotle thinks the expression "come under a pledge and mischief is at hand" should be ascribed to Chilon. (Rose, frag. 4, attributed to the work *On Philosophy*; Walzer, frag. 4 of *On Philosophy*)

5. *Str*. i,14,62,2: Aristoxenus wrote a Life of Pythagoras, Aristotle and Theopompus (following the Preller reading, Rose, frag. 190, attributed to the work *On the Pythagoreans*)

6. *Str*. i,21,133,3-4: This section relates the story of Execestus, tyrant of the Phocians, who wore two rings which told him when to act. Nevertheless he was murdered, though warned by the sound from the rings, as Aristotle says in *The Polity of the Phocians*. (Rose, frag. 599)

7. Str. i,26,170,3: Plato, Aristotle, and Ephorus write that Lycurgus was trained in legislation by constantly going to Apollo at Delphi. (Rose, frag. 535, attributed to the work on The Polity of the Lacedaemonians)

8. Str. i,26,170,3: Aristotle in the Polity of the Locrians mentions that Zaleucus the Locrian received laws from Athene. (Rose, frag. 548)

9. Str. vi,6,53,3: Aristotle says that all men are provided with demons which attend them while they have a body. (Rose, frag. 193, attributed to the work Eudemus)

10. Str. vi,16,139,1: The embryo is perfected in the sixth month, in 180 days, says Aristotle in his book On Nature. (Rose, frag. 282)

11. Str. i,16,75,1: Cadmus invented letters and therefore they are called Phoenician letters, as Ephorus and Aristotle say. (Hilgard reading, Rose, frag. 501, attributed to the work on the Polity of the Thebans)

12. Str. i,16,75,4: Another Idean discovered the tempering of brass. (Rose, frag. 602, attributed to the work on the Polity of the Chalcidians)

13. Str. i,16,75,7-9: Cadmus invented stone-cutting. (Rose, 2nd edition, 1931, frag. 459)

14. Str. i,16,75,10-76,1: The Carthaginians were the first to construct a trireme. (Rose, frag. 600)

15. Str. ii,12,53,4: We fear a father not as we fear a wild beast. (Rose, frag. 184, attributed to the work on the Laws of Man and Woman)

✓ 16. Paed. ii,8,69-4-5: Women who dye their gray hair only grow grayer. (Rose, frag. 235, attributed to the work on Natural Problems)

17. Str. vi,18,162,5: To inquire whether or not we ought to philosophize is already philosophizing. (Rose, frag. 51, attributed to the Protrepticus, but Rose does not include Clement's testimony among several others given for this passage. Sir David Ross in his edition of Aristotelis fragmenta selecta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), includes Clement's testimony and lists it as fragment 2 of the Protrepticus, as does Walzer.

18. Pro. 1,7,4: This statement concerns the punishment of the Etruscan robbers who were bound to corpses until they also decayed. (Rose, frag. 60, attributed to the Protrepticus,

but Rose does not include Clement's testimony among several others given for this passage. Ross lists Clement's testimony as frag. 10b of the *Protrepticus*, as does Walzer.

Johannes Gabrielsson, *Über die Quellen des Clemens Alexandrinus*, adds three more suggestions which were not listed in the standard collections of Aristotelian fragments:[1]

19. *Str*. vii,6,32,5: This statement concerns the unbloody sacrifice of Pythagoras at Delos. (Gabrielsson selects this statement as an Aristotelian fragment since Diogenes Laertius says in his *Lives* viii,13,2 that Aristotle spoke of this matter in his *Delian Polity*.[2])

20. *Paed*. ii,4,42: This section lists the musical instruments used in war. (Gabrielsson attributes this to Aristotle's *Problems*.[3])

21. *Str*. iv,5,237,1-2: Aristotle agrees that the things named in Simonides' *skolion* are goods.[4]

The reader has probably noticed that many of the works to which these fragments are attributed are the writings on the constitutions of various city-states. These writings are not, except for the *Constitution of Athens*, today considered to be from the pen of Aristotle himself, but from his pupils. But there is much more evidence than this that Clement was familiar with the works of later Peripatetics. Wehrli's collection of fragments from the later school of Aristotle has twenty-four citations from the works of Clement.[5]

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[1] Johannes Gabrielsson, *Über die Quellen des Clemens Alexandrinus* (Upsala: C.J. Lundström, vol.I,1906; vol.II,1909.)

[2] *Ibid*., vol.II, p. 147.

[3] *Ibid*., vol.II, p. 171.

[4] *Ibid*., vol.II, pp. 286-289.

[5] Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentar*. 10 vols. (Basel: Benno Schwabe & Co., 1944-1949).

The names and writings of Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus, Clearchus, Strato, Lycon, Heracleides Ponticus, Phainias of Eresos, Chamaileon, Praxiphanes, Hieronymus, Critolaus, and Diodorus are mentioned and discussed throughout the text of Clement's writings.

Clement himself gives us some "factual" information about the history of the Peripatetics. He wrote that Aristotle studied philosophy under Plato and withdrew to the Lyceum,[1] and that Aristotle's chief pupil was Theophrastus,[2] who is mentioned a number of times in Clement's works. He reported that Aristotle's disciples divided his treatises into the esoteric and the common or exoteric.[3] Clement also relates that the writings of Aristotle were transcribed and epitomized by Bion of Proconnesus.[4]

The express criticism of Aristotle by Clement centered on the teaching about God. According to Clement, the Peripatetics reduced the "highest" to a mere "soul of the universe." Aristotle, wrote Clement, identified the universe with God, and Theophrastus was even more confused, for at one time he thought heaven to be God and at another time, spirit.[1] Moreover, Aristotle's God did not exert providence below the sphere of the moon,[2] and Clement insisted that philosophy must confirm providence for mankind.[3] In the field of ethics, Clement repeated the standard Stoic criticisms of the Aristotelian ethics: apatheia was better than temperance,[4] and bodily and external goods were not considered to be really good.[5]

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[1] Str. i,14,63,5. Düring (Aristotle, p. 260) thus considers Clement as a perpetrator of the legend about Aristotle's rupture with the Academy. He notes that Clement's reference to Aristotle founding the Peripatetic School in the Lyceum is the earliest explicit reference to this legend; previous Hellenistic commentators had referred in more general terms to Aristotle as the founder of the "Peripatetic philosophy." Thus Clement is seen as an elaborator upon what Düring considers the myth about Aristotle.

[2] Str. vi,18,167,2; vi,7,57,3.

[3] Str. v,9,58,3.

[4] Str. vi,2,26,8.

We must hasten to add that Clement had a very high opinion of the worth of philosophy in general. Philosophy was for him a work of divine providence.[6] No matter in what way one explained the origin of Greek philosophy, the origin was divine. If the Greeks discovered philosophy by accident, it was one of divine administration. If one called it a natural conception (physikē ennoia), the father of such conceptions was the Creator. If one called it prediction, this was a form of prophecy. Clement's favorite explanation for philosophy, though, was that it was a reflection of the truth.[7] A philosopher should not limit himself to one particular school, but should accept whatever was well-said by any school, any teaching of righteousness there might be.[8]

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[1] Pro. 5,66,4-5. This statement probably reflects more than just the teaching in the De mundo, Alfonsi points out, and probably goes back to Cicero(or as seems more probable to this writer, to Cicero's sources), De natura deorum i,33-35. (Luigi Alfonsi, "Motivi tradizionali del giovane Aristotele in Clemente Alessandrino e in Atenagora," Vigiliae Christianae, VIII (1953), pp.129-131. Diels had already noted this correspondence in his Doxographi graeci (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1929), pp.129-132.

[2] Pro. 5,66,4; Str. v,14,90,3.

[3] Str. i,11,52,3.

[4] Str. iv,23,147,1.

[5] Paed. iii,12,86,2.

[6] Str. i,1,18,4.

[7] Str. i,19,94,1-7.

[8] Str. i,7,37,6.

The content of Aristotle's philosophy which Clement did approve, he attributed to two other sources: Plato and the Old Testament. He advised his readers, if you want to be a philosopher, devote yourself to Plato; if you want to be a naturalist, then study Aristotle.[1] There does not seem to be much question which of the alternatives Clement considered the better! Since Clement was a lover of Plato, it was natural for him to assume that whatever in Aristotle's philosophy was of value, must have been derived from Plato. The Platonists have composed books, Clement tells us, in which they show that the Stoics[2] and Aristotle took the most and the principal of their dogmas from Plato.[3]

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[1] Str. vii,16,101,4.

[2] It is interesting to notice that Clement treats the Stoics almost as badly as he treats Aristotle. Spanneut (Le Stoïcisme des pères de l'église de Clément de Rome a Clément d'Alexandrie (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957), p. 100, note 115) has counted that Clement has cited Stoic works 115 times on ethics alone, according to the footnotes in the Stählin edition, yet when we note the authors and writings which Clement specifically mentioned, the list is very small. Each of the three great "old Stoics" is mentioned, although Chrysippus only once, in a list of philosophers, and Antipater the Stoic is also spoken of. The lack of references to Chrysippus is interesting, since his doctrines are used many times. The lack of reference to Panetius and Posidonius, except for the Str. ii,21 passage on philosophical opinions on the end (telos), bears out Spanneut's thesis (p. 85) that the Fathers were more interested in the ancient ethical theory of the Stoics than in that of Panetius or Posidonius, and that ancient Stoicism gave to Christianity concepts and theories, whereas contemporary Stoicism influenced Christianity on the level of practical morals (p. 266). Spanneut maintains a moderate and we think correct estimate of Clement's Stoicism. He emphasizes the dominant strain of Platonism against those who overplay the Stoic role (p. 423). Yet Spanneut rejects the too easy identification of Clement as the "first Christian Platonist" and points out the Stoic concepts of the hegemonikon, apatheia and providence in Clement's thought (p. 425).

[3] Str. vi,2,27,3. "The Platonists" reflect the attitude of Antiochus.

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The other source from which Aristotle derived any truth which might be present in his philosophy was the Jews. Clement reports that Clearchus said he knew a Jew who associated with Aristotle.[1] Aristobulus the Peripatetic had written many books to show that the Jewish philosophy was the oldest, Clement relates.[2] It was from Moses and the prophets that Aristotelianism was derived.[3] In his criticisms of sophistry, Aristotle had but "assented to Scripture."[4] Even his belief that providence extended at least to the moon was "borrowed" from Psalm 36:5.[5]

Clement's assertions would indicate that he had not found much of value in Aristotle's philosophy, and that when he did agree with some point of Peripatetic teaching, he ascribed the statement to a Platonic or Scriptural source. It is therefore understandable that little scholarship has been undertaken to show the relationship between Clement and Aristotle, although some of those who have written on this relationship, have overemphasized the Aristotelian influence. In 1851, H.J. Reinkens tried to make Clement emerge as an Aristotelian philosopher, but his attempt was totally un-

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[1] Str. i,15,70,2. No doubt this is a reference to the story in Josephus Contra Apionem i,22,177-181, in which Clearchus, Aristotle's pupil, said that Aristotle related that the Jew with whom he talked taught him more than he could teach the Jew. Aristotle expressed amazement at the self-denial of the man in his diet and chaste way of life.

[2] Str. i,15,72,4.

[3] Str. v,14,97,7.

[4] Str. i,17,87,3.

[5] Str. v,14,90,3. The verse reads: "Thy steadfast love, O Lord, extends to the heavens/Thy faithfulness to the clouds."

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convincing since the main point on which he based his judgment was Clement and Aristotle's division of man into soul and body, and further division of the irrational soul into two parts.[1] This doctrine can be found in Aristotle but it is not distinctive of him; to omit reference to Plato on this point is a major oversight.

A more significant correspondence between Aristotle's discussion of involuntary action in Nicomachean Ethics iii,2, 1111a6-18, and Stromateis ii,13 and 14 was noted by Jacob Bernays in 1867, although Bernays did not think that Clement had read Aristotle first-hand.[2] Bernays' article is almost never mentioned in scholarly works, though it would appear to be of far greater interest for determining Aristotelian influence on Clement than the usual historical and scientific comparisons noted.

Johannes Gabrielsson[3] was interested in showing that Clement retained some Aristotelian material, given in the list above, which he derived through Favorinus' Pantodapē historia.[4] If there are Aristotelian elements in Book viii of the Stromateis (although Gabrielsson does not tell us what these may be), they too may have passed to Clement through Favorinus' work.

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[1] H.J. Reinkens, De Clemente presbytero Alexandrino (Vratislaviae: G.P. Aderholz, 1851), pp. 305-309.

[2] Jacob Bernays, "Zu Aristoteles und Clemens," Symbola Philologorum in honorem Friderici Ritschelii Collecta (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1864-1867), pp. 301-312, esp. 312.

[3] In Über die Quellen des Clemens Alexandrinus, noted above.

[4] Ibid., vol. II, p. 430.

Clement's use of a mysterious, little-known pseudo-Aristotelian work known as the "Peplos" is also noted by Gabrielsson.[1] Basing his account on A. Wendlung's *De peplo Aristotelico* and W. Michaelis' *De origine indicis deorum cognominum*, Gabrielsson decided that Clement must have gotten from this work the list of those loved by the gods in *Protrepticus* 2,32; the inventions of the barbarians in *Stromateis* i,16; the founding of the Greek games in *Protrepticus* 2,38; and the section on the graves of the gods in *Protrepticus* 2,30 and 37.[2]

In 1905, 1906 and 1909, Otto Stählin published his three volume edition of the writings of Clement,[3] with footnotes suggesting philosophical sources on which Clement might have drawn. Stählin noted 112 sections in which Clement might have made use of Aristotle's writings, 18 of which are considered by Rose, Ross and Walzer to be Aristotelian fragments. For some of the remaining references, Stählin often gives a Platonic source as well as an Aristotelian. In doubtful cases, it seems wiser to credit the idea to Plato, since his influence on Clement is more widely accepted than that of Aristotle.[4]

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[1] *Über die Quellen*... ,vol.I, p. 220. [2] *Ibid.*

[3] Otto Stählin, ed., *Clemens Alexandrinus* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, vol. I, 1905; vol. II, 1906; vol. III, 1909). (*Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der Ersten Drei Jahrhunderte*, vols. 12,15,17). A fourth volume of Clement(vol.39 in the same series) which appeared in 1934 contains the index of names and terms. A new edition of the *Stromateis* i-vi, revised by Ludwig Früchtel, appeared in 1960.

[4] By my count, Clement was familiar with or mentioned at least twenty-one works of Plato, including the letters.

Last to be noted is Harry Wolfson's volume on The Philosophy of the Church Fathers,[1] in which the author pointed out some Aristotelian elements chiefly in Clement's doctrine of knowledge, although his conclusions are much too schematic to do justice to the fluidity of Clement's thought.

In this thesis we will deal with possible Aristotelian influences on Clement's logic, physics, doctrine of God, psychology and epistemology, and ethics. It will be our contention that the clearest and most direct influence of Aristotle on Clement is in the area of ethics. On this subject, only Bernays noted the correspondence between the works of Clement and Aristotle, and even he did not investigate the motivation behind Clement's use of Aristotle.

Clement was a practical thinker. At times he liked to display his vast knowledge about ancient history and literature, but these passages appear as a mere decoration appended to his central religious and ethical interests. The value of Aristotelian thought lay in its usefulness for the polemic against the Gnostics, on the one hand, and against those who could think only in crude anthropomorphisms, on the other. Whether or not Clement was conscious that his source for many arguments against the Gnostics and the "anthropomorphizers" was Aristotelian, remains problematic, although that he was aware of the usefulness of philosophy in polemic is shown by his statement that philosophy does not directly teach the Word but assails the sects.[1]

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[1] Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. I: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

As we have already suggested, Aristotle is not the prime philosophical influence on Clement. Such an assertion would be a gross misrepresentation of the source material. In many cases we will not have to insist on Clement's knowledge of the text of Aristotle itself, since by Clement's time, many elements which we would consider Aristotelian had been taken into the thought of such men as Philo of Alexandria and Antiochus of Ascalon. Besides the works and fragments left to us of such Hellenistic philosophers, which we shall consider extensively, Clement had available various compilations, such as that of Favorinus noted above, or Aetius' *Placita*, which is reconstructed in Diels' *Doxographi graeci*. Thus it may sometimes happen that Clement uses an idea which is psychologically or logically what is called for to express an opinion or combat someone else's position, without seeming to recognize its Aristotelian source.

The remainder of this thesis will be a point-by-point analysis of Aristotelian ideas in Clement and the purpose they served in their new Christian context.

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[1] *Str*. i,19,95,5.

Note on Clement's Life and Work

Titus Flavius Clemens, according to information given in Books v and vi of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History, was born around 150 A.D., probably in Athens, although "some people" say Clement came from Alexandria, Epiphanius relates in section 32,6 of his Against Heresies. Clement's parents were probably pagan. As a young man, Clement travelled throughout Syria, Palestine and Southern Italy, looking for teachers who could satisfy his desire for truth. Some have tried to identify the philosophers to whom he refers in Stromateis i,1, 11,2: the Ionian as Melito of Sardis, the Assyrian as Bardesanes or Tatian, the Jew as Theophilus of Caesarea or Theodotus the Gnostic, and the "Sicilian bee" as Pantaenus.[1] Around 180 Clement went to Egypt and in Alexandria met Pantaenus, who is usually called a Stoic, although Bousset [2] has postulated that Pantaenus was a Gnostic from whom Clement learned many of the Gnostic ideas which permeate the Excerpta ex Theodoto and the Eclogae propheticae. According to tradition, Pantaenus was head of a catechetical school in Alexandria in which baptismal candidates were prepared. When he died in the 190's or 200, Clement became head of the school. Bardy, however, rejects the Eusebian presentation that there was such a catechetical school established as an official institution before or during Clement's stay in Alexandria, on the grounds that Clement never speaks of his bishop, and surely an official institution would be under the supervision of a bishop.[1] Bardy admits that Origen was the head of an organized catechetical school, but we do not know who his predecessor was, if he had one.[2] The reasons Bardy gives to support his claim appear weak because it is not definitely known that Clement was a church official of any sort. In one place[3] Clement refers to himself as among those who "preside over the churches," but the testimony outside Clement's own writings is problematic. We have two letters[4] which refer to Clement after he left Alexandria. Hugo Koch has argued that in the first letter, Clement is called a presbyter because the writer of the letter, Bishop Alexander of Cappadocia, wanted the bishop who was to receive the letter from the hand of Clement to accept the letter as "official" and thus called

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[1] Marcel Caster, in Clément d'Alexandrie, Les Stromates, Stromates I (Paris: Éditions du Cerf,1951), p. 51,note 4.

[2] Wilhelm Bousset, Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom (Göttingen: Dandenhoeck & Ruprecht,1915), p.263. Robert P. Casey in The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (London: Christophers,1934), pp.4-5, has shown that the ideas presented in these works do not represent Clement's own thought, but are Gnostic concepts presented by him so that he can comment on them.

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[1] Gustave Bardy, "Aux origines de l'école d'Alexandrie," Recherches de Science Religieuse, XXVII (1937), pp. 82-83.

[2] Ibid., pp. 87-88. H.I. Marrou (A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. George Lamb from the third French edition [New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956]) p. 327, agrees with Bardy that the Alexandrian school of theology became official only in Origen's time; at least we have no evidence of a regular succession before then.

[3] Paed. i,6,37,3.

[4] Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History vi,11,6; vi,14,9.

Clement a presbyter to emphasize the authoritativeness of the epistle. In the second letter, also written by Bishop Alexander, Clement is not referred to as a presbyter, Koch argues, because this was a private communication and Alexander had no need to represent Clement as a church official. This second letter then represents Clement's true status as a layman.[1] For our purposes it is not essential to determine whether or not Clement was a presbyter, although it is important to understand that Clement saw himself in the line of an ongoing tradition; he was not conscious of himself as a thinker independent of the Christian community.

We do know that in 202-203, the persecution of Septimius Severus forced Clement to leave Alexandria, and we have no evidence that he ever returned. The two letters cited above show that Clement spent the next years in Asia Minor, and was dead by 215 or 216.

The scanty information we possess concerning Clement's life has given the opportunity for ungrounded speculation about Clement's activities before and after his sojourn in Alexandria.[2] The tendency to conjecture about Clement's life has been aggravated by the fact that we are unable to date his works precisely and, indeed, are not certain how many of Clement's writings actually can be attributed to him. Thus, for example, attempts have been made to date his works by considering whether or not the particular section in question shows "Gnostic" tendencies. Some writers feel that such expressions could have been made only after Clement left his position in Alexandria, and that "Gnostic" phrases reveal the piece of writing to be late.[1] This position presupposes that Clement was an official religious leader of a well-defined educational institution in Alexandria and could speak only of "orthodox" teachings which could be approved by the simple believers; it does not allow for the consideration that Clement was an intellectual and a philosopher who would not be bound to such a simple "orthodoxy," even if there were such a thing in 200 A.D. Nor does this view take into account the supposition that the Alexandrian religion may have been a far more "radical" and "Gnostic" brand of Christianity than was found in other centers. Both Valentinus and Basilides had lectured in Alexandria forty or fifty years before Clement, and their influence on Alexandrian Christianity should not be considered solely in the light of the church's rejection of their teaching.

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[1] Hugo Koch, "War Klemens von Alexandrien Priester?", Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, XX (1921), pp. 43-48, cited in Friedrich Quatember, Die Christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandrien nach seinem Paedagogus (Vienna: Herder, 1946), p. 15.

[2] For example, R.B. Tollinton in Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism (London: Williams & Norgate, 1914), vol.II, p. 238, discusses Clement's initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries!

We know from the list which Eusebius gives us in Ecclesiastical History vi,13, that Clement wrote more works than we now possess. His three major extant works are an

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[1] Jules Lebreton, "La théorie de la connaissance religieuse chez Clément d'Alexandrie," Recherches de Science Religieuse, XVIII (1928), p. 460. Also Bousset, Schulbetrieb, p. 267.

Exhortation to the Greeks (Protrepticus),[1] an Instructor (Paedagogus)and a Miscellanies (Stromateis). There is a short treatise by Clement preserved, What Rich Man Shall Be Saved? (Quis dives salvetur). The Excerpta ex Theodoto and the Eclogae propheticae are more difficult to evaluate and will not be quoted extensively, since it is not clear to what extent the concepts preserved in these works are genuinely Clementine. We have a number of fragments from the works of Scriptural exegesis, the Hypotyposes, a book On the Soul, one On Slander, one On Marriage, one On the Passover, and several others. These fragments will not be referred to very often and thus their authenticity is not a matter of prime importance for our thesis, although the fragments rejected by modern scholars have been noted.[2]

Even within the scope of the limited number of works with which we shall deal, there is little agreement as to order and dating. Wendland, in Quaestiones Musoniae, favored the hypothesis that Clement's works were not written in the order commonly held. Wendland set the order as Protrepticus, Stromateis i-iv, Paedagogus, Stromateis v-vii. [3] More confusion was occasioned by the study of Clement's statement in

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[1] Many philosophers wrote popular exhortations entitled "Protrepticus,"among them Aristotle, Demetrius of Phaleron (Wehrli, Schule, iv,frag. 77), and Chamaileon (Wehrli, Schule, ix, frag. 3-6).

[2] Fragments from Clement's book On the Soul, preserved in Maximus Confessor, have been declared spurious by Stählin, Clemens, iii,p. lxxi. Also, the fragments from the book On Providence, also preserved in Maximus, have recently been rejected as spurious by E.F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge: University Press, 1957),p. 190.

[3] Cited in John Patrick, Clement of Alexandria (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1914), pp. 10, 301.

Paedagogus i,1, in which Clement distinguished the divine Logos as *protreptikos*, *paidagōgos*, and *didaskalikos*. Some have inferred from this distinction that Clement meant to write a *Didaskalos* and that what we possess in the *Stromateis* was not the third part of the original plan,[1] but is only an introduction to a work on philosophical theology.[2]

DeFaye's argument opened up a problem which has been fiercely debated for half a century. Heussi claimed that the first four books of the *Stromateis* were written before the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*, but that the latter books of the *Stromateis* *are* the *Didaskalos*. Prat agreed with the latter claim but denied that the *Paedagogus* was later than *Stromateis* i-iv. Munck decided that there had been two trilogies planned: the *Protrepticus*, *Paedagogus* and *Didaskalos*; and *Stromateis* i-iii, *Stromateis* iv-vii, and a *Physiologia*. The final work of both trilogies was not completed.[3]

More recent scholars have been sceptical of the results of such speculation. Lazzati rejects Munck's second trilogy and accuses Munck of looking for too much "system" in Clement's thought.[4] Quatember holds that there is not sufficient evidence to show that Clement ever meant to write a Didaskalos as part of a trilogy; rather, the text in Paedagogus i,1 refers only to three stages of instruction.[1] Marrou, by means of a philological analysis, has shown that the titles of Clement's works were not supposed to be based on Seneca, Epistle 95,65, as Wendland, Stählin and others thought. The terms Clement used in Paedagogus i,1 had been taken to correspond with the praeceptio, suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio whose use Seneca in this letter attributed to Posidonius. The praeceptio had been correlated with the didaskalikos logos of Paedagogus i,1, 2,1. This equivalence is wrong, states Marrou; in Epistle 95,1, Seneca explicitly declared that the part of philosophy called praeceptiva in Latin is parainetikē in Greek. In Paedagogus i,1,2,2, the teaching is said to be that of the parainetikōs, not that of the didaskalos. Marrou holds that one cannot extract a "didaskalos" title out of the passage in Seneca, and thus there is no reason to insist that Clement must have intended to write a book with this title.[2]

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[1] Eugene deFaye, *Clément d'Alexandrie: Étude sur les rapports du Christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au IIe siècle* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1906), p. 8.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 114-115.

[3] This information is summarized in Osborn, *Philosophy*, p. 5.

[4] Giuseppe Lazzati, "Introduzione allo studio di Clemente Alessandrino," (*Pubblicazioni dell' Universita cattolica del S. cuore*, ser. 4, vol.XXXII, Milano: Societa editrice "Vita e pensiero," 1939), p. 27.

We are therefore left only with the possibility of citing the traditional dates and their variants. Bardenhewer thinks the Protrepticus was written between 195-199; Zahn, before 189; Harnack, in the 180's; Überweg, around 195. As for the Paedagogus, Zahn dates it around 190; Bardenhewer, soon after the Protrepticus; Harnack, 200-210; Überweg, after

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[1] Quatember, Lebenshaltung, pp. 32-38, 29-32.

[2] H.I. Marrou, Clément d'Alexandrie, Le Pédagogue, I. (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1960), pp. 11-12.

195. The dating of the Stromateis is a most controversial topic. Bardenhewer and Zahn assign it to the period 202-203; Harnack, following Heussi's division of the Stromateis, says that books i-iv were written before Clement left Alexandria in 202 or 203, and v-vi after he left; Überweg thinks all the books were composed between 208 and 211.[1] Bardy ascribes a late date to all of Clement's "great works", namely, the time after Clement left Alexandria.[2]

The purpose of citing these varying opinions is to impress upon the reader that to associate differences of opinion within Clement's works themselves with certain periods of his life is ungrounded. We cannot prove that an environment which provided greater intellectual freedom was the stimulus for Clement to express "Gnostic" concepts he had not previously revealed. We think it may be more profitable to attempt to understand the differences in Clement's approach by keeping in mind the different audiences for whom he was writing, from the "simple believers" to the "Christian Gnostics." [3] We must take into consideration the polemical character of much of Clement's work[1] and try to see how changes in philosophical opinion, especially in his ethical discourses, result from his need for arguments against views which he considered dangerous.

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[1] This information is summarized in Patrick, Clement, p. 11, note 3; pp. 14, 21. Also see Friedrich Überweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Part II: Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie, Bernhard Geyer, ed., (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Son, 1928), p. 62.

[2] Gustave Bardy, Clément d'Alexandrie (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1926), p. 17.

[3] Marrou (Clément, p. 7) is correct in saying the Paedagogus is not addressed to pagans but to Christian converts. Clement presupposes that his readers have been regenerated (Paed. i, 25,1 - 30,2) and have received a new birth by water and spirit (Paed. i,98,2,)

Clement is not a consistent philosopher and all attempts to present his thought as a unity fail by dulling its sharp edges and picturing him as innocuously "pious." His eclecticism is not the type in which all philosophies turn out to be the same, although he himself proclaims that truth is one. Any philosophical opinion which Clement can use to buttress his argument is acceptable to him; it does not bother him that at one moment he appears as a Stoic and at another as a Platonist. Clement's use of philosophy can thus be compared with the approach of Origen in the Contra Celsum rather than in the De principiis, which is undergirded by a more consistent Platonism. We must not look for consistency of philosophical opinion any more than we can make hypotheses which require definite knowledge about the chronology of Clement's activities and writings.

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[1] This polemical character tends to be overlooked, since Clement has a gentle style and does not mock or insult with the sharpness that Irenaeus and Tertullian do.

CHAPTER TWO

LOGIC AND RHETORIC

Aristotle's logic was one of the best-known parts of his philosophy in later antiquity. The study of logic did not come in the early literary training of a student, but was reserved for those pursuing more advanced philosophical disciplines.[1] Although not many people studied philosophy, whoever did would receive some logical training. It is safe to assume that under at least one of his many philosophy teachers, Clement would have been exposed to the rudiments of logic, although there was no chair in Aristotelian philosophy in Alexandria itself until the end of the third century A.D.[2] Discussers of logic in Hellenistic times had just two main schools on which to draw; only the Stoics had elaborated a system of logic different from that developed by Aristotle and his followers.[3] Most logical works of Clement's time seem to have been an eclectic combination of Aristotelian and Stoic elements, such as was Apuleius' treatise Peri hermēneias.[1] Some commentators, such as Galen, felt no obligation to write on the logic of just one school; they commented on the logical writings of both Aristotelians and Stoics.[2]

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[1] Marrou, Education, pp. 206, 209. [2] Ibid., p. 323.

[3] Benson Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953) has many harsh words for historians such as Zeller who for decades have prejudiced the minds of students so that they think there was nothing new or significant to be found in Stoic logic.

Although a number of writers such as Albinus who were not themselves Aristotelians incorporated Aristotelian logic into their writings, a far more significant transmission of the Aristotelian logic was made by men sympathetic to Aristotelian doctrine who wrote long commentaries on individual works. We are told that Andronicus of Rhodes wrote a commentary on the Categories which was his most-quoted writing in ancient times.[3] Ariston of Alexandria, another Peripatetic of the first century B.C., also commented on the Categories as well as on the Analytics,[4] as did Eudemus of Rhodes in the generation after Aristotle.[5] Herminus, the master of Alexander of Aphrodisias, shortly before Clement's time composed writings on Aristotle's logical works.[6] Two other second century philosophers, Adrastus and Aspasius, commented on the Categories.[1]

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[1] Apuleius, Apologie, Les Florides, Traités Philosophiques. Text and translation by Henri Clouard (Paris: Librairie Garnier Frères, no date).

[2] Carl Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (Graz: Akademische Druckerei, 1955), vol. I, pp. 559-577.

[3] Eduard Zeller, A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy, trans. by S.F. Alleyne (London: Longman, Green & Co., 1883), p. 115, note 4. Also see Prantl, Logik, I, p. 537.

[4] Zeller, Eclecticism, p. 121, note 1. Also see Joseph Moreau, Aristote et son école (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 282.

[5] Wehrli, Schule, vol. viii, frag. 71-78.

[6] Moreau, Aristote, p. 285. See also Prantl, Logik, I, p. 545.

In the case of Clement, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle Aristotelian from Stoic logic, for he used the names and forms of both schools side by side. Book viii of the Stromateis contains many ideas which Arnim has attributed to Chrysippus; for example, almost all of chapter 5 is Chrysippus' argument concerning the self-refuting character of the Pyrrhonian suspense of judgement.[2] Interspersed with the Stoic expressions are a number of Aristotelian definitions and conceptions. For the most part, these are not of great importance for Clement's theology, but they do indicate that Clement had access either to handbooks of Aristotelian logic or to the logical works themselves.

In soliciting classical support for his denunciation of sophistry, Clement linked Aristotle's name with that of Plato. He wrote that Aristotle followed Plato in holding that sophistry was a dishonest art (kakotechnē).[3] We cannot find this phrase in the sources Clement mentioned, but Sextus attributes the concept of rhetoric as a dishonest art to

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[1] Prantl, Logik, I, p. 545.
Neither Sextus Empiricus' work Against the Logicians nor Photius' description of Aenesidemus' writing On the Pyrrhonians (in the Bibliotheca 220) give us information about Aristotelian logic. These works were both directed against Stoic logic and epistemology and are concerned with setting forth the Sceptic position.

[2] Johannes von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1903-1924), vol. II, frag. 121. This work shall hereafter be abbreviated as SVF. Chrysippus, of course, may have taken some logical notions from Aristotle.

[3] Str. i,8,39,2.

Critolaus and Plato before him.[1] There is thus some Peripatetic precedent for Clement's statement.

In another passage, Clement wrote that Aristotle had assented to Scripture in declaring sophistry to be stolen wisdom (kleptikē sophia).[2] This phrase is not found in Aristotle either, although we may guess that Clement had in mind such a passage as Topics iv,5,126a31. In this section, Aristotle was discussing different errors made in arguing cases. Has the opponent included something which is blameworthy or to be avoided in the category of "capacity," asked Aristotle; for example, has he defined a sophist or slanderer or thief as someone capable of secretly stealing the goods of others. The authorities with whom Clement says Aristotle agrees represent a nice instance of Clement's attribution of concepts he approves to either Plato or Scripture, while in fact it is difficult to locate the specific passage in either source.

All dialectical practices in the schools which were used for disputation and not for discovering truth were rejected by Clement.[3] Thus he does not praise rhetoric too highly, for it can only persuade (peithō).[4] Rhetoric is not based on firm knowledge, and therefore cannot lead us to truth. Clement knew the linguistic connection between "persuasion" and the "probable." The beginning of rhetoric, he wrote, is the probable (pithanon), an attempted proof (epicheirēma) is the process, and the end is persuasion (peithō).[1] Clement's definitions of rhetoric show affinity to the Aristotelian ones, that rhetoric seeks to persuade,[2] and that it belongs to this subject to find the real or apparent means of persuasion.[3] In Diogenes Laertius' account of Aristotle's logic, it is said that rhetoric aims at pistis and the pithanon, whereas philosophy aims at the truth.[4]

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[1] Adversus mathematicos ii,12. "We would not say burgling an art which advises 'this is the way one ought to burgle a house,' or thieving an art which instructs us that 'this is the right way to steal and cut purses,' so we must not suppose rhetoric to have any technical formulation when based on such shakey injunctions. Critolaus and Plato before him condemned rhetoric as a kakotechnē, rather than as a technē." Wehrli, Schule, x, lists this as a fragment of Critolaus, frag. 32.

[2] Str. i,17,87,3.

[3] Str. i,8,39,5.

[4] Str. i,8,39,1.

Throughout Clement's comments on logic and forms of discourse, we find the recurring themes that such exercises are something to be done to reach truth or knowledge. Clement never gives to logic a value independent of its goal. Having mentioned a passage in the Statesman in which dialectic alone is said to conduct to true wisdom, Clement added that this true wisdom deals with the knowledge of beings as beings (tōn ontōn hōs ontōn gnōstike).[5] We are not surprised to find this approximation of the Aristotelian definition of "metaphysics"[6] given as the goal of the logical processes, for directly above this passage, Clement had written that

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[1] Str. i,8,39,3.

[2] Topics i,3,101b9.

[3] Rhetoric i,1,14,1355b.

[4] Diogenes Laertius, Lives v,28.

[5] Str. i,28,178,1.

[6] Metaphysics is the science of to on hē on, Metaphysics iv,1,1003a21; iv,2,6,1003b22.

Aristotle had called the theological division of philosophy metaphysics. [1]

Clement's division between syllogism and demonstration is Aristotelian and also reveals Clement's concern only for true forms of discourse. To draw a proper conclusion from what is admitted is to syllogize (syllogizesthai), but to draw conclusions from premises which are true is to demonstrate (apodeiknuein).[2] Aristotle had explained that it was possible to syllogize from false premises,[3] but that reasoning which was to be called demonstrative must proceed from premises which are true and primary.[4]

A number of Clement's Aristotelian definitions suggest that there may be Aristotelian elements in his epistemology. Clement's definition of "definition", for example, is Aristotelian. By means of the principal form or species (eidos), the definition (horos) makes an exposition of the essence (ousia) and almost has the essence in its quality (poiotēs). [5] Definition is always of the essence for Aristotle: horos is that which indicates *to ti ēn einai*,[1] which is *ousia*.[2] By form (*eidos*) Aristotle also meant essence (*to ti ēn einai*).[3] For Aristotle, definition must be of the essence rather than of the particular, for it is the former which is *known*. The Aristotelian definition of definition or formula was known to later Hellenistic philosophers; Sextus Empiricus repeats that for Aristotle, definition shows *to ti ēn einai*.[4] This characteristically Aristotelian phrase was also known to Clement, who used it in discussing definition, although he incorporated it into the Platonic terminology of "cutting and dividing"; the succession of divisions completes *to ti ēn einai*.[5]

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[1] Str. i,28,176,2. Clement does not appear to have had any knowledge of the content of this work beyond its title. He does not seem to have been aware that it was Andronicus of Rhodes who was the originator of this title, not Aristotle himself. See Düring, Aristotle, p. 429.

[2] Str. viii,3,6,2 - 4; 3,7,8.

[3] Prior Analytics ii,2,53b4-5. Aulus Gellius gives this Aristotelian definition of syllogism in Attic Nights xv,26, as does Apuleius, Peri hermēneias 272.

[4] Topics i,1,100a29; Posterior Analytics i,2,71b20-24.

[5] Str. viii,6,21,6.

Clement's definition of induction is also Aristotelian and hints at an epistemology in which confrontation with the particulars of sense perception leads to the knowledge of universals. The starting point of induction (*epagōgē*), wrote Clement, is sensation (*aisthēsis*) and the end is the universal

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[1] *Topics* i,4,101b23.

[2] *Metaphysics* viii,1,1042a18.

[3] *Ibid.* vii,10,16,1035b34-35.

[4] *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* ii,2,12.

[5] *Str.* viii,6,18,2. Stählin suggests that the source for this passage may be *On the Parts of Animals* i,3,643b33, where definition of the ultimate differentia is by division, but it seems more probable simply to attribute the concept of definition by division to Plato. R.E. Witt (*Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, [Cambridge: University Press, 1937], p. 36) suggests that Antiochus may have been the first to link the Platonic concept of division with the Aristotelian theory of definition, and that Antiochus may have influenced Clement.

(katholou);[1] there is no knowledge of particulars.[2] Induction thus aims at the universal (katholou) and at definition (horismos).[3] Clement's statements may be compared with Topics i,12, 105a13: induction is the progress from particulars to universals.[4] Definition for Aristotle is always of the universal.[5] Albinus paraphrased Aristotle's concept of induction as a series of reasonings from similar to similar or particular to universal.[6] Since Albinus did include a number of Aristotelian definitions such as this in his Didaskalikos, Clement could have learned these formulae from him, although Clement's presentation is more "Aristotelian" than that of Albinus. Moreover, Clement's use of the logical doctrine for a theory of knowledge may suggest that he had a deeper understanding based on first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's logical works or on a longer commentary about them.

Clement had some comments to make on language and forms of discourse, although here again it is difficult to separate Stoic from Aristotelian teaching. A choice example of a Stoic and Aristotelian mixture is found in Stromateis viii.

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[1] Str. viii,6,17,6. Katholou is a typically Aristotelian term in this usage. Ross finds a hint of its probable origin in Plato's Meno 77a6: "saying about virtue, as about a whole (kata holou), what it is." David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 18.

[2] Str. viii,8,23,2.

[3] Str. viii,6,17,4.

[4] Also Posterior Analytics i,18,81a38.

[5] Metaphysics viii,1,1042a15-18.

[6] Didaskalikos v,7. (Pierre Louis edition: Albinos. Épitomé. Rennes: Imprimeries Réunies, 1945)

In this passage, Clement relates that there are three things in language: names (onomata), conceptions (noēmata), and subject matters (hypokeimena).[1] Stählin suggests that we compare this with De interpretatione i,16a3, where Aristotle distinguishes spoken words, mental affections and objects of which the affections are images. However, we also think of the Stoic threefold division, especially since Clement uses the terminology of impression (typōsis) to describe how the three relate themselves to men's souls, although he does not use the Stoic terms[2] to describe the three.

Another definition given by Clement which seems to have both Stoic and Aristotelian roots is that of sign. A sign, wrote Clement, exists as either a coincident, or an antecedent or a consequent.[3] On the one hand, this definition might be considered Clement's addition to or paraphrase of a Stoic fragment which comes directly before his addition.[4] On the other hand, the passage can be compared with Aristotle's statement that a sign exists with something else, or before or after it.[5]

A few of Clement's incidental definitions are more clearly Aristotelian. Whole sentences must be stated in connection; things stated without connection, such as "man" and "runs" are not sentences nor are they true or false.[6]

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[1] Str. viii,8,23,1.

[2] Chrysippus, SVF II, frag. 166: phōnē or sēmainon, lekton or sēmainomenon, and tygchanon or ektos hypokeimenon.

[3] Str. vi,15,121,4.

[4] Chrysippus, SVF II, frag. 102.

[5] Prior Analytics ii,27,70a7-10.

[6] Str. viii,8,23,4-5.

Clement's example comes from the Categories, where Aristotle also held that uncombined words such as "man" and "runs" are neither true nor false.[1]

Clement devoted a few paragraphs to a discussion of words which can be said univocally and equivocally, heteronyms, polynyms, and paronyms. His example of univocal (synōnyma) terms is that "man" and "ox" are both classified under the term "animal"[2], despite the differences existing between man and the beasts. In the Categories, Aristotle had also used as an example of univocal predication that "man" and "ox" can both be described as "animals".[3]

One topic of Aristotelian logic which Clement knew well was the doctrine of the ten categories. These are listed in varying degrees of completeness in several places in Clement's writings. One can say substance (ousia), or how much (poson), quality (poion), what relation (pros ti), where (pou), when (pote), position (keisthai), condition (echein) ,action (poiein), or suffering (paschein).[4] Aristotle's categories are listed in exactly this order in Categories iv,1b25-28. In another passage, Clement reduced the ten categories to the two of the Academy, kath'hauta and pros ti.[5] The doctrine of the ten categories was well-known and often mentioned in later Hellenistic literature. Philo listed all ten of them in at least one place,[6] and Albinus considered Plato to have

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[1] Categories iv,2a7-10.

[2] Str. viii,8,24,2-9.

[3] Categories i,1a1-15.

[4] Str. viii,6,20,2.

[5] Str. viii,8,24,1.

[6] De decalogo 30,185.

"discovered" the ten categories in the Parmenides and other dialogues.[1]

"How much", "where", and "when" were three of the categories which Clement often considered in determining the "mean" state for his ethics. One of Clement's examples reveals that he had an Aristotelian passage in mind when he applied such categories to ethical questions. Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics[2] had written that the liberal man will give rightly when he gives to the right people, the right amount (hosa), and at the right time (hote). Clement's paraphrase of Aristotle's discussion is that in making gifts, we should consider to whom to give, how much (hoposon), when (hopote), and how.[3] On many other occasions we must consider these categories: when we should pray[4]; how much should be bestowed on the soul and when[5]; when and where we should use various things[6]; when and where we should laugh.[7] Marriage is a relative point (pros ti pōs echein)[8]: we consider who and in what condition (pōs echonti), to whom, of what quality, and when. [1] Clement thus can use three or more of the Aristotelian categories as ethical guideposts for what is suitable in various circumstances; some of the categories help him determine what the mean is in a particular situation.

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[1] Didaskalikos vi,10.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics iv,1,12,1120a24-26.

[3] Str. vii,12,69,3.

[4] Str. vii,6,39,1.

[5] Str. i,6,34,1.

[6] Paed. ii,1,14,4;3,38,3.

[7] Paed. ii,5,47,3.

[8] Clement here mentions two of the Stoic categories in conjunction with the Aristotelian ones. For the four Stoic

Lastly, Clement noted a distinction which was to become important in medieval religious terminology, that between essence and accidents in the doctrine of God. Although Clement did not reproduce Aristotle's discussion[2] in detail, his meaning is clear. Change of quality is to be distinguished from change of essence.[3] The accidents (*symbebēkota*) are to be distinguished from the *ousia* ; this is the difference between searching for God (*ton theon*) and for the things about God(*ta peri theou*).[4] In other places, Clement wrote that it was impossible to express in words the concept of God,since he could not be defined by genus,species, number and accidents.[5] Clement's distinction had a Philonic ring to it. Philo insisted that God's essence could be understood only as to its being(*to einai*); his nature we do not know. It was his powers which were revealed to man in the

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categories, *hypokeimenon*, *poion*, *pōs echon*, *pros ti pōs echon*, see *SVF* II,frag. 369ff. S. Sambursky,*Physics of the Stoics*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1959), p. 17, explains the difference between the Stoic and the Aristotelian categories. Aristotle's is a horizontal classification and every non-compounded word must belong to one category. The Stoic categories represent a vertical classification, in which every category includes the preceding one; every object can be said to be in four ways. Clement's statement is a good example of his usage of a Stoic term along with Aristotelian terms, in an Aristotelian context.

[1] *Str*. ii,23,137,3.

[2] *Metaphysics* v,30,4,1025a30-33.

[3] *Paed*. i,6,40,1.

[4] *Str*. vi,17,150,7.

[5] *Str*. v,12,81,5.

theophanies. [1] Such distinctions as that between essence and accidents Clement did not develop, however, either in his discussions of God or in his references to the Lord's Supper; such topics were not to become the center of theological discussion for some centuries after Clement.

The logic which Clement borrowed from Aristotle is perhaps the least interesting of all the Aristotelian ideas Clement incorporated into his writings, yet even in this area, he was able to make use of a few Aristotelian definitions to advance his beliefs.

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[1] Questions on Exodus ii,45.

CHAPTER THREE

PHYSICS

Clement, by the nature of his works, had little occasion to discuss concepts which Aristotle would consider "physical." Some notions which we would consider characteristically Aristotelian, such as the eternity of the world and of time, are automatically ruled out for Clement, since he must affirm a doctrine of creation. Clement does mention a few notions from Aristotle's physics, although it is only in the case of causality that the Aristotelian teaching will become important for his theology.

The hierarchy of the grades of nature was an often discussed topic in Hellenistic philosophy, as were the distinctive factors separating man from the other animals, animals from plants, and in the Stoic version, plants from such things as stones. In one passage, Clement distinguished the four states in Stoic terms: stones have cohesion (hexis), plants have a nature (physis), animals have impulse (hormē) and perception (phantasia), and man has the reasoning faculty (logikē) peculiar to the human soul.[1] In a fragment taken from Maximus Confessor's writings, Clement mentioned the four states, but called them first ousia, second ousia, third ousia, fourth ousia.[1] Clement is not consistent in his usage, however. At one point he wrote that the Stoics extended physis to plant life and to stones.[2] Clement is mistaken, as stones had only hexis by the Stoic definition. In other passages, Clement cited Aristotle as the authority for his distinctions. Plants have vegetative and nutritive capacities but are not animals because they lack sensation.[3] Plants do not have aisthēsis, but an animal (zōon) is an animate sentient being (ousia empsychos aisthētikē).[4] Aristotle had frequently made such distinctions as this. Plants have only the nutritive faculty (threptikon) while other living beings have this faculty plus sensation.[5] Animals differ from plants in that they have sense perception.[6]

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[1] Str. ii,20,110,4-111,2. This section Arnim gives as a fragment of Chrysippus, SVF II,458.

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[1] Frag. 38, Stählin.

[2] Str. ii,19,101,1.

[3] Str. viii,4,10,3.

[4] Str. viii,4,10,7. This discussion is part of Clement's plea for clear definitions. The question of whather or not the foetus was an animal was a matter of great debate in Hellenistic times. Clement thought the problem might be solved if people would agree on what an animal was and whether plants should be considered to be animals. The question is also discussed in Aetius' Placita (v,26,1-3), where the Platonic, Stoic and Aristotelian opinions are given on whether or not plants are animals and whether plants have souls. The common opinions are also given in Galen Historia philosophica 130. The accounts of Aetius and Galen are reconstructed by Diels in Doxographi graeci .

[5] De anima ii,3,414a33-414b2.

[6] On the Generation of Animals ii,5,741a9-10; ii,4,740b36; De anima ii,2,413b7; iii,9,432a29.

Clement made a few references to the concepts of form and matter in Greek philosophy, but he did not develop these distinctions in his theology. In commenting on Wisdom 7:24 ("He pervades and passes through all by reason of his purity"), Clement wrote that the "Greeks" thus supposed the existence of matter among the first principles, rather than admitting just one first principle. Clement's statement seems to reflect the Stoic teaching that God and matter are the two first principles,[1] but Clement adduces more than Stoic support for the statement. Plato and Pythagoras thought this too, he wrote, as well as Aristotle the Peripatetic. They say that matter is without form (*aschēmatiston*) and quality (*apoion*), and Plato said that matter is non-existent (*mē on*).[2] Now Aristotle did not, according to his own writings, hold that matter should be identified with the total non-existence of form, but only the incidental non-existence of attributes.[3] He said that matter was indeterminate (*aoriston*) and needed the formula (*logos*) of the essence to define it.[4] But accounts of the later Hellenistic age had interpreted Aristotle's writings so that they agreed with the Platonists and Stoics. In Aetius' Placita we read that whereas Plato had three principles, God, matter and the ideas, Aristotle had form, matter, deprivation, the elements and the "fifth body."[1] Aetius wrote that both Plato and Aristotle held that matter was without form and quality.[2] Some thinkers proposed that Aristotle had two principles, God and matter.[3] It would seem likely, judging from the schematic character of Clement's statements and his use of the exact words of Aetius, that he had used a doxographical account in formulating this passage.

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[1] *SVF* I,85; II,310.

[2] *Str.* v,14,89,5-7. Plato did not speak of *hylē* but his later readers appear to have identified his "receptacle," "nurse" or "third kind" with matter. Plato said in the *Timaeus* (49A) that "the third kind" was a generated imitation of the pattern, and that an image does not have existence or reality in itself (52C). In *Timaeus* (51A) "the receptacle" is said to be free from form. Clement's phrasing of Plato's ideas may reflect the Aristotelian statement that the Platonists included both matter and deprivation under the concept of not-being (*Physics* i,9,191b36-192a7). The Stoic view that matter is without quality is reported in *SVF* I,85 and 493; II,300 and 318.

[3] *Physics* i,9,191b36-192a7.

[4] *Metaphysics* vii,11,16,1037a28; ix,7,7,1049b2.

Clement does not appear to have been familiar with the concept of matter as potentiality, and he used the form-matter distinction only once: sculptors clothe the material (hylē) with the form (schēma) of the divine glory.[4]

Clement did know the Aristotelian distinction of potentiality and actuality, dynamis and energeia, however. In one passage, the distinction comes down in a fragment attributed to Chrysippus.[5] The capability of causing covers both that which is now acting (energoun) and that which possesses the power (dynamis) of acting (energēsai). In the section in which Clement discusses whether the embryo is a plant or an animal, he suggests that a good way to approach the problem is to acknowledge that the embryo has the power of sensation and movement potentially (dynamis) but that it is another thing to possess them actually (energeia). In the latter case, it is one thing to be actually exerting these powers (energoun) and another to be capable of exerting them (energein...dynamenon) but to be at rest or asleep.[1] Aristotle's distinction of the potentiality and actuality of the exertion of powers is well-known and can be found in many passages.[2]

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[1] Placita i,3,21-22. [2] Ibid., i,9,4-5.

[3] Arius Didymus, Epitomes fragmenta physica, 3, and Epiphanius, Against Heresies iii,31. Both of these accounts are given in Diels, Doxographi graeci.

[4] Pro. 4,62,3.

[5] Str. viii,9,25,5 is given as frag. 344 of Chrysippus, SVF II.

Clement's teaching on cause combined the Stoic and Aristotelian positions. He knew the four Aristotelian causes: hylē, kinoun, eidos, telos.[3] In another passage, he substituted poioun for kinoun.[4] He used the example of statuary to explain his teaching on cause: the "what" (ho) the cause is, is the art of statuary (andriantopoios); the "of what" (hou) it is the cause, such as, of the becoming of the statue; the cause "in what" (hō) is the matter (hylē), such as bronze.[5] This example is somewhat confused and omits the efficient cause; nonetheless, the Aristotelian background is clear.

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[1] Str. viii,4,13,7.

[2] Physics ii,3,195b4-6; iii,1,201a10-15; iii,2,201b34; viii,5,257b5-10; Metaphysics ix,6-8,1048a25-1051a4. Eudemus of Rhodes also wrote a book on physics which contained discussions of potentiality and actuality. A fragment is given in Wehrli, Schule, viii,frag. 37a.

[3] Str. viii,6,18,1.

[4] Str. vii,9,28,2.

[5] Str. viii,9,26,2. The three examples are intended to represent the formal, final, and material causes.

Aristotle himself had no consistent names for his causes. In one passage they are referred to as the enhyparchon or ex hou, as bronze for a statue; the eidos; the poioun; and the telos, "for the sake of which," to hou heneka. [1] In another section, they are called ousia or to ti ēn einai, hylē, a principle of kinēsis, and to hou heneka. [2] In yet another passage, the material cause is called hypokeimenon.[3] The standard example of the causes of a statue is given in a number of passages.[4]

After listing these four causes, however, Aristotle noted that there were intermediary factors which were set in motion by the prime mover as means to an end. Both actions (erga) and tools or instruments (organa) can be the means through which an end is reached.[5] Such statements as these were combined with opinions on causality which later Hellenistic philosophers considered to be Platonic, and new names and descriptions for the causes resulted. It is necessary to mention some of these various accounts of the causes, for it was in the language of cause that the role of the Logos and the ideas were discussed in patristic theology.

The pagan writers had no difficulty in keeping the efficient and material causes separate from the others. Aetius calls the efficient cause hyph' hou or poioun. [6] For Albinus, the efficient cause is hypo tinos.[1] Philo also calls the efficient cause of creation, God, hyph' hou.[2] The material cause is identified as ex hou[3] or ek tinos.[4] But should one more or two more causes be listed after these, and what should they be called? Aetius informs us that Plato had one more cause, the pros ti, which obviously is meant to represent the ideas. Aristotle, relates Aetius, had two more: the kath' ho which is the eidos and the di' ho which is the telos.[5] In another section, Aetius describes the four causes as ex hou, di' hou, kath' ho, and hou heneka.[6] Albinus adds just one more cause to the material and efficient causes, the pros ti, which he explicitly says is the idea.[7]

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[1] Physics ii,3,194b23-195a3.

[2] Metaphysics i,3,983a26-35.

[3] Physics ii,3,195a20-25.

[4] Physics ii,3,195a6-8; Metaphysics v,2,1013b7-8.

[5] Physics ii,3,194b35-195a.

[6] Placita i,11,2 and 4.

The most obvious way to reconcile Platonic teaching with the Aristotelian doctrine of cause was simply to add as many more causes as were needed to Aristotle's four. In an extremely interesting fragment of Eudemus of Rhodes preserved in the writings of Simplicius[8], the four Aristotelian causes are listed but wedged among these is the paradigmatic cause, the ideas, and this cause is closely identified with the final cause, which is called the goodness on account of which everything in the sensible sphere copies the intelligible paradigms.

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[1] Didaskalikos ix,3.

[2] De cherubim 35,127-128.

[3] Aetius Placita i,11, 2 and 4; Philo De cherubim 35,127-128.

[4] Albinus, Didaskalikos ix,3.

[5] Placita i,11, 2 and 4.

[6] Placita iv,8,4.

[7] Didaskalikos ix,3.

[8] Wehrli, Schule, viii, frag. 31.

Seneca also adds more causes to the Aristotelian four. He says that the number was increased to five by Plato, who considered the idea as a cause, that at which the artist gazed. The five causes are then listed as id ex quo, id a quo, id in quo (the enhylon eidos), id ad quod, id propter quod, and the final result, id quod ex his.[1]

A later reflection of the Hellenistic addition to the four Aristotelian causes can be found in Simplicius. To these four, Simplicius has Plato add the pros ho as the paradeigma and the di' hou as the organikon. Simplicius gives Porphyry as the source for his explanation.[2]

We can sense the difficulty of Jewish and Christian writers in an account as early as that of Philo. In discussing the creation of the world, Philo lists God as the "by whom," matter as the "out of which," and the goodness of God as the final cause. Aristotle would hold the fourth factor to be the formal cause. Philo's description is peculiar: he lists the Logos as the organon or di' hou.[3] What does Philo wish to indicate by calling God the "by whom" and the Logos the di' hou ? We know that in the writings of Philo, the Logos does function as an "agent" in creation, in a role which other writers might describe as a secondary efficient cause. It is not clear what Philo intended, but early Christian writers took this form of expression to mean that the Logos, who for them was a "person", was the agent of creation: the second person of the Trinity was the Creator God. The Hellenistic discussion of causality was an essential part of the background of the patristic discussion of the Logos. The Logos was the efficient cause of creation and contained the ideas according to which creation took place.

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[1] Seneca Epistle 65,7. Discussed in Willy Theiler, Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (Berlin: Weidmann,1930), pp. 15-16.

[2] On Aristotle's Physics 10,25, in Theiler, Vorbereitung, p. 20. The causes are described as ex hou, kath' ho, hyph' hou and di' ho.

[3] De cherubim 35,127-128.

Clement's discussion of cause reflects the arguments between Stoics and Peripatetics on whether causes were corporeal or not.[1] Some say that causes are chiefly bodily, others, incorporeal (Arnim notes, the first position belongs to the Stoics, the second to the Peripatetics). The first say that the incorporeal can be called a cause "only by a misuse of language" (katachrēstikōs), for the incorporeal is only "like a cause," while others reverse the claim. Testimony that the Stoics held causes to be corporeal is also furnished by Aetius,[2] and Albinus has a passage attacking those who say the efficient causes have bodies. Bodies are in flux and have no stability; it is rather they which are acted on than that they are the agents.[1]

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[1] Str. viii,9,26,1, a fragment attributed to Chrysippus, SVF II,345.

[2] Placita i,11,5.

The Stoics also held that there were four divisions of causes: the antecedent (*prokatarktikon*), the operative (*synektikon*), the joint or accessory (*synaition*), and the intensifying (*synergon*).[2] These four are mentioned in several places in the *Stromateis*.[3] Clement used *synergon* and *synaition* to explain the role of philosophy in the apprehension of truth.[4] Sambursky has pointed out that although the four Stoic causes were probably patterned after the Aristotelian, it was not necessary in the Stoic description to have all four types present for a result to occur; only the first two types were really essential for the Stoic doctrine of causality and fate.[5]

Clement upholds one Stoic idea on causality which is worthy of notice: that which does not prevent (*mē kōluon*) is not a cause.[6] Causation for Clement is seen in working, doing, acting, but "not-preventing" is inoperative.[7] The idea is useful to Clement in that he must establish that

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[1] *Didaskalikos* xi,2.

[2] Galen, *Historia philosophica*, 19, in Diels, *Doxographi graeci*.

[3] *Str*. viii,9,25,1-4; viii,9,32,7.

[4] *Str*. i,20,97,1 & 2; i,20,99,1.

[5] Sambursky, *Physics*, p. 60.

[6] Chrysippus, *SVF* II,353.

[7] *Str*. i,17,81,4-84,1; viii,9,27,6-28,1.

God's "not-preventing" of evil does not make him the cause of it.[1]

At no point does Clement's understanding of Aristotle's physics strike us as profound. Most of his information consisted of set formulae known to most philosophers of later antiquity. Only in the area of causation did his understanding of Aristotelian physics influence his theology.

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[1] *Str*. iv,12,86,3; i,17,84,1.

CHAPTER FOUR

DOCTRINE OF GOD

If a twentieth century student were asked to describe how Aristotle's teaching on God and metaphysics had been taken into Christian theology and used to supplement a Christian picture of the divine, he would probably think first of medieval developments such as Thomas' proofs for the existence of God. The early Apologists, however, would not have recognized the schoolmen's Aristotle as "Aristotelian," for these Christian writers had a rather different conception of Aristotle's God. We do not know the precise origin of the misinterpretations of Aristotle's admittedly vague teaching, but we do possess some documents which show us the confused state about the doctrine from the first century B.C. on.

In the third book of the De philosophia, Cicero wrote, Aristotle had many confused notions. At one time he said divinity to be exclusively mind; at another, that the world is a god; or that god is some being over the world and to him is assigned the role of regulating and sustaining world-motion by inverse rotation; at another time, he said the heavenly heat was god. Theophrastus, Cicero held, was just as confused: at one time he assigned divine pre-eminence to mind, at another, to the heavens, and then again to the constellations and stars in the heavens.[1]

Cicero's account, as well as those of Clement[2] and Minucius Felix, seems to presuppose a source for Aristotle's doctrine of God which is more descriptive than the De mundo. The latter book teaches only that the stars are gods[3] and that god has his home in the highest place of the heavens, from where he penetrates all things.[4]

The version in Aetius' Placita is even more astonishing since Aetius ascribes to a large number of Greek philosophers the statement that god is mind; Thales, Democritus, Pythagoras, Zeno and Xenocrates are among the many prefacing the way to Plato's summary, "God therefore is mind, separated form."[5] Aetius has Aristotle agree that God is separated form, but adds that God is mounted upon the sphere of the whole, which is the etherial body, called the "fifth" by Aristotle.[6]

Two early Christian Apologists, one writing in Greek and one in Latin, testify to the peculiar notions of Aristotle's God circulating in Hellenistic times. Athenagoras, writing in the middle of the second century, informs us that Aristotle believed God to be a sort of compound being consisting of soul and body; his body is the ether, the planets and the sphere of the fixed stars moving in circles; his soul is the principle whereby the body is set in motion, though the soul itself does not move.[1]

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[1] Cicero De natura deorum i,13,33 & 35. Cicero probably took these criticisms from a Greek writer or school unsympathetic toward Aristotle, probably an Epicurean.

[2] See above, page 17, note 1.

[3] De mundo 2,391b15-17.

[4] Ibid. 6,397b25-35. Everyone in late antiquity thought the De mundo was written by Aristotle. If the book actually were not written until the first century A.D., Cicero of course could not have used it.

[5] Aetius Placita i,7,1-31.

[6] Ibid. i,17,32. Also in Galen Historia philosophica 35.

Minucius Felix, writing in the early third century in Latin, has an account similar to and perhaps based on Cicero's. Aristotle, although he frequently contradicts himself, assigned one supreme power. At one time he called God mind, at another, world; at another, he subordinated the world to God. Theophrastus varied also, at one time investing the world with supreme authority and at another, the divine mind.[2]

Clement repeated the distorted notions of his predecessors about Aristotle's concept of God and added a few distinctive emphases of his own. The "Father of the Peripatetics," wrote Clement,

> not knowing the Father of all things, thought that he who is called the Highest is the soul of the universe; that is, he supposed the soul of the world to be God and so is pierced by his own sword. For by first limiting the sphere of providence to the orbit of the moon[3] and then by supposing the universe to be God, he refuted himself, inasmuch as he taught that that which is without God is God.

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[1] Athenagoras A Plea Regarding Christians 6,3.

[2] Minucius Felix Octavius 19,9.

[3] Also in Aetius Placita ii,4,12; Epiphanius Against Heresies 31; Origen Contra Celsum iii,75.

> And Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil, conjectured at one time heaven and at another time spirit to be God.[1]

Although Clement's section on Aristotle does not closely resemble that of Cicero, Diels thought that Clement might have known a Greek translation of a Latin work based upon Cicero's _De natura deorum_.[2] De Faye thinks Diels is unjustified in imagining a "translation" and suggests rather that Clement and Cicero used a common manual.[3]

These writers show that they have no knowledge of Aristotle's doctrine of God in the _Metaphysics_[4] nor do they seem to have known or taken seriously the references to God in the Aristotelian dialogues, for instance, that God is _nous_ or something beyond _nous_,[5] or that gods had created the natural bodies.[6]

Does the fact that the writers of later antiquity did not know the doctrines of the Aristotelian _Metaphysics_ mean that there was no Aristotelian influence on the theology of this period? No, but we must look to other sources to find it, namely, to Middle Platonism. It _cannot_ be stated that

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[1] _Pro_. 5,66,4 and 5. [2] Diels, _Doxographi_, pp.129-132.

[3] DeFaye, _Clement_, p. 334.

[4] Clement related (_Str_. i,28,176,2) that Aristotle called theology _meta ta physika_, but does not seem to know the content of that work nor that Aristotle himself did not originate the title.

[5] Frag. 49 Rose.

[6] Frag. 12 Rose. This "proof" for God from the natural world seems to have been known to Philo, _De praemiis et poenis_ 41-42, 414-415.

Aristotle's God was appreciated only at the beginning of the Christian era, when men yearned for a transcendent deity,[1] unless it is firmly emphasized that the Aristotelian elements were taken into a more complex synthesis and were not known as Aristotelian, but were considered to be Platonic.

It strikes us at once that the concept of God in Middle Platonism which writers like Albinus attributed to Plato, does not reproduce the sketch of the Demiurge Plato gives us in the Timaeus. The attributes of incorporeality, separability and immutability which Plato ascribed to the Ideas, especially to the Idea of the Good, do not correspond to his description of the Demiurge who is engaged in busy activity.[2] It was Aristotle's concept of the Unmoved Mover which took over all the attributes of the Ideas. "With his abolition of all those incorporeal beings which Plato calls ideas, but retaining that incorporeal being which he calls God, Aristotle transfers to God all that which Plato says about the incorporeality and simplicity and immutability of the ideas."[3]

Two problems in particular were discussed in Middle Platonic theology and through this channel influenced Clement's theology. The first was the description of God as unmoved, which became a problem when it was confronted with the Old Testament heritage of creation and revelation stories. Secondly, the Platonic Ideas were considered to be the thoughts of God, who was conceived of as a thinking mind, and were identified with the Logos by Philo and the early Christian Apologists. The Logos was described as the paradigm of creation of whom man was an "image." We will stress again that neither of these doctrines had a specifically or consistently Platonic background; Platonism was mingled with Stoic and Aristotelian criticism and the result was a new amalgam in Middle Platonic theology. It was from Philo and others that Clement derived his basic position in the light of which he was to reinterpret the traditions of Apostolic Christianity. In no case can we say that Clement had any awareness of Aristotle's doctrine of God as a mind which thinks itself or as an Unmoved Mover; such concepts he bluntly calls "Platonic" and even "quotes" such statements from Plato's writings!

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[1] Jaeger, Aristotle, p. 156, note 1.

[2] Ross, Ideas, p. 127, emphasizes that for Plato the Forms and the Demiurge were independent of each other. The Demiurge is not the Form of the Good, nor the sum of all the Forms, nor does he make them. Albinus and other Middle Platonic writers appear to mean the Idea of the Good when they speak of "Plato's God."

[3] Harry A. Wolfson, "The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, lvi-lvii (1947), p. 241.

The "unmoved" quality of God is a familiar part of Aristotle's writings for us. All human emotional traits must be removed from the concept of God: gods should not be pictured as enduring terrors[1] or needing friends,[2] nor can God be jealous.[3]

Aristotle seemed to have two motives behind his refusal to ascribe physical motion to God. The first is based on a concept of value. If something is changed, it is changed either by itself or by something else. But that which is divine and best can have nothing better than itself by which it may be changed; nor is it lawful for the better to be affected by the worse, for that would be admitting some evil into itself. It does not change through desire for the better, since it lacks none of its own excellencies; nor for the worse, since one does not willingly make himself worse.[1]

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[1] Nicomachean Ethics x,8,7,1178b7-24.

[2] Eudemian Ethics vii,12,2,1244b8; 12,15-16,1245b14-19.

[3] Metaphysics i,2,13,983a2.

The second reason why change must be rejected for God stems from Aristotle's physics: since there can be no infinite regress in motion, there must be a first unmoved cause. If there is to be an eternal movement, the mover must itself be actuality.[2] God's activity, however, is not to be identified with motion. If any man had a simple nature, the same activity would give him the greatest pleasure always. "Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only an energeia of motion, but also an activity of immobility (akinēsis) and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in motion."[3]

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[1] Frag. 16 Rose.

[2] Metaphysics xii,6,2-4,1071b12-20.

[3] Nicomachean Ethics vii,14,8,1154b25-27. Aspasius (In Ethica Nicomacheaquae supersunt commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, ed. Gustave Heylbut [Berlin: George Reimerus, 1889], p. 157) in commenting on this passage, notes that it is ho prōtos theos which has the eternal and simple greatest pleasure, an activity of motionlessness, the contemplation of the best. It is interesting to note that his title for the deity could be passed off as genuinely Aristotelian by the second century A.D.

This "activity of immobility" accords well with the explanation of how God moves the universe by being the object of desire, the final cause towards which all being tends.[1] The desirable and the knowable move without being moved; in this primary instance, God, they coincide.

There is evidence that later Aristotelians had difficulty with their master's notion of God. Theophrastus puzzled over the reason why the things that desire what is at rest do not imitate the immobility of the first mover,[2] though he repeated the Aristotelian position that the object of desire which is the source of circular motion does not move itself.[3] Eudemus of Rhodes had other questions: if the unmoved mover has no parts, how can it touch anything to move it, and if it is not affected by what is moved, what kind of relationship can cause movement?[4]

A number of accounts of Middle Platonism reveal how the Aristotelian notion was taken into Platonic theological doctrines. For Albinus, the first God is nous akinētos;[5] since God does not have parts, he must be unmoved and incapable of changing place. If he could move, this could come only from himself or from another. If from another, there would have to be something more powerful than God; if by himself, he would have to change either for the better or the worse. Both possibilities are absurd.[1] God acts without moving by being the object of desire.[2]

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[1] Metaphysics xii,7,4 & 5,1072b3-11.

[2] Theophrastus Metaphysics 5,16,7b23-8a2. Trans., commentary and intro. by W.D. Ross & F.H. Fobes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929).

[3] Theophrastus Metaphysics 1,5,4b22.

[4] Wehrli, Schule, viii, frag. 123a and 123b.

[5] Didaskalikos x,2.

The account of Numenius is of interest not only for its refusal to ascribe movement to the first principle[3] but also for its assignment of creation to the second divinity.[4] The First God does not create but is free from all labor.[5] It is impious to say that because the First God was good, it was necessary for him to create the universe; this could be said only of the Maker.[6] The First God is the "standing one" (hestōs); it is the Second God which is in motion.[7]

It is Philo, however, who is of the most importance for our purposes, since he was forced to cope with the problem of reconciling the Creator God of his Judaic tradition with Greek philosophy. Especially on the point of God's immovability some ingenuity was required, for the anthropomorphism of many Old Testament passages could not easily be dismissed.

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[1] Didaskalikos x,7. Compare with the fragment of Aristotle, above, p. 63.

[2] Ibid. x,2.

[3] Treatise on the Good 2,19, in Kenneth S. Guthrie, Numenius of Apamea: The Father of Neoplatonism (London: George Bell & Sons, 1917).

[4] Ibid. 5,25 Guthrie.

[5] Ibid. 5,27a Guthrie.

[6] Numenius in Eusebius Preparation for the Gospel xi,18, 1,5,8. Trans. E.H. Gifford (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903).

[7] Numenius Treatise on the Good 5,30 Guthrie.

Again and again, Philo announced that God is free from change of emotional states.[1] It would be the greatest impiety to suppose that the Unchangeable changes.[2]

Philo had a number of explanations for the old Testament's references to God moving. One thing in the universe rests, he wrote, and this is God, but Moses does not call "rest" what is mere inactivity (apraxia). The cause of all things must be by nature active. God's rest is rather a working with absolute ease, without toil and without suffering.[3] Philo's books on Questions on Genesis and Exodus are most revealing on this issue. How does one explain "the sound of God walking" (Genesis 3:8)? God only gave the impression without actually doing so, indeed without moving at all. It was only after man tasted of evil that he himself became changeable, and then he imagined God to be the same way. Before the Fall, men were immobile and imagined God to be likewise, just as he is in truth.[4] How do we explain the glory of God coming down on Mt. Sinai (Exodus 24:16a)? Scripture here shames those who think that there are movements of place or change in the Deity. What descended was not God's essence but his glory, which denotes the existence of powers and a belief in the divine glory so as to produce in the minds of those who are there an appearance of the coming of God, who really was not there.[1] When Scripture speaks of God as "standing" (Exodus 24:10), it does not refer to a change in God but to his powers, or his Logos, for the nature of the Father remains fixed and unchanged.[2]

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[1] De Abrahamo 36,202; Quod Deus immutabilis sit 12,59; De posteritate Caini 1,3 & 4: De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 29,95 & 96.

[2] Quod Deus immutabilis sit 5,22.

[3] De cherubim 26,87 & 86.

[4] Questions and Answers on Genesis i,42. This treatise and the one on Exodus were translated from Armenian versions of the Greek original, of which we have only fragments.

In discussing the creation of the world, Philo maintained that God is the cause by which (*hyph*' *hou*) it came into being, matter, that out of which it was produced, the goodness of God as final cause, and the Logos as the *organon* through which (*di*' *hou*) God worked.[3] It is interesting to notice that Philo mentioned the agent, the material, and the end, but in place of the formal cause, he substituted the instrumental cause, the Logos. Why does Philo think God needs the Logos as an instrument, we may ask? Is it because Philo, despite his Jewish background, felt uncomfortable at making the highest transcendent God who does not move, the Creator?

With great insistence Harry Wolfson has argued that Philo's references to the Logos as the instrument of creation or ~~as~~ that *di*' *hou* or *hō* God made the world is used *only* in the sense that the Logos as the intelligible world is the pattern for the creation of the visible world,[4] that the Logos is always the formal cause. [1] Wolfson is correct in asserting that God the Father never loses his place as the first cause or the chief efficient cause, [2] but when Philo wanted to express God as doing something, he always spoke of the powers of God, which he associated with the Platonic ideas. As the powers appeared at the burning bush, so they appeared to Abraham as the three angels (Genesis 18:2). [3] When God does not move but sends his powers, certainly these are seen as instruments rather than as patterns. As we have seen, Aristotle could be understood as suggesting that the organon be considered as a fifth factor in addition to the four causes. Later writers such as Simplicius actually called the organon a fifth cause, but ascribed the addition to Plato. Hellenistic writers added other categories to take care of the ideas "according to which" creation took place. The expression di' hou never refers to the formal cause as Wolfson insists.[4] This point need not be pressed in the case of Philo, but when we enter the area of early Christian Apology, the meaning of Logos as secondary agent stands out very clearly for the reason we have developed: the First God does not move.

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[1] *Questions on Exodus* ii,45; ii,47.

[2] *Ibid*. ii,37.

[3] *De cherubim* 35,127-128.

[4] Harry A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), I, pp. 269-270.

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[1] Harry A. Wolfson, Philo, I, pp. 264-266.

[2] See Questions on Genesis i,58, on Genesis 4:1: we must distinguish carefully between "by someone" and "through something," which means through an instrument; the Father and Creator of the universe is not an instrument but a cause.

[3] Questions on Genesis iv,2.

[4] Because Wolfson will not take into serious account the whole philosophical tradition prior to Philo which had reinterpreted the names and meanings of the causes, he must seek to find evidence in Aristotle's writings which is not there. Wolfson (I, pp. 261-264) says that Aristotle holds that the organon is a formal cause. The passages he cites do

The Apologists give us ample testimony that the Logos was held to be both instrument of creation and revealer of God the Father. Justin Martyr wrote that God created and arranged all things through Christ (di' autou).[1] The reason for such statements is given very clearly in the Dialogue with Trypho. Justin was trying to convince his opponent that it was not God the Father who appeared to the patriarchs in the Old Testament stories:

> For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither comes to any place, nor walks, nor sleeps, nor arises, but abides in his place, wherever that is, seeing acutely and hearing acutely not with eyes nor ears, but with power beyond all speech. And he surveys all things and knows all things, and no one of us escapes his notice. Nor is he moved, who cannot be contained in any place, even the whole world, who in truth was even before the world came into being.

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not bear out this interpretation. Metaphysics v,2,1013a35-1013b3, cited above, adds the organon as a fifth entity, as a means toward an end; there is no indication that it is a formal cause. In Physics viii,5,256a6, Wolfson sees the background of Philo's association of organon and di' hou with the formal cause (I,pp. 264-266); all Aristotle has said is that a thing may be moved directly by a mover (through itself, di'hauto), or indirectly. The passage does not refer to formal cause. Commenting on On Coming to Be and Passing Away ii,9,335b29-33, Wolfson notes that Aristotle "indirectly" applied the term instrument to form, as Philo did to Logos. Aristotle apparently did this so very "indirectly" that neither the term organon nor di' hou are mentioned in the passage. The Logos is the pattern of creation for Philo, but Wolfson insists on finding this interpretation even in passages which speak of the Logos in the language of organic cause.

[1] Apology II 6,8.

Therefore, concludes Justin, it was God's Son who appeared thus.[1]

In Athenagoras' *Plea Regarding the Christians*, it is said of the Son that it is by him (*pros autou*) and through him (*di' autou*) that all things were made.[2] The *Letter to Diognetus* tells us that the invisible God sent the demiurge of the universe himself to men, by whom (*hō*) he had created the heavens, confined the seas, and so forth.[3] God communicated his future plan for the salvation of men through his beloved child (*dia tou agapētou paidos*).[4] And Irenaeus related that everything was made *by* God *through* the Word (*omnia...fecisse Deum per Verbum suum*); God does not need other instruments (*organis*) of creation.[5] This reference to the Logos as the organic cause or instrument, and as revealer, demonstrates how strongly early Christian theology was affected by the concept of God as unmoved.

Clement preserved the emphasis on God's unchangeability as part of his polemic against the crude anthropomorphism both of pagan Greek religion and of his simple Christian believers. He railed against the attribution of any human emotion to God.[6] God is without passion or desire; He needs nothing.[1] He continues immutably (*aparabatōs*) in his goodness.[2] Clement, like Philo, had some difficulty in explaining the emotion attributed to God in the Bible. We rejoiced on account of our salvation and the Lord appropriated the joy to himself. Likewise, he is nourished by the one whom he wishes nourished, and rejoices, without suffering change, for the repentant one now in joy.[3] Another method of explaining God's emotion is that he condescends to feelings such as anger on man's account,[4] presumably because this sort of response man could understand in his own terms.

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[1] *Dialogue with Trypho* 127,2. Translation, introduction & notes by A.L. Williams (New York: Macmillan, 1930).

[2] *Plea Regarding the Christians* 10,2.

[3] *Letter to Diognetus* i,7,2.

[4] *Ibid*. i,8,11.

[5] *Against Heresies* ii,2,5.

[6] *Str*. vii,6,30,1; *Paed*. i,2,4,2.

Clement also claimed that God is physically immovable. He cannot be contained.[5] God once created, Clement grants, but now he rests (*epanapauetai*), delighting in his creation.[6] Like Philo, Clement explained that God's resting was not a cessation from doing.[7]

In his battle against anthropomorphism, Clement called on Aristotle to support the theory of Euhemerism he was developing. Clement referred in deprecation to the fact that the Greek god Apollo was credited with numerous manifestations. One Apollo was said to be the son of Hephaestus and Athene, another was born in Crete, and so on. Aristotle listed five such stories of the god, wrote Clement, who concludes that "they are numberless, mortal men, all helpers of their fellow men."[1]

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[1] *Str*. vii,3,15,1.

[2] *Str*. vi,12,104,3.

[3] *Str*. ii,16,72,4-73,2.

[4] *Paed*. i,8,74,4.

[5] *Str*. ii,2,6,2.

[6] *Str*. ii,2,6,2-3.

[7] *Str*. vi,16,14,1.

The chief way in which Clement preserved the "unmoved" quality of the highest God, however, was by attributing creative and revelatory activity to the Logos.

At times, Clement was very vague in his usage of the word "cause" for Father or Logos. Sometimes he spoke simply of "God" as the first cause[2] or as the efficient cause(*aitia poiētikē*);[3] he chastized Anaxagoras for not preserving the dignity of the "efficient cause."[4] In a few instances, Clement used phrases such as "first efficient cause of motion" (*aitios*...*prōtourgos kinēseōs*) to describe the *Son*,[5] or has the Word say that he is the *demiourgos* of the world and man.[6] We are told by Clement to contemplate the *poiētikē aitia* from that which is divine in us,[7] and it is always to the Logos to which Clement refers when he used the terminology of image and archetype in discussing man and his creator.

In most cases, however, Clement tried to keep God the Father as the ultimate cause or creator and called the Logos his instrument or *organon* in creation and revelation. The Word is here a cause not just as a pattern, that "according to which" creation takes place, but also was a sort of subsidiary efficient cause. Thus Clement's most frequent reference to the Word's causality is that *di' hou* and the use of the dative of means or instrument (*e.g.*-*logō*), since God the Father is usually called the Creator. The Son is second, through whom (*di' hou*) all things came into being according to the will of the Father.[1] Clement cites with approval the phrase in John 1:13 that the Logos is he by whom (*di' autou*) all things came into being according to the will of the Father and in this passage goes so far as to call the Instructor (the Logos) *dēmiourgos*,[2] a term usually reserved for the Father. We call God Maker and Father by the Word (*logō*).[3] The Lord made all things by the Word (*logō*).[4] The Word is that by whom (*hō*) all things were created.[5]

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[1] *Pro*. 2,28,3. This fragment of Aristotle can be found as frag. 283 in *Fragmenta historicorum graecorum* II, p. 190.

[2] *Str*. v,21,71,5; ii,4,14,1; vi,17,161,6.

[3] *Str*. i,19,94,4.

[4] *Str*. ii,4,14,1.

[5] *Str*. vii,2,8,5.

[6] *Paed*. iii,12,100,1-2.

[7] *Str*. i,19,94,4.

The Word as divine agent is also seen in the role of revealer and manifestor of the Father. Clement especially used the concept of the Logos to explain the Old Testament theophanies, as did all the Greek Christian Apologists. The "face of God" which Jacob saw (Genesis 32:30) was the Logos by whom (*hō*) God is manifested and made known.[6] It was the Logos who descended in Moses' vision of the burning bush (Exodus 3:2).[7]

The idea that the Logos is the means of creation and revelation is the correlate of the notion that God is unmoved.

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[1] *Str*. v,14,103,1.

[2] *Paed*. i,11,97,3.

[3] *Str*. v,14,89,3.

[4] *Str*. i,9,45,5; vi,16,136,3.

[5] *Pro*. 1,7,3.

[6] *Paed*. i,7,57,2.

[7] *Paed*. ii,8,75,1.

The extremely unbiblical concept of the immutability of God had its roots in the immovability of the Platonic ideas, but it was applied to God by Aristotle and from the Aristotelian source found its way into the theology of Middle Platonism.

The second concept we must consider, that of the ideas as the thoughts of God, is one of the most eclectic formulations in all speculation about the divine. Plato had not been clear on the relation between the ideas and God. Sometimes his language suggested that God produced the ideas;[1] at other times, he said the ideas were not produced.[2] Sometimes God is subordinated to the ideas, looking to them,[3] and in the *Republic*, the Idea of the Good stands at the pinnacle of Plato's hierarchy.[4] Aristotle has many criticisms to make of the Platonic ideas,[5] but he never ascribes to Plato the notion that the ideas are created by God.[6]

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[1] *Republic* x,597B: god is the maker of the ideal bed.

[2] *Timaeus* 52A; 38C. *Philebus* 15B.

[3] *Phaedrus* 247D; 249C. *Phaedo* 97B & C.

[4] *Republic* vi,508A-509B.

[5] See Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944). The "third man" argument is based on the refusal to accept infinite regress (*Metaphysics* vii,13,7,1039a2-3; i,9,3,990b17; i,9,8,991a1-3; also cited by other Aristotelians, *e.g.*, Phainias of Eresos (in Wehrli, *Schule*, ix,frag. 9). Aristotle rejected the ideas as substances (*Metaphysics* vii,13,2,1038b8-13; 10, 1039a14). The ideas had no motive power and could not account for eternal change (*Metaphysics* xii,10,9,1075b16-17; xii,6,1, 1071b6-6,4,1071b20). Aristotle's position as viewed by later antiquity was summed up by Aetius: with his concept of form (*eidos*), Aristotle abandoned the ideas and said that form was not separate from matter (*Placita* i,10,4).

[6] Cherniss *Criticism*, I,p. 609.

It was first in Aristotle that we find the concept of God as mind thinking itself. He did not want to conceive of his God on the analogy of Endymion, perpetually asleep,[1] yet all motion and creative action is unfitting to God. Only contemplation is left to him.[2] God could not be dependent on the knowledge of some external thing, however, or he would be in potency in regard to that knowledge. Thus God must know himself.[3] The classical texts in the Metaphysics tell us that thought thinks itself through participation in the object of thought. "Mind thinks itself, if that is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of thinking" (...estin hē noēsis noēreōs noēsis).[4] Aristotle held that God thinks himself rather than the ideas, yet the way is prepared for further development because God is pictured as a mind which thinks.

Audrey Rich has suggested another way in which Aristotle's writings may have made a contribution to the notion of the ideas as the thoughts of God. In Aristotle we find the notion that any builder has the paradigm or form present in his soul before the house exists.[5] It is because the maker has the form of the intended product that he can produce his creation, whether it is a human father[1] or a builder.[2] The use of the image of the craftsman to represent God becomes important for later accounts.

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[1] Nicomachean Ethics x,8,7,1178b19.

[2] Ibid. x,8,7,1178b21-22.

[3] Metaphysics xii,9,1,1074b19-20.

[4] Metaphysics xii,7,8,1072b20-31; xii,9,4,1074b34-35.

[5] Audrey Rich, "The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God," Mnemosyne, series iv, vol. 7 (1954), pp. 131-132. The texts she cites are Physics 194b26 and Metaphysics 1013a27.

The third step in the commentary on the ideas was taken by the Stoics: the ideas are reduced to thoughts of a human mind.[3] This interpretation had been explicitly rejected by Plato in the Parmenides.[4] The ennoēmata are neither some things nor qualities, but are as some things and as some qualities, and are located in the soul. These were called Ideas by the ancients, for they say that ideas correspond to notions of things, such as horse or man. These ideas are really non-existent (anhuparktous). In Aetius' account, the Stoics say that the ideas are our own conceptions (ennoēmata hēmetera). And Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoics say that the ennoēma is a presentation or appearance to the intellect (phantasma dianoias).

We can see that it was from the Stoic school that the notion of the ideas as thoughts or conceptions sprang, although in later Platonic writers the ideas retain their function as archetypes of the sense world; they have reality and are not posited merely as part of the structure of the human intellect.

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[1] Rich cites Metaphysics 1033b32 and 1032a24.

[2] Rich cites Metaphysics 991a9-991b9.

[3] The following citations from the Stoics can be found collected as fragment 65 of Zeno, SVF I.

[4] Parmenides 132 B & C. See Ross, Ideas, p. 88: Plato never said the ideas to be thoughts of either a divine or a human mind.

The transformation of ideas as human thoughts to ideas as divine thoughts is a difficult problem and has been much discussed. Audrey Rich's lucid monograph on this subject presents the thesis that "the transformation of the Platonic Ideas into the thoughts of God appears to rest ultimately upon the assumption of an analogy between the human mind and the divine." The theory developed "from a transference to the divine sphere of various psychological conceptions applied originally to the mind of man."[1] She cites a number of authors (Albinus, Atticus, Origen) to show that these writers held that, as ideas on the human level are universal concepts, so in the divine sphere, they are thoughts of God.[2] Of special interest for the comparison between the divine mind and the human craftsman is Cicero's account describing how Phidias gazed on a perfect idea of beauty in his own mind rather than using a human model; such patterns are called ideas by Plato.[3]

The suggestion that Antiochus may have been the originator of the idea is suggested by the fact that Varro, who had connections with Antiochus and is used by Cicero as a mouthpiece for Antiochus, gives us our earliest piece of evidence for the theory. Augustine[4] cites Varro on the allegory of the birth of Minerva. Varro spoke of the exempla rerum, which Plato calls ideas. In interpreting the myth, he writes, we call Jove heaven, Juno earth, and Minerva the ideas. Heaven is that a quo (hyph' hou) something is made, earth is de qua (ex hou), and the exemplum is that secundum quod (kath' ho). When we recall that Minerva sprang from the head of the god and Minerva is represented as the ideas, we can see that the ideas must have been considered to be in the divine mind.

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[1] Rich, "Ideas," p. 127. [2] Ibid., pp.129-130.

[3] Cicero, Orator ii,9 & 10. Discussed in Rich, "Ideas," p. 131.

[4] Augustine, De civitate Dei, vii,28. This example is discussed by Theiler, Vorbereitung, p. 19.

Earlier attributions of the theory to Posidonius or to Neo-Pythagoreans should probably be rejected, as well as the view that Albinus was the first to present a full statement of the ideas as the thoughts of God.[1] Albinus' account is of interest to us, however, because it is somewhat fuller and more explicit than the fragment from Varro.

Albinus wrote, if God be mind or a thinking being, he has thoughts (noēmata) and these are eternal and immutable, the ideas.[2] The first mind thinks himself and his thought, and it is in this activity of mind that the ideas consist.[3]

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[1] Roger M. Jones("The Ideas as the Thoughts of God," Classical Philology xxi [1926], pp. 317-322) rejects the two former attributions but holds that Albinus is the first to present the idea in its full form. Witt (Albinus, p. 75) and deVogel (Greek Philosophy, vol. III: The Hellenistic-Roman Period [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1959], frag. 1326b note, p. 401) have called our attention to the probability of a doxographical account in the first century B.C. which portrayed Plato's ideas as the thoughts of a divine mind. DeVogel notes that we have a very old trace of this doctrine in the fourth century B.C. account of Alkimus (in Diogenes Laertius Lives iii,13): each of the ideas is a notion (noēma), eternal and unchanging.

[2] Albinus Didaskalikos ix,3.

[3] Ibid. x,3.

The idea, considered with reference to God, is his thought (noēsis); with reference to us, the first intelligible; with reference to matter, the measure; with reference to the sensible world, the pattern (paradeigma); with reference to itself, essence (ousia).[1] Albinus goes on to explain what the ideas are not: they are not of fabricated objects, nor of things contrary to nature, nor of vulgar objects, nor of relative notions, but they are the eternal and perfect operations of the divine thought (noēseis theou).[2]

The account of the ideas as the thoughts of God can be found in Latin literature of Albinus' period also. Seneca says that Plato had added a fifth cause to Aristotle's four, the idea, what the artist looked at when he created. It does not matter whether he had the pattern outside him so that he might look at it, or within himself, conceived and placed there by himself. God has within himself these patterns (exemplaria) of all things, and his mind contains the harmonies and measures of all things to be carried out; he is filled with these shapes which Plato called the ideas, imperishable and unchangeable.[3]

The interesting development in Philo's writings is that the ideas of God, the patterns of creation, are identified with the Logos.[4] The intelligible world was "thought out"

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[1] Didaskalikos ix,1. [2] Ibid. ix,2.

[3] Seneca Epistle 65,7, pointed out by Theiler (Vorbereitung, pp. 15-16) for comparison with Albinus' account.

[4] Rich ("Ideas," p. 125) notes the Stoic influence on Philo's thought at this point: all the individual logoi are contained within the supreme Logos. Wolfson not only overlooks

(enenoēse) by God when he decided to create the world, and this intelligible world exists in the mind of God.[1] The realm of the ideas is identified with God. Commenting on Exodus 20:21; Philo says that Moses entered into the darkness where God was, which means into the conception (ennoias) concerning being that belongs to the unapproachable region where there are no material forms.[2] These ideas were the measures of all things in both the intelligible and the sense-perceptible worlds.[3] The world is completed through the ideas, the archetypal form (archetupon eidos).[4] The ideas are said to be contained in the Logos[5] or are identified with the Logos.[6] Philo tells us that Moses wrote this in "his" account of creation in Genesis I.[7] The Logos as

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Stoic influence; he attempts to derive Philo's position from a consideration of Plato's and Aristotle's writings alone. Plato, says Wolfson, spoke of the ideas as being in the "supercelestial place." Since Philo conceived this place to be the void, and he had, under Aristotelian influence, denied a void outside the world, he located the ideas in the divine logos. Harry A. Wolfson, Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 34-36.

[1] De opificio mundi 4,16-5,20. Wolfson cannot reconcile that for Philo the ideas are products created by God and that they are eternal, so he must posit a "two-stage" Logos theory: the ideas exist eternally within God and as real beings outside his mind even before creation. (Philo, I,pp. 208-209). It would be better to admit that Philo is inconsistent, and that any theory which has to deal with the Biblical concept of creation will have difficulty in allowing the eternity of the Platonic ideas. See Paul Kristeller's review of Wolfson's book, Journal of Philosophy, xlvi (1949), p. 360.

[2] De posteritate Caini 5,14.

[3] Questions on Genesis 4,138.

[4] Ibid. 3,42.

[5] De opificio mundi 6,23.

[6] Ibid. 6,24.

[7] Ibid. 6,25.

the sum of the thoughts of God, the idea of ideas, imparts reality to all lower ideas, and they in turn to sensible things.[1] Intelligible man is a copy of the Logos, the archetypal idea.[2] There is thus ample evidence that Philo interpreted the ideas to be the Logos as the pattern, the cause _pros ti_ or _secundum quod_, as our various writers would express it.

Pagan Platonists of this era also show us that the notion of the ideas as the thoughts of God was considered to be a Platonic tenet. Aetius has Plato say that the ideas are incorporeal essences in the thoughts and representations of God.[3] Aetius tells us that Plato held that God made the world using _himself_ as the pattern.[4] Atticus, a very anti-Aristotelian Platonist of the second century A.D., also taught that for Plato, God was the Creator of the ideas. As a human artist forms concepts of what he is about to make, so God's concepts are the patterns from which things are made.[5] Numenius said that the Second Divinity produced the ideas in which all intelligible and sensible things participated.[6] Lastly, there was a Pythagorean interpretation, in which it is said that all things in the world are

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[1] _De opificio mundi_ 6,1,5. [2] _Questions on Genesis_ 1,4.

[3] Aetius, _Placita_ 1,3,21; 1,10,3. [4] _Ibid_. 1,7,4.

[5] Atticus, in Eusebius, _Preparation for the Gospel_ xv,13,5,815d.

[6] Numenius, _Treatise on the Good_ 5,3 Guthrie. This would appear to be the pagan equivalent of the early Christian doctrine that the second divinity is the Logos, identified with the ideas.

"according to number" under the mind that creates the whole;[1] here number takes the place of the paradigmatic ideas.

Clement has five references which relate to the ideas as the thoughts of God and which identify these with the Logos. It is thus logically necessary for Clement to postulate that God is mind. He describes both God[2] and the Son[3] as "complete mind" (holos nous). The Word is called the Son of Mind.[4] As God is nous, he is the first principle of reasoning and judgment.[5]

Clement viewed the ideas, identified with the Logos, as the patterns according to which creation took place; this concept became the background of Christianity's definition of man as the image of God. We assume that Clement derived his information about the ideas as the thoughts of God from Philo, for two of the five references mention Moses and Abraham in a context of Biblical exegesis; Clement certainly could not have gotten this application from the pagan world. Like Aetius, Clement claimed Plato as the author of this doctrine. He wrote, the Word of God said, "I am the truth" (John 14:6) and Plato said in the Phaedrus that truth is an idea. "Now an idea (idea) is a conception (ennoēma) and this the barbarians have termed the Word of God." This Word issuing forth was the cause of creation.[6]

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[1] Nicomachus of Gerasa, frag. 1288b, in De Vogel, Greek Philosophy III.

[2] Str. vii,2,5,5.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Pro. 10,98,4.

[5] Str. iv,25,162,5.

[6] Str. v,3,16,3. Note the Stoic definition: an idea is a conception.

Clement also has Plato say, "that man who devotes himself to the contemplation of ideas (ideōn) lives as a god among men; now the mind (nous) is the place of ideas and God is mind."[1] Perhaps the first part of the statement is supposed to refer to Sophist 216C, in which it is written that philosophers are divine; the second part is an addition by Clement, so arranged as to receive Platonic sanction. Clement continues,[2] when the soul rises above the sphere of generation, it dwells amidst the ideas and will be with Christ, rapt in contemplation.

Other references do not directly say that the ideas are in the mind of God, but they say that the place (chōra) of God is the same as that of the idea, but as we just observed, the place of the ideas is God and God is mind. Commenting on Genesis 22:3 and 4, Clement wrote that the phrase, "Abraham saw the place afar off," referred to the region of God, which is the same as the region of the ideas. He saw the place "afar off" because he was in the realms of generation; we must rise above this world to the world of thought. "Now we see through a glass darkly, but then we shall see face to face." (I Corinthians 13:12)[3] The latter quotation, one of Clement's favorite Biblical passages, is always used by him to mean contemplation of God or Christ. The phrase "face of God" always carries a personal reference. In fact,

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[1] Str. iv,25,155,2. [2] Str. iv,25,155,4.

[3] Str. v,11,73,1-3. Kosmos noētos is a favorite Philonic expression of Clement, used also in Str. iv,25,159,2; Str. v,6,35,5, and Str. v,6,36,3.

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he tells us that the face of God is the Word by whom God is made known,[1] or the Son who reveals the Father's character to the five senses.[2] Clement obviously does not mean that we will contemplate the ideas in the Platonic sense, but the Christian Lord. In this passage, Clement attributed Plato's knowledge of the region of ideas to Moses, from whom he learned that it was a place which contained all things universally.

In another section, Clement wrote of Moses pressing into the darkness where God's voice was, that is, into the inaccessible and invisible concept (ennoias) concerning being.[3] This account appears to be taken directly from Philo's works, in which the same topic is discussed and the same phrases used.[4]

In a fifth passage, Clement wrote that the true Gnostic distinguishes things of intellect from those of sense, hastening to the entrance to intelligible things where he will contemplate face to face. "For there is nothing like hearing the Word himself."[5]

Clement also has a section in which he places the paradigms in heaven, the Christian concept of heaven. Clement spoke of heaven as a city, and mentioned that Plato's city was placed as a paradigm in heaven.[6] He is probably referring to Republic ix,592B, where Plato says that his commonwealth does not exist on earth but perhaps is a pattern set up in the heavens. Clement identifies Plato's "heavens" with the Christian "heaven," which is of course the "place" where God is said to be.

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[1] Paed. i,7,57,2.

[2] Str.v,6,34,1.

[3] Str. ii,2,6,1.

[4] Philo, De posteritate Caini 5,14. See above, p. 79.

[5] Str. v,6,39,4-40,1.

[6] Str. iv,26,172,3.

When the concept of the ideas as the thoughts of God had been wedded to that of the Logos, Clement could use this new combination to explain the verse Genesis 1:26 that man was created in the image and likeness of God. When the Hebrew Old Testament was translated into Greek, the words chosen to express this passage were kat' eikona hēmeteran kai kath' homoiōsin. The use of the term eikona to express b'tzalmēnu allowed the transfer of the meaning of the Platonic archetype scheme into the Biblical picture of creation, and for Christians, the Logos was the idea according to which man was created.

Clement's writings are filled with the image-archetype terminology. After giving Plato's formulation, Clement added that "barbarian" (Jewish and Christian) philosophy also knew the world of thought and the world of sense, the former archetypal (archetupon) and the latter the image (eikona) of the model (paradeigmatos). The description of creation in Genesis means that God created both invisible and sensible heavens and earths. Plato left the ideas of living creatures in the intellectual world and made sensible species from them according to their genera.[1] Giving this explanation a

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[1] Str. v,14,93,4-94,5.

Christian interpretation, Clement commented that God the Savior, who imaged forth (apeikonistai) from the invisible God first, fashioned (tetupōken) all things which came into being after him.[1]

As all creation was fashioned by the Word, the mind of man is the direct image of the Logos. Disapproving of Democritus' belief that the same images (eidōla) issue from the divine essence on men and irrational animals alike, Clement held that man was far from destitute of a divine ennoia.[2] The image of God is the Word and the image of the image is the human mind.[3] As an archetype, the Word must be considered as an idea. Logos and man as archetype and image is one of Clement's favorite descriptions.[4] One of his clearest statements is found in Stromateis vi. The Word of God is intellectual and the mind of man is kath'ho the Word of God.[5] Kath' ho was the phrase used by Aetius and later by Simplicius to describe the Aristotelian formal cause.[6] In Clement's wording, the meaning of formal cause is joined to the Platonic terminology of imaging. The Logos as equivalent to the Platonic idea is portrayed as the formal cause of its image in man.

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[1] Str. v,6,38,7.

[2] Str. v,13,87,3 & 4. Note the use of a Stoic concept to express the Platonic notion of idea.

[3] Str. v,14,93,4-94,5.

[4] Pro. 10,98,4 based on II Corinthians 4:4 and Genesis 1:26.

[5] Str. vi,9,72,2.

[6] See above, pp. 52 and 54.

What binds man to God, then, is mind. The good man is *theoeidēs* and *theoeikelos*. On the other hand, God is like man, for the distinctive *eidos* of each is mind.[1] The fulfillment of man's essence comes through the exertion of his intellect.[2] In explaining why God and man have mind in common, Clement "cites" the testimony of Aristotle, who according to Clement, wrote that mind comes to man through divine fate.[3] Clement's insistence that our relationship with God must be through mental and not through physical things led him to interpret a text of Theophrastus, "it is not expensive sacrifices that we should offer to God, but such sacrifices as are dear to him," to mean the "incense" of prayer and faith.[4]

Clement's championing of the God who is unmoved both physically and emotionally is part of his battle against anthropomorphism, the tendency he found so abhorrent in Greek religion and which he feared among his recently converted Christian congregations. The fear of anthropomorphism and the desire to express God in the most transcendent terms possible are the motives behind Clement's description of the

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[1] *Str*. vi,9,72,2. Clement's statement is in accord with his testimony in *Str*. vi,16,136,3 that man's likeness to God is not in terms of body; nor in terms of virtue, in *Str*. vi, 14,114,5.

[2] *Str*. iv,22,136,4. Compare with *Metaphysics* xii,7, 1072b27: *hē nou energeia zōē*.

[3] Is Clement thinking of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (frag. 1 Ross) where mind is spoken of as what is alone divine in man?

[4] *Str*. vii,6,34,2. Theophrastus' passage is found in Porphyry, *De abstinentia* ii,19.

Son as the organon of creation. Clement probably derived his doctrine from Philo.

The notion of the ideas as thoughts of God is an eclectic concept combining elements of several philosophical traditions. God as the mind which thinks itself and the metaphor of the artisan containing the patterns in his own soul are the Aristotelian contributions. The ideas, identified with the Logos, are the patterns, the cause "according to which" creation took place. The Logos as the ideas became the basis of the Christian understanding of man's creation in the image of God. Theōria is no longer of the ideas, but of the Word.

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CHAPTER FIVE

ANTHROPOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY

The search for the ancient sources of Clement's psychology is of interest more in helping us to see what he rejected than what he accepted. Although Clement derived little of importance from Aristotle's psychology, he did not accept much more from either Platonism or Stoicism. His rejection of the Platonic concepts of the pre-existence of souls and their natural immortality is an important prelude to our discussion of epistemology, as the exclusion of these concepts under the province of psychology rules out a theory of recollection in epistemology and would lead us to suspect a more naturalistic approach to knowledge.

We have already noted in the chapter on physics that Clement repeated the Stoic and Aristotelian distinctions concerning the degrees of nature. It was the rational faculty possessed by man which made him distinct from lower animals.[1] Clement had other, less scientific expressions for the difference between men and animals which would appear to be based on Aristotelian distinctions. Aristotle's distinction between _poiein_ and _prattein_, the former referring to irrational creatures and the latter only to man,[1] was known to Clement. Of special interest is the testimony in Nicomachean Ethics vi, in which poiēsis is distinguished from praxis. Aristotle noted that this distinction was explained in the "exoteric discourses," that is, in the dialogues.[2] Thus we have Aristotle's own statement that this distinction was present in both his earlier and his later works. Clement spoke of this doctrine as a teaching of Aristotle. He concluded that if poiein were applicable only to irrational creatures and inanimate things, the word should not be used to describe God's creation of the world.[3]

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[1] Frag. 38 Stählin; _Str_. ii,20,110,4.

A second distinguishing characteristic of man is his ability to laugh. Aristotle had described man as a laughing animal and noted that humans are the only creatures which laugh.[4] Clement wrote that man is a rational laughing animal,[5] that the faculty of laughing completed the whole nature of man.[6] He advised his readers not to laugh all the time just because man was a laughing animal.[7] These distinctions were not of importance for Clement's theology, but merely point to the fact that he had access to books which contained such Aristotelian distinctions.[8]

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[1] Eudemian Ethics ii,6,1222b20; ii,8,1224a28.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics vi,4,2,1140a1.

[3] Str. v,13,86,2.

[4] On the Parts of Animals iii,10,673a8.

[5] Str. viii,6,21,5.

[6] Str. viii,6,21,1.

[7] Paed. ii,5,46,2.

[8] The definition of man as a laughing animal was common in such compilations as Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism ii,211.

Clement accepted the commonplace division of man into soul and body, calling one part rational and the other irrational.[1] Without a doubt Clement assigned a higher value to the soul, but he had to take care in his wording of the evaluation. In a chapter written against those who deplored creation and vilified the body, in which Basilides the Gnostic was specifically named, Clement insisted that the soul was not good by nature nor was the body bad. The constitution of man, he wrote, is composed of things which are diverse, not opposite: soul and body. On the one hand, Clement argued from the goodness of nature; on the other, he reminds us that what is not good, is not immediately bad.[2] In other places, when he was not combatting Gnostic opinion, Clement showed a preference for Platonic doctrine and terminology. He wrote that a philosopher through life-long study prepared for the final dissolution of the chains which bind body and soul together.[3] Death is spoken of as the separation of the soul from the body.[4]

Clement's writings do not reveal any knowledge whatsoever of Aristotle's teaching in the *De anima*, either of the classic definition of the soul as the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life[5] or the statements concerning the soul's necessary connection with the body.[1] Nor does Clement ever cite the teaching that the mind can exist after the body's death,[2] supposedly because it comes into the human soul from the outside.[3]

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[1] *Str*. iv,3,9,4. ("...*ek logikou kai alogou sunkeimenos, psychēs kai sōmatos*...")

[2] *Str*. iv,26,164,3 & 5.

[3] *Str*. iv,3,12,5. Compare *Phaedo* 67D,80E.

[4] *Str*. vii,12,71,3. Compare *Phaedo* 67D.

[5] *De anima* ii,1,412a28.

On the other hand, Clement did not accept the ideas of "Aristotle the Platonist" on the soul, for he was not able to accept the theory of recollection as put forward by Plato or by Aristotle in the Eudemus. In this dialogue, life without the body was described as health and life in the body as unnatural, like a disease.[4] We also have the testimony of Elias that Aristotle in the dialogues, supposedly in the Eudemus, said that the soul was immortal, on the grounds that we all make libations and swear by the dead, and that no one would do either if there were not a part which existed after the body died.[5]

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[1] De anima ii,2,414a20-22.

[2] Ibid. ii,2,413b24-27.

[3] On the Generation of Animals ii,3,736b28. Such Aristotelian definitions would have been available to Clement in such handbooks as Aetius' Placita; iv,2,6, definition of the soul; iv,6,2, the soul as unmoved; v,1,4; the soul not deathless. The Platonic theories of immortality and recollection were criticized by Peripatetics after Aristotle, notably Strato (Wehrli, Schule v, frag. 122-127); in frag. 108 Strato holds that the soul is diffused throughout the body. Dicaearchus also criticized the immortality of the soul (Wehrli, Schule i, frag. 9), probably because he held the soul to be a harmony of the four elements (frag. 11 and 12).

[4] Frag. 41 Rose; Walzer frag. 5 of Eudemus. Düring's statement that such remarks from the dialogues may not represent Aristotle's own opinions should be considered seriously. See above, p. 7.

[5] Frag. 39 Rose; Walzer frag. 3 of the Eudemus.

The pre-existence and transmigration of souls were sharply rejected by Clement, although he attacked these doctrines as they were found in the teaching of Basilides rather than in that of Plato himself. Basilides apparently had taught that the soul endured punishment in this life for the sins of another life; the elect soul was punished more honorably with martyrdom, while other souls received less glorious chastisements. Clement's criticism of Basilides' doctrine was an ethical one: such a theory made right action useless. Giving ourselves up as martyrs to be persecuted must depend on us, be "up to us" (eph' hēmin).[1] Clement's rejection of the pre-existence and transmigration of souls was thus directly related to his ethical theory that the praiseworthy must be by volition.

Our ability to understand Clement's position on the post-existence or immortality of souls has been aided by Stählin's decision that two fragments from Clement's supposed "Book on the Soul," preserved in the writings of Maximus Confessor and others, were spurious.[2] Stählin thinks that the "Book on the Soul" was only an intended work and never was actually written.[3] Both of the fragments had been included in earlier editions of Clement's works, including the volume in the Ante-Nicene Fathers series.[4]

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[1] Str. iv,12,83,2.

[2] Stählin, vol. iii,p. lxxi.

[3] Ibid., p. lxv.

[4] The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Vol. II: Fathers of the Second Century (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1951) (American reprint of the Edinburgh edition), p. 580.

These fragments taught that all souls were naturally immortal, even those of the wicked, and that when the soul was separated from the body in death, it rose immortal to God.

In authentic fragments taken from the Biblical commentary, the Hypotyposes, we find that Clement rejected the natural immortality of souls. His commentary on I Peter[1] is particularly interesting. I Peter 1:5 & 9 reads, "you are kept by the power of God...to receive the salvation of your souls." Clement commented that the soul was not naturally immortal but was made so by the grace of God. On I Peter 1:23 ("being born again, not of perishable seed, but of imperishable"), Clement wrote that the soul, which was produced along with the body, was also corruptible, as some think (quidam putant). The last phrase suggests that Clement was not familiar with the De anima,[2] for he was always eager to quote philosophical opinions to support his views, and here he let slip by an excellent opportunity to name a definite philosopher rather than just add the vague "as some think."

Apart from his rejection of the pre-existence and natural immortality of the soul, Clement's description of the soul had more in common with Platonism than with any other school, but even on this point he is not consistent. In several places, Clement spoke of the tripartite soul.[1] The divisions are sometimes listed as noeron, thumikon, and epithumētikon.[2] The threefold partition of thumos, epithumia, and logismos is correlated with Paul's distinction of sarx, psychē and pneuma.[3] The tripartite division of the soul is of course best known in its Platonic form,[4] and Clement uses distinctively Platonic terminology.

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[1] Frag. 24 Stählin.

[2] Aristotle in the De anima does not outrightly assert that the soul is corruptible. There are hints, though, that he thought nous the only part to continue beyond death. See De anima ii,2,413b25-28, where nous is said to be the only genos of soul which admits of being separated, as the immortal from the perishable (phthartou).

Aristotle's characteristic division of the rational faculties again into two parts is not found in Clement.[5] In a very complicated passage,[6] Clement referred to the pneuma sarkikon and the sōmatikon pneuma as distinct from the logistikon and the hēgemonikon, but the latter two seem to be one element, as they are indicated by one definite article and are spoken of in the singular, as *a* cause. This section is a choice example of Clement's use of different philosophical terminology in the same passage. "Spirit of the flesh" and "spirit of the body" come from Paul, while hēgemonikon is a distinctively Stoic term. Prohairetikon is associated with Aristotle although the word had become common philosophical property in the later Hellenistic age. The Platonic element of epithumia is mentioned, along with "the irrational part" which could be either of a Platonic or early Aristotelian origin, but would not come from classical Stoicism.

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[1] *Str*. v,12,80,9.

[2] *Paed*. iii,1,1,1.

[3] *Str*. iii,10,68,5.

[4] *Republic* iv,441A.

[5] *Nicomachean Ethics* vi,1,5 & 6, 1139a5-15 where the epistēmonikon is distinguished from the logistikon; or *Politics* vii,13,23,1334b18-24, logismos and nous.

[6] *Str*. vi,16,135,2-136,1.

Of Platonic origin is Clement's reference to the soul as moving itself,[1] although the "Platonic Aristotle" had apparently taught this too, if we accept Olympiodorus' testimony: if the soul is deathless, it is not carried by motion outside itself, and indeed it is deathless: Plato and Aristitle teach this.[2] The soul is ceaselessly active, not needing sleep, wrote Clement;[3] for the soul to cease from activity would be its destruction.[4] The Aristotelian concept of the soul as the unmoved source of motion[5] is totally absent from Clement's works.

A last point to be noted is Clement's listing of the ten faculties of the soul.[6] These turn out to be the Stoic eight[7] plus the two Biblical categories of the spiritual principle communicated at man's creation, and the Holy Spirit.

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[1] Str. vi,12,96,2.

[2] Olympiodorus Commentary on Plato's Gorgias vi,1,p.41, 10ff. (Norvin), cited in Ettore Bignone, "Importanti Conferme all' 'Aristotele Perduto;" Studi sul pensiero antico (Naples: Luigi Loffredo, 1938), p. 321.

[3] Paed. ii,9,82,1. Compare Phaedrus 245C.

[4] Paed. ii,9,82,3. Compare Laws xii,956A.

[5] De anima i,2,406a1-5. Later Peripatetics, especially Strato (Wehrli, Schule v, frag. 74) departed from Aristotle's teaching. He said both rational and irrational souls move since movement is the energeia of the soul. That which thinks is eternally moved, just as that which sees, smells or hears.

[6] Str. ii,11,50,3.

[7] SVF I, frag. 143.

Clement needed to show that the number ten was holy so that he could expound the wonders of the Decalogue; the eightfold Stoic division had no consequences for his theology.

We can conclude that Clement either did not know or completely rejected the psychology of the *De anima*. That he also rejected the pre-existence and natural immortality of souls meant that he excluded the possibility of a Platonic epistemology.[1]

For Aristotle, the starting point of knowledge was in sensation. Through wondering at the universe, man began to philosophize, he wrote.[2] Induction he thought proceeded from particulars (*ek tōn kata meros*) to universals (*katholou*).[3] Particulars were prior in perception, although universals were prior in formula[4] or definition. Sensation (*aisthēsis*) was of particulars, whereas *epistēmē* was of universals.[5] Knowledge was always of the form for Aristotle and could thus proceed from sensation since *aisthēsis* was the reception of the *eidos* of sensible objects without the matter.[6] Sensation was true, he thought, whereas *phantasia* was often false.[7]

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[1] According to Ross (*Ideas*, p. 2), the knowledge of ideas is connected with a theory of recollection from the *Phaedo* (76D-77A) on.

[2] *Metaphysics* i,2,9,982b12; i,2,15,983a13.

[3] *Posterior Analytics* i,18,81a38f.; *Topics* i,12,105a13.

[4] *Metaphysics* v,11,5,1018b32-34.

[5] *De anima* ii,5,417b23-24; *Metaphysics* xiii,10,4,1086b33.

[6] *De anima* ii,12,424a18-19.

[7] *De anima* iii,3,428a1 f.

The emphasis on the importance for knowledge remained in the later Peripatetics. An epistemology centered on sensation is clearly evident in the writings of Strato,[1] by whom the analogy of seeing and thinking was developed. *Noēsis* is the *energeia* of *dianoia*, just as seeing is of the power of sight. The thinking part of the soul is first moved by sensation. To the extent that we do not see, we are not able to think.

Clement adopted Aristotle's description of the relation between sensation and knowledge. The beginning of knowledge is wondering at objects, Clement said, although here he referred to Plato's opinion in *Theatetus* 155D rather than to the Aristotelian expression.[2] The true Gnostic will begin with admiration of creation and thus show himself capable of receiving knowledge.[3] The starting point of induction (*epagōgē*) for Clement was *aisthēsis* and the end was the universal (*katholou*).[4] Truth, he wrote, resides in four things: things of *aisthēsis*, *nous*, *epistēmē* and *hypolēpsis*. Intellectual apprehension (*nous*) is first in the order of nature, but for us, *aisthēsis* is first.[5]

The highest tribute Clement could pay to sensation was to write that *aisthēsis* is the *archē* of faith (*pistis*), for from sensation the basic principles extended to our reason and understanding. He who believes the Scriptures receives an irrefutable proof, for faith cannot be established by scientific demonstration.[1] Clement attributed his remarks on sensation in this argument to Theophrastus.[2] The association of the Scriptures with sensation on this point gave a rather high status to the sense world.

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[1] Strato, Wehrli, *Schule* v, frag. 74.

[2] *Str*. ii,9,45,4.

[3] *Str*. vii,11,60,1.

[4] *Str*. viii,6,17,7; viii,6,17,4.

[5] *Str*. ii,4,13,2.

A second point on which Clement may have borrowed ideas from Aristotle is the conviction that knowledge in the sense of epistēmē is based on principles known before. All learning, said Aristotle, proceeded wholly or in part from what is already known (progignōsokomenōn).[3] Demonstrative knowledge (apodeiktikē epistēmē) must proceed from premises which are primary, immediate, prior to, and causative of the conclusion.[4] All teaching and learning which involves the use of reason proceeds from pre-existent knowledge (ek prohyparchousēs gnōseōs).[5]

Clement concluded, in Socratic fashion, that all knowledge was capable of being taught, but added that what was capable of being taught was based on what was known before (proginōskomenon).[6] The science of demonstration depended on principles which were better known.[7] Every question must be solved from pre-existing knowledge (prohyparchousēs gnōseōs).[1] Both the concepts and the terminology of Clement suggest that he was acquainted with Aristotle's teaching.

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[1] Str. ii,2,8,4-9,6.

[2] This citation from Clement is preserved as fragment 13 of Theophrastus' writings in the Wimmer edition of the fragments of Theophrastus, vol. iii, p. 162.

[3] Metaphysics i,9,33,992b.

[4] Posterior Analytics i,2,71b 20 f.; Prior Analytics ii,16,64b32 f.

[5] Posterior Analytics i,1,71a1 f.

[6] Str. viii,4,9,1.

[7] Str. v,12,82,3.

Both Clement and Aristotle held that there was a limit to the regression in the process of reliance on former knowledge. First principles must be accepted, beyond which there can be no inquiry. These first principles Aristotle described as self-evident and undemonstrable.[2] There could be no epistēmē of these archai.[3] Since only nous was more infallible than scientific knowledge, it must be intuition which apprehended the first principles, and thus nous becomes a primary source of scientific knowledge.[4] Theophrastus wrote in his Metaphysics that those who demanded proof for everything destroyed proof and knowledge, for they sought proof of things for which there is not or cannot be proof.[5]

Clement found these Aristotelian maxims of great benefit because he needed to say that God could not be apprehended by the science of demonstration (apodeiktikē).[6] The first principles of all things are undemonstrable; there must be something self-evident.[7] Scientific demonstration depended on primary, better known principles, and nothing was antecedent (prohyparchei) to the Unbegotten.[1] Thus knowledge of the first cause is of faith (pistis) but it is not demonstration.[2] Clement's statements that faith is undemonstrable[3] and that faith is itself the essence of demonstration[4] thus mean for him that all knowledge must ultimately rely on an accepted but unproved first principle.

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[1] Str. viii,4,9,1.

[2] Magna moralia i,35,1197a22. Until recent times this book was considered to be an authentic writing of Aristotle.

[3] Posterior Analytics ii,19,100b9-17.

[4] Ibid. ii,19,100b9-17.

[5] Theophrastus Metaphysics viii,26,9b22-24.

[6] Str. v,12,82,3.

[7] Str. viii,3,7,1.

Clement identified the Epicurean and Stoic term prolēpsis with the Aristotelian concept of the undemonstrable first principles, which Clement had equated with faith in God. For the Stoics and Epicureans, this "anticipation" referred to memory of past sense experiences,[5] but Clement drastically changed the meaning of the term. We can learn nothing without pistis, he wrote, because we learn nothing without prolepsis.[6] We progress to knowledge through preconception.[7] Pistis is a prolepsis, the exercise of which will produce knowledge.[8] Thus Clement gave a basically Aristotelian meaning to a term which in philosophical usage carried quite another connotation.

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[1] Str. v,12,82,3.

[2] Str. ii,5,24,3.

[3] Str. ii,4,14,3.

[4] Str. vii,16,98,3.

[5] See Chrysippus frag. log. 83 in Arnim, in which prolēpsis is a conception resulting from perception; and Epicurus, frag. 252 Usener, in which prolēpsis is anticipation based on memory of that which has appeared from the outside.

[6] Str. ii,4,17,3.

[7] Str. i,18,88,5.

[8] Str. ii,2,8,4-9,6.

The concepts of faith in Clement and Aristotle are highly complicated in themselves and have been made even more confusing by Harry Wolfson's account in the _Philosophy of the Church Fathers_.[1] In Platonic thought, he noted, _pistis_ was a subdivision of _doxa_. In Aristotle's works, he asserts, we find a totally different concept, namely, that _pistis_ is part of the apparatus of speculative reasoning, and deals with the truth and falsehood of knowledge rather than with the goodness of our desires, which concept lies within the province of practical reasoning. Wolfson cited as a basis for this statement, _Nicomachean Ethics_ vi,2,1139a21-31, which indeed deals with speculative and practical reasoning but says nothing about faith. _Pistis_ for Aristotle, Wolfson held, became a judgment that the knowledge of a thing corresponds to the reality of a thing. Wolfson cited the _Nicomachean Ethics_ vii,3,1146b29 as demonstrating that Aristotle held that there can be belief in opinion and also belief in knowledge, and Wolfson used this statement to support his claim that faith is an intellectual category for Aristotle. What Aristotle has written in the latter passage does not support Wolfson's claim. Aristotle here has merely remarked that it makes no difference whether you describe the incontinent man as acting against opinion or knowledge, for some men are as convinced (_pisteuousin_) of what they opine (_doxazousin_) as of what they know (_epistantai_). Aristotle is stressing that the weakness of conviction cannot be used to distinguish opinion from knowledge. Pisteuō does not carry the intellectual "weight" of "judgment," as Wolfson claimed.

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[1] Wolfson, _Philosophy_, pp. 113-115.

It is true that Aristotle had a higher evaluation of the sense world than Plato.[1] The reason for this would not seem to be that he had a higher estimate of pistis or doxa than Plato, but that he was more firmly convinced that knowledge, epistēmē, proceeded from the things of the sense world. It is not claimed that doxa and pistis are given more worth because they deal with what can be true and real;[2] the higher evaluation concerns the subject matter, not the mode of knowledge. Aristotle did not set forth a closely correlated scheme of modes of knowing with their appropriate subject matters. We have no evidence that Aristotle desired to elevate pistis to the rank of "intellectual judgment," as Wolfson asserts.

Pistis does not seem to have had a technical meaning in Aristotle's philosophy, but its usage suggests conviction rather than intellectual judgment. Aristotle defines pistis as hypolēpsis sphodra, intensified conviction,[3] and pistis is thus a species of hypolēpsis.[4] It is a property of epistēmē to be "the most trustworthy conviction" (tēn pistotatēn

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[1] That the later Hellenistic age was well aware of this difference between the teachings of Plato and Aristotle can be seen from Aetius' Placita: Plato said that aisthesis was false (iv,9,1); Aristotle said that aisthesis was not misleading by itself, but only by accident (iv,9,3).

[2] Posterior Analytics i,33,88b30-34; i,33,89a5.

[3] Topics iv,5,126b 18.

[4] Topics iv,5,125b37.

hypolēpsin).[1] Things which are true and primary command *pistis* through themselves.[2] Demonstration proceeds from things that are surer (*pistoterōn*).[3]

Wolfson further postulated that for Aristotle, assent (*synkatathesis*) was a judgment about the practical sphere,[4] and is thus distinguished from *pistis* which is of the intellectual sphere. The Stoics, he said, used "assent" to mean a judgment about the truth of a thing as well as the goodness of a thing. They thus include Aristotle's meaning of the word "faith" in their term and can use *synkatathesis* as applying to things which are "probably true" as well as to those which are demonstrably true.[5] Wolfson has here assumed that both *pistis* and *synkatathesis* for Aristotle had technical meanings which they do not in actuality seem to have had. It would be very unwise to think that Clement used *synkatathesis* with any reference to Aristotle; the term is surely known to him as one of Stoic philosophy.

Clement incorporated so many shades of meaning into his use of the word "faith" that it is difficult to state what the term did mean for him. He recognized the etymological root of the word in his statement that persuasion (*peithō*) is the means of being established in the faith (*pisteōs*).[6] He used the term in both religious and epistemological senses, yet even his religious usage seems to be based on the statements given above, that *pistis* refers to the undemonstrated primary principle from which all demonstration proceeds. His use of *pistis* agrees with the principle that there can be no infinite regress in knowledge, that there must be some basic principle on which all other claims rest.[1] Consequently, all demonstration is traced back to undemonstrable faith.[2] Once this first principle was identified with the God of the Christian tradition, the way was open for Clement to fill the word "faith" with Christian meanings: faith is grace;[3] it is the unfailing energy of the Christian life;[4] it is a power of God;[5] it is obedience to the commandments.[6]

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[1] *Topics* v,3,131a24.

[2] *Topics* i,1,100b18-19.

[3] *Prior Analytics* ii,16,64b32-33.

[4] Wolfson, *Philosophy*, p. 116.

[5] *Ibid*., pp. 116-118.

[6] *Str*. i,11,52,1.

When Clement uses "faith" as an epistemological term, he often calls it *synkatathesis*. Both Platonists and Stoics, he wrote, say that *synkatathesis* is in our power; all opinion and knowledge is an assent, which is nothing else than faith.[7] *Pistis* is the *hekousios* *synkatathesis* of the soul,[8] or the *logikē synkatathesis* of the soul exercising free will.[9] In other places, Clement uses the term *prohairesis*, a more distinctively Aristotelian phrase, to express the same concept that he designated by synkatathesis. Pistis is a prohairesis,[1] and Clement uses this definition against Basilides and Valentinus who said that faith was a product of nature. Rather, wrote Clement, faith must be by our own choice or it is not open to praise or blame.[2]

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[1] *Str*. viii,3,6,7-7,2. Clement's identification of the term *prolēpsis* with the Aristotelian principle of the undemonstrated *archai*, and Clement's definition of this revised understanding of *prolēpsis* as *pistis* has been discussed above, pp. 99-[illegible].

[2] *Str*. viii,3,6,7-7,2.

[3] *Str*. i,7,38,5.

[4] *Paed*. i,13,102,4.

[5] *Str*. ii,11,48,4.

[6] *Ibid*.

[7] *Str*. ii,12,54,5-55,1.

[8] *Str*. v,13,86,1.

[9] *Str*. v,1,3,2.

Clement also used the word hypolēpsis to describe faith, and this usage has an Aristotelian ring. Aristotle, we recall, had defined faith as hypolēpsis sphodra. In Stromateis ii, Clement wrote that whereas pistis was an hypolēpsis hekousios, apistia was an hypolēpsis...asthenēs apophatikē.[3] Conjecture (eikasia) he wrote, counterfeited faith and thus was a "feeble supposition" (asthenēs hypolēpsis).[4] That Clement had Aristotle in mind in writing this last passage is suggested by the fact that directly before it[5] he wrote, Aristotle says that the judgment which follows after knowledge is, as something true, faith. Stählin informs us that Aristotle did not write this passage, although Theodoret[6] reports that Aristotle called faith a kritērion of knowledge. Clement adds to this statement, which Aristotle would not have, that faith is superior to knowledge and is the judge of it. The judging power of faith is mentioned by Clement in several passages: faith is a power of judging (krisis) according to reason;[1] it is an infallible criterion (kritērion).[2]

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[1] Str. ii,2,9,2.

[2] Str. ii,3,11,1.

[3] Str. ii,5,28,1.

[4] Str. ii,5,28,1.

[5] Str. ii,4,15,5.

[6] Theodoret Gr. affect. 1,90, cited in Stählin, vol. ii, p. 120.

Clement's statement that faith could be of knowledge as well as of opinion is reminiscent of the passage in the Nicomachean Ethics quoted above, in which Aristotle reported that men are as convinced of what they opine as of what they know.[3] Clement's insistence that faith is not of a lower order, as was Plato's doxa, is apparently motivated by the need to combat the Gnostic claim that faith was only for simple believers and was to be discarded as soon as one achieved a state of enlightenment. Clement found it convenient to use Aristotle's testimony in a way which Aristotle never would have sanctioned, and on the basis of his authority, to claim that faith was superior to knowledge.

Clement himself probably would have liked to state more clearly the idea common in Greek thought from the time of Plato, that to know is more than to believe.[4] Indeed, the firm quality of knowledge which was essential to Plato's description, Clement emphasized by using the term from Aristotelian ethics, hexis. Epistēmē is a hexis apodeiktikē.[5] We suspect that Clement would outrightly have championed the claims of knowledge if he had not been faced with the Gnostic threat. There was not much danger in Clement's day that an educated man would prize an irrational "faith" in religious matters above the knowledge or at least the investigation into such matters. Nor did his uneducated hearers seem to have declared their state of ignorance as more holy than the philosophical tendencies of their teacher. There was no need for Clement to impress upon his hearers and readers that knowledge was better than faith; what was needed was to show that knowledge and faith must be kept in tension, that faith must never be eliminated. Faith was not to be disparaged as simple and vulgar, pertaining to anyone; if it were a merely human habit, it would have perished.[1] There was no knowledge (*gnōsis*) without faith, nor faith without knowledge.[2] Faith was not something which could be done away with when another stage was reached. There were two grades of faith, a two-fold faith, "or rather, one which admits growth and perfection."[3] There is the common faith (*koinē pistis*) and that which results from instruction (*ek mathēseōs*).[4] Thus there is a type of faith appropriate even to the state of knowledge, for knowledge *is* demonstration through faith (*gnōsis apodeixis tōn dia pisteōs*).[5]

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[1] Str. i,1,8,2.

[2] Str. ii,4,12,1.

[3] Nicomachean Ethics vii,3,4,1146b29-30.

[4] Str. vi,14,109,2.

[5] Str. ii,4,14,3.

Another aspect of Clement's anti-Gnostic polemic was his attribution of abilities to the believer which the Gnostic sects would not have allowed: he who believes sees intellectual objects (*ta noēta*) with the mind (*nous*).[6] The

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[1] *Str*. ii,6,29,4-30,1.

[2] *Str*. v,1,1,13.

[3] *Str*. v,1,2,4.

[4] *Str*. v,1,2,4-6.

[5] *Str*. vii,10,57,3.

[6] *Str*. v,3,16,1.

Gnostics would never have allowed a mere believer to have an intellectual vision which is reminiscent of Plato's theōria; this privilege would have been reserved for the one who "knows," one of the "perfect." On the other hand, Clement makes it clear that knowledge was not the highest state to be reached. Paul's perfection, for example, was said to be one not of knowledge (gnōsis), but was the striving after an ethical Christian life.[1] Similarly, love was said to be above knowledge. To those who have faith is given knowledge, he wrote, but above this is love, and to love, will be added God's inheritance.[2]

Two less interesting points, but ones which show some Aristotelian influence, must be briefly noted. Clement's comparison of knowledge with sight is done by way of an Aristotelian analogy, which may itself have been related to, but expressed differently from Plato's image of the sun and light in the Republic. Clement's best wording of the comparison is, what the eye is in the body, that gnōsis is in the nous.[3] Likewise, believers "see" (hora) intellectual objects (ta noēta) with the mind.[4] Aristotle's wording of the analogy is, as sight is in the body, so nous is in the soul (psychē).[5] Clement may have taken this image from Philo rather than directly from Aristotle. Philo wrote that nous is the sight of the soul.[1] What nous is in the soul, this the eye is in the body.[2]

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[1] Paed. i,6,52,2-3.

[2] Str. vii,10,55,7.

[3] Str. ii,5,44,3.

[4] Str. v,3,16,1.

[5] Nicomachean Ethics i,6,12,1096b29. Compare Topics i, 17,108a11.

A last point to be noted is Clement's usage of phronēsis. Jaeger has shown that Aristotle in his early works such as the Protepticus understood phronēsis in the Platonic sense of philosophical knowledge.[3] This meaning of the word was almost abandoned by the time Aristotle composed his later works, according to Jaeger. In these later works, phronēsis became a faculty of practical usage as distinguished from sophia and nous.[4] Phronēsis deals with particulars which are not apprehended by scientific knowledge.[5]

Clement cited a statement from Xenocrates' book Peri phronēseōs, that phronēsis was divided into the practical and the theoretical, the latter of which is human sophia.[6] Clement added that all sophia is phronēsis but not all phronēsis is sophia;[7] in this passage, wisdom does not have as wide a meaning as phronēsis. But in other passages, Clement gives up this compromise with the Academic position, and writes that phronēsis deals with things which can be otherwise, which are not necessary.[1] Phronēsis is a virtue, under which the art of acting sagaciously (phronimōs) is classed.[2] The concepts of phronēsis as something practical and as a virtue are to be found often in Stoic thought,[3] although no doubt they received their inspiration from Aristotle. Cicero's usage of the term phronēsis in contrast to sophia in the De officiis[4] may reflect the teaching of the Stoic Panetius, although in other fragments of Panetius it would appear that he held phronēsis to refer to theoretical matters.[5] Thus Clement's use of the term may have come from Stoicism, although the initial shift in the meaning of the term and its relocation in the arena of practical life was made by Aristotle.

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[1] Philo, Quod Deus immutabilis sit 10,46.

[2] Philo, De opificio mundi 18,53.

[3] Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 82-83.

[4] Nicomachean Ethics vi,8,9,1142a26-28.

[5] Gauthier and Jolif, L'Ethique, I, p.28*, reject that there is a change of the meaning of phronēsis between the Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics. Both books use for the most part the Platonic connotation, though the Eudemian books contain some references to the more practical, technical meaning, as does the Nicomachean Ethics.

[6] Frag. 6 Heinze.

[7] Str. ii,5,24,1.

In this chapter, we have shown how Clement's rejections and acceptances in psychological doctrine prepared the way for his epistemology, which in its high evaluation of sensation, its description of the relation between sensation and knowledge, the denial of infinite regress in knowledge, the complex terminology concerning "faith" and the relegation of phronēsis to the practical sphere showed direct or indirect Aristotelian influence. Since so many of the topics dealt with under the heading of epistemology were discussed in Aristotle's logical works, it is not surprising to find them turning up in Clement's writings, for we have ascertained that Clement knew something about Aristotelian logic which he must have learned from Aristotle's writings themselves or from handbooks which contained Aristotelian definitions.

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[1] Str. ii,4,13,4.

[2] Str. vi,17,160,2.

[3] Zeno, frag. 200 Arnim; Chrysippus, frag. 274 Arnim.

[4] Cicero De officiis i,43,153.

[5] Panetius, frag. 103: theoretical virtue is phronēsis. See Modestus Van Straaten, Panétius: sa vie, ses écrits, et sa doctrine avec une édition des fragments (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1946), pp. 173,175.

CHAPTER SIX

ETHICS

It is in the area of ethics that Aristotle's influence on Clement is shown most directly. Aristotelian distinctions concerning ethics are not paraded as superfluous information to demonstrate Clement's erudition, but are an integral part of his thought which he puts to use in waging his theological battles. In two large areas of ethics, that concerning "the good life" and that dealing with volition, is Aristotle's influence demonstrated.

Section I: The Good Life

The Aristotelian definition of happiness (_eudaimonia_) as the activity (_energeia_) or use (_chrēsis_) of virtue (_aretē_), or the activity in accordance with perfect virtue,[1] was well-known in the later Hellenistic age. Arius Didymus' account of Peripatetic ethics, as related by Stobaeus, informs us that happiness is an activity according to virtue, or the use of perfect virtue in a perfect and complete life.[2] The definition given by Philo is that happiness results from the use of perfect virtue.[1] Clement repeated the Aristotelian definition of happiness as the use (chrēsei) of virtue (aretēs).[2] The content of this happy life as seen by Clement is the subject which we will investigate.

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[1] _Nicomachean Ethics_ i,7,15,1098a16-18; _Eudemian Ethics_ ii,1,1219a38; _Politics_ vii,8,1328a37.

[2] Arius Didymus, in Ioannis Stobaeus _Eclogae ethicae_, ed. Curt Wachsmuth (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884), ii,pp. 126,130.

A distinction often made by Aristotle had been that between living and living well, or being and well-being. This distinction may ultimately be Platonic;[3] indeed, Lazzati has pointed out that it dates from the early and hence, according to Jaeger, "Platonic" period in Aristotle's thought as is evidenced in the dialogues.[4] This division was carried into his later works. The city-state came into existence for the sake of life (tou zēn); it continues to exist for the good life (tou eu zēn).[5] Man is the only animal which has a capacity for living well (eu zēn) as well as for living (zēn), since he is the only animal with something of the divine in him.[6]

Aristotle's phrase was repeated by later writers. Philo, for instance, distinguished to zēn from to eu zēn. The means of living, he wrote, are the things producing enjoyment; the means of living well are provided by the contemplation of the heavenly existences.[1]

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[1] De agricultura xxxvi,157; Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat xvii,60.

[2] Paed. ii,1,15,4.

[3] Crito 48B.

[4] Giuseppe Lazzati, L'Aristotele perduto e gli scrittori cristiani (Pubblicazioni dell' Universita cattolica del Sacro cuore, ser. IV, vol. XXVI [Milan: Societa editrice "Vita e pensiero," 1938]);p. 30. These can be found in Rose frag. 52 and Walzer frag. 24 De philosophia.

[5] Politics i,1,125b29.

[6] On the Parts of Animals ii,10,656a66.

Clement used the living-living well distinction several times. Living well was of more worth than simply living;[2] to eu zēn consists in the use of knowledge while living.[3] His stress on the theoretical element in living well is implied both in Aristotle and in Philo. Clement added a distinctively Christian emphasis: Christ was at first the cause of our being (tou einai) and then of our well-being (tou eu einai). It is he who taught us to live well (to eu zēn), and having learned this, we are on our way to life eternal.[4]

Both Aristotle and Clement held that, in the final analysis, the life of contemplation was what was meant by "living well." Aristotle praised contemplation as that which produced happiness, for it was the activity of the highest part of the mind, of the divine in man, an end in itself.[5] The life of contemplation is said to excel the life of practical pursuits.[6] That later Hellenistic philosophers knew this distinction to be Aristotelian is shown in Aetius' Placita, where it is written that Aristotle, Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics distinguish the theoretical and the practical lives.[1] Albinus comments that the theoretical holds first place and the practical second.[2] Arius Didymus writes that because of shortness of time, the wise man cannot choose both types of life; the theoretical life is preferred.[3]

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[1] De opificio mundi 25,7.

[2] Str. vi,12,100,2.

[3] Str. iv,4,18,1-3.

[4] Pro. 1,7,3; 1,7,1.

[5] Nicomachean Ethics x,7,1,1177a13-18; x,7,5,1177b1-5; x,7,8,1177b26-30; Politics vii,3,5,1325b14-22.

[6] Nicomachean Ethics x,7,7,1177b15-26.

Clement often distinguished the active (poiētikē) from the theoretical (theōrētikē) life.[4] Although he assures us that the Word exhibited the practical virtues as well as the theoretical,[5] he makes it clear that the end of both the statesman and the one who lives according to the law is theōria.[6] It is necessary to keep in mind throughout the following discussion of very "practical" matters, that neither Clement nor Aristotle, despite the statements made about them, held the practical life to be the highest.

One of the most characteristic of all Aristotle's ethical doctrines was that of the mean.[7] Whitney Oates has pointed out that Aristotle took the doctrine from Plato's Philebus, where it was an entity occupying a place alongside the good and the beautiful. For Plato, the mean was a

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[1] Aetius Placita intro.,3. We learn in frag. 25 of Dicaearchus (Wehrli, Schule i) that Theophrastus thought the theoretical life held first place and Dicaearchus, the practical.

[2] Didaskalikos ii,1.

[3] Stobaeus Eclogae ii,p. 144 Wachsmuth.

[4] Str. ii,4,13,4. [5] Paed. i,3,9,4. [6] Str. i,25,166,2.

[7] The long discussion of the mean is in Nicomachean Ethics, ii,6-9. Aspasius' commentary on the passage is found on pp. 47-57 of his work on the Ethics.

"cosmological principle," acting like a formal and final cause. The mean lost its transcendent significance in Aristotle's thought because he did not accept the concept of the ideas.[1] For Aristotle, the mean has to do with moral virtue.[2] It is a "middle state" or moral goodness,[3] which does not imply that living according to the mean is going through life "carefully avoiding both good and evil." [4] The mathematical imagery associated with the mean should not dull our perception of the fact that the mean itself represents an "extreme" state of virtue, not a "halfway" state of goodness.[5] Flexibility is provided in the doctrine by Aristotle's explanation that the mean is pros hēmas, that the mean may vary according to persons and circumstances. [6] In his now lost work On Contraries, Aristotle wrote that the contrary of a good is always an evil, but the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good and sometimes an evil. [7] This statement can be considered an indication of how the chart of the mean virtues with their corresponding vices functioned.

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[1] Whitney J. Oates, "The Doctrine of the Mean," The Philosophical Review XLV (1936), pp. 384-388,397. Note references to the mean in Republic x,619A; Laws iii,691C; v,728E; vii,792C.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics ii,6,9 & 10,1106b9-18; Aspasius Commentary,p.47.

[3] Eudemian Ethics ii,10,30,1227b6-11; ii,3,2 & 3,1220b.

[4] Oates, "Mean," p.390, note 16.

[5] Nicomachean Ethics ii,6,17,1107a7-8; Aspasius Commentary, pp.48-49.

[6] Nicomachean Ethics ii,6,5,1106a32.

[7] Frag. 124 Rose.

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The doctrine of the mean was one of the best-known points of Aristotle's philosophy among later generations, and many thinkers were aware of the subtleties as well as of the crude outline of the doctrine. Arius Didymus' account of Peripatetic ethics lists the three states of excess, deficiency and the mean (mesotēta), which may be considered in their reference to each other or "toward us" (pros hēmas). In all things, the mean "toward us" is best, and the author cites Theophrastus' testimony for this statement. The mean is not determined by quantity as much as by the quality of the virtue, for perfection and excellence lie in the latter.[1] Arius Didymus gives a long list of the virtues lying in the mean and the opposing vices.[2]

Witt[3] posits that Albinus may have learned the doctrine from Arius Didymus' account, for he gives examples of the virtues which lie between two vices.[4] Albinus advocates a mean state of grief, a sensible measure of feeling (metriopathēs)[5] to be shown at the death of parents, rather than being apathēs or hyperpathēs.[6]

Cicero's references to the mean in the first two books of the *De officiis* make us wonder if Cicero knew these formulas from Panetius' *Peri tou kathēkontos*, on which these books of Cicero's work were based.[1] Cicero writes of the "happy mean" which lies between excess and defect.[2] He applies the doctrine to very specific cases: in making gifts of money[3] as in dressing neatly,[4] the best rule is the mean (*mediocritas*).

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[1] Stobaeus, Eclogae ii,pp. 139-140 Wachsmuth.

[2] Ibid., pp. 145-146 Wachsmuth.

[3] Witt, Albinus, pp. 90-91.

[4] Didaskalikos xxx,4 & 6.

[5] Düring (Aristotle, p. 73) claims that the word metriopatheia was not an originally Aristotelian word, but is a Stoic interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine, although Düring admits that the word expresses Aristotle's intent very well.

[6] Albinus, Didaskalikos xxx,5.

Philo also knew the doctrine. He could list some of the specific virtues and vices[5] as well as apply the doctrine to his Biblical exegesis, as in his account of Abraham's mean (*mesou*) state of grief at Sarah's death.[6] One of Philo's most striking images of the mean is that of the royal road which lies between excess and deficiency.[7] There is no doubt that Philo thought that *metriopatheia* was an inferior state to *apatheia* even though he did praise the mean.[8]

Many of the more elusive points concerning the mean are apprehended by Plutarch, as is seen in his treatise on moral virtue. The virtue which needs the service of the passions is an extreme in regard to its power and quality but a mean in regard to its quantity in so far as it does away with excess and deficiency.[1] In other treatises, he advises that to pursue the mean (*mesēn*) in everything is always in good taste.[2]

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[1] Van Straaten, *Panetius*, p. 30.

[2] *De officiis* i,25,89.

[3] *Ibid*. ii,17,59.

[4] *Ibid*. i,36,130.

[5] Philo, *Quod Deus immutabilis sit* 35,164-165.

[6] *De Abrahamo* 44,257.

[7] *Quod Deus immutabilis sit* 34,162; *De migratione Abrahami* 26,146.

[8] *Legum allegoriarum* iii,45,131-132.

Thus there are a number of sources from which Clement could have learned about the mean. We suspect that he did not work directly from the text on Aristotle on this question, although we shall show that he *was* familiar with some parts of Aristotle's ethical writings, since he does not give the characteristic lists of virtues and vices, nor does he mention the less obvious features of Aristotle's account. Instead, Clement took the principle of the mean in its simple, unelaborated state and applied it to various practical affairs. *Ametria* in all things is an evil;[3] the *metron* is what we must always aim at.[4] The *meson* state is defined as being in no want of necessaries;[5] in other words, it does not veer toward deficiency. Especially at the Christian *agapē* meal, we must remember that the medium state (*mesē katastasis*) and middle courses (*mesotētes*) are good; the extremes (*akrotētes*) are dangerous.[6] The trouble with passion is that it tends to exceed the mean (*metra*) of what is rational.[7]

More frequent than Clement's direct references to the mean itself are his comments on moderation, temperance, and continence.[1] That he is speaking of a mean state when he mentions these qualities is indicated by his linking of these words to images of excess and deficiency. S̄ophrosynē is contentment, which is a habit (hexis) which dispenses with superfluities yet does not fail because it receives what suffices.[2] "Decency" (semnon) is produced by the removal of excess.[3]

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[1] Plutarch *De virtute morali* 444D.

[2] Plutarch *De liberis educandis* 7B.

[3] *Paed*. ii,1,11,4.

[4] *Paed*. iii,10,51,2.

[5] *Paed*. ii,1,16,4.

[6] *Ibid*.

[7] *Str*. ii,13,59,6.

There is almost nothing to which Clement does not apply his idea of moderation: eating and drinking;[4] marriage;[5] perfumes;[6] sleeping.[7] In worship, only temperate (sōphronas) harmonies should be used.[8] Even the angels are described as living self-restrained (enkrateias) lives[9] in a paradise in which people enjoy themselves temperately (sōphronōs)![10]

It would be relating only half of Clement's precepts for action if we implied that for him the mean was the ideal. It is interesting to notice that the greater share of Clement's applications of the doctrine of the mean are to be found in the *Paedagogus*, a book which is obviously directed toward those who had been initiated into the faith but had not yet become perfect "Christian Gnostics." The latter books of the *Stromateis* are directed toward a more advanced type of Christian and here a different ideal is set forth. The key to the change in position is found in the statement, moderation tends toward *apatheia* in the Gnostic.[1] The Gnostic is no longer to be *enkratēs* but *apathēs*.[2] Being totally without passion (*exō pathōn*) is the ideal.[3] Self-control (*sōphrosynē*) is said to be mortal and to subsist in those who philosophize but who are not yet wise![4] The goal should not be just a moderation of passion (*metriopatheia*) but the complete eradication of desire; self-restraint is needed by those who are not pure.[5]

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[1] Clement often speaks of these virtues as identical, whereas Aristotle makes a strict separation. The self-restrained (enkratēs) man is said still to have evil desires, while the temperate (sōphron) man has none. Nicomachean Ethics vii,9,6,1152a1-4. See Aspasius Commentary, p. 140.

[2] Paed. iii,11,55,4. Arnim considers this a fragment of Chrysippus (SVF III,276). If this is correct, the passage represents a case in which an Aristotelian theme was taken into Stoicism.

[3] Paed. iii,11,57,4.

[4] Paed. ii,1,11,1; i,2,32,22-23.

[5] Str. ii,23,143,2.

[6] Paed. ii,8,68,1.

[7] Paed. ii,9,77,1.

[8] Paed. ii,4,44,5.

[9] Str. iv,3,8,8.

[10] Paed. ii,8,71,1.

We can not assume that the shift in Clement's position represents his being freed from the fetters of Alexandrian orthodoxy.[6] We cannot say that the new freedom of speculation found in Asia Minor was the stimulus for Clement to write *Stromateis* vi and vii.[7] The tendency of Clement to become increasingly interested in *apatheia*, which Lebreton notes, is undoubtedly correct, but it is not correct to make such a radical division in Clement's works and assign the writing of them to different geographical locations. Many examples could be found to refute Lebreton's theory. In _Stromateis_ _iii_, Clement writes that the human ideal of self-restraint as set forth by "Greek philosophers" is to fight desire, whereas our ideal is not to experience desire at all.[1] And it is in _Stromateis_ _iv_ that the Gnostic is spoken of as no longer self-restrained but without passion.[2] On the other hand, we have found passages such as that in _Stromateis_ _vii_ in which the Gnostic is spoken of as putting a bridle-bit on the restive irrational spirit.[3] In the same book we read that it is through moderation of bodily pleasures and pains that the Gnostic resembles the divine.[4]

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[1] *Str*. vii,3,13,3.

[2] *Str*. iv,22,138,1.

[3] *Str*. vii,11,65,4.

[4] *Str*. vi,15,125,4.

[5] *Str*. vi,9,71,2-76,2. Clement *does* lapse back into saying that the Gnostic studies to master passion (*Str*. vii,11, 67,3) and is "*sōphrona* and *apathē*" (*Str*. vii,11,67,8), but on the whole he is very much aware of the difference between temperance and passionlessness; these two are *not* the same for him.

[6] Lebreton, "Theorie," pp. 459-460.

[7] *Ibid*., p. 478.

Surely then it is wrong to equate the struggling Christian of Alexandria with the _Paedagogus_ and the first four books of the _Stromateis_, and Clement's passionless sage with books six and seven. It would be more helpful to try to tie the concepts, _wherever_ they may be found in Clement's works, to his distinction between the simple believer and the "Christian Gnostic." One significant statement made by Clement assures us that we are correct in identifying the doctrine of the mean with the simple believer and the ideal of the _apatheia_ with the Christian Gnostic, who does indeed resemble the Stoic sage to whom the term originally applied. To be simply saved, wrote Clement, is the result of "medium"

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[1] _Str_. iii,7,57,1.

[2] _Str_. iv,22,138,1.

[3] _Str_. vii,12,79,6.

[4] _Str_. vii,11,64,5.

(mesōn) actions, but to be saved rightly is the right action (katorthōma) of the Gnostic. The mean action (mesē praxis) of the simple believers is not perfected according to reason and knowledge.[1] It now seems logical that the *Paedagogus*, written for those who had just made their conversion to Christianity, should speak so often of the mean as if it were the criterion for behavior; for those Christians, it *was*.

It is instructive to correlate Clement's thoughts on mean and *apatheia* with his attitudes toward the heretical Gnostics. It is logical that the doctrine of the mean would be useful in combatting ethical doctrine which tended to the extremes of licentiousness on the one hand and asceticism on the other. The mean as a sensible balance between these two positions was suggestive to Clement and could serve as a guide to those who needed instruction in Christian behavior.

Clement thought all heresies could be divided into two groups: those which held it was a matter of indifference whether one did right or wrong and those which advocated too ascetic a position, setting themselves against creation.[2] Clement agreed with Tatian that incontinence and fornication were diabolical passions, but he suggested that a controlled marriage occupying a "middle position" (mesiteuei) might be the proper solution.[1] Against Tatian's sect of the Encratites, Clement showed that even the Lord drank, though with moderation, thus encouraging us to do so moderately.[2] To the Marcionites Clement suggested that fear of the law could be good, enducing moderation of feeling (metriopatheia) in us by discipline.[3] The Nicolatians, on the other hand, are chastized for abandoning themselves to pleasure; saying that "the flesh must be abused," they lead lives of self-indulgence.[4]

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[1] *Str*. vi,14,111,3. Arnim considers that the Stoic terms demonstrate this to be a fragment of Chrysippus (*SVF* III,415). Clement does not generally use the category of the mean in the Stoic sense of an indifferent middle ground which is not true virtue. There are a few exceptions to this generalization, of course, a notable one being found in *Str*. iv,26,164,4: some things are neither good nor bad but occupy a middle place (mesotētes), and of these some things are preferred.

[2] *Str*. iii,5,40,2 & 3.

For those who no longer were simple believers but had passed onward to the Gnostic state, the ideal of the sage, the Stoic wise man, seemed more applicable than the doctrine of the mean. The mean was not discarded, but was seen as a "lower" way of action;[5] it was just that Greek philosophy, even at its best, had a merely human goal.[6] Clement considered marriage a good when it was used with temperance, but what was best was a state of apatheia.[7] Since it appeared that there was no hope that all the simple believers could miraculously and at the same instant be transformed into Gnostics, the virtues appropriate to their stage and to that of the Christian Gnostic must be held together in a somewhat tenuous relationship. The ethic of the mean is not discredited, but surpassed in an ideal of passionlessness which is an *imitatio Dei*.

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[1] Str. iii,12,81,4.

[2] Paed. ii,2,32,2-33,1.

[3] Str. ii,8,39,4 & 5.

[4] Str. ii,20,118,3 & 4. Clement correlates this position with that of Aristippus the Cyrenaic.

[5] Note how Clement's insistence that the mean is a valid criterion of action corresponds with his demand that faith is not to be discarded when one has reached the state of knowledge, p. 108.

[6] Str. iii,7,57,1.

[7] Str. iv,23,147,1.

We have noted above that Aristotle firmly believed that the life of the mind held first place, both in the worth of its activity and in the happiness it produced. In the later Hellenistic era, Aristotle was represented as a philosopher enslaved to things of sense, the bodily and external goods of his ethical system, although he made it quite clear that external goods were to be used as instruments.[1] Aristotle's discussion of what goods were necessary for happiness reveals a "realistic" outlook; unlike the Stoic or Epicurean sage, Aristotle would never be able to cry "How sweet!" if he were being tortured on the rack![2] Happiness required goods of the body (*agathōn tōn en sōmati*), external goods (*tōn ektos agathōn*) and goods of the soul (*psychē*).[3] This threefold division might have been a pre-Aristotelian concept, but it quickly became identified with his name. The use of external things is recommended by Aristotle so that one's activity might not be impeded. On the other hand, if good fortune were to become excessive, it could also be a hindrance to activity.[1] It would appear that a "mean" state is what is desirable for the possession of external things.

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[1] *Politics* vii,1,4,1323b8-12; *Nicomachean Ethics* iv,1,6 & 7,1120a4-12; Aspasius *Commentary*, p. 96. A famous story told by Critolaus (Wehrli, *Schule* x,frag. 21) illustrates Aristotle's point. If the goods of the soul were put on one side of a scale and on the other side, external goods and goods of the body, the first side would outweigh the second with land and seas thrown in as well!

[2] Diogenes Laertius *Lives* x,118.

[3] *Nicomachean Ethics* vii,13,2,1153b17-27; i,8,2,1098b12-15; Aspasius *Commentary*, p. 21.

This threefold classification was often discussed and frequently attacked by later philosophers, especially the Stoics. Chrysippus objected that the goods of body were not really goods at all.[2] It would appear that the Stoics tried to devise a third category of their own: goods which are neither of the soul nor external but a third variety, "to be good and happy oneself."[3] In another threefold classification, Zeno and Chrysippus listed the things which produce neither happiness or unhappiness but are *adiaphora*, and in this category they lumped wealth, strength, friends and such.[4] Those who attributed happiness to be a result of external things were compared to people who are not content with daylight unless it is increased by a tiny fire.[5] Some Middle Stoics modified the more rigid doctrines of their predecessors. Posidonius included health and wealth among the good things,[6] and Panetius is mentioned as agreeing with Posidonius that to virtue must be added health, strength and means of living.[7] Those who admired Plato claimed the doctrine of the autarkeia of virtue for him, accusing Aristotle of having deserted Plato on this point and asserted that the things of fortune were necessary.[1]

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[1] *Nicomachean Ethics* vii,13,2,1153b15-25; Aspasius *Commentary*, p. 152.

[2] *SVF* III,96. [3] *SVF* III,97a. [4] *SVF* I,191-196; III,119.

[5] Seneca *Epistle* 92,5; De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy* III, frag. 1212b.

[6] Diogenes Laertius *Lives* vii,103.

[7] *Ibid*. vii,128.

The doctrine of the threefold goods was passed down through Peripatetic and Academic currents as well as being taken into Middle Stoicism. Arius Didymus mentions the goods of body soul and external things, and preserves Aristotle's emphasis that the goods of body and external goods are things by which we can proceed to the goods of the soul; if the virtues of the body are chosen for themselves, how much more those of the soul.[2]

Antiochus also adopted the Aristotelian view. Virtue can make a man happy, but it is not enough to make him supremely happy.[3] It is reported that Antiochus, far more than the Peripatetic Staseas of Naples, attached importance to good and bad fortune, to bodily goods and evils.[4]

Philo is a last witness that the doctrine of the threefold goods was a matter of discussion in Hellenistic philosophy. Philo mentions the doctrine a number of times, although he rejects the classification, holding that good is to be found only in the soul.[5]

Clement knew the three classes of good things to be specifically Peripatetic doctrine.[1] He mentioned the doctrine again in Stromateis iv, but here does not relate of what the goods consist.[2] Aristotle, wrote Clement, said that neither happiness nor the end is reached by everyone who has virtue, for these take time and the three kinds of good things.[3] In places, Clement scorned the goods of health, wealth, strength, and so on, comparing them to the "really good" things which we have not seen or heard.[4] He also could consider all these goods as belonging to the "intermediate" category of the Stoics, things which were neither good nor bad in themselves.[5]

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[1] Atticus, cited in Eusebius Preparation for the Gospel xv,3,1-4,2,794a-d; 4,5,795c.

[2] Stobaeus Eclogae ii,pp. 123,125 Wachsmuth.

[3] Frag. 81 Luck (Georg Luck, Der Akademiker Antiochos [Bern: Paul Haupt, 1953]).

[4] Frag. 79 Luck.

[5] De sobrietate xiii,67-68; Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat iv,9.

Despite his sometimes unfavorable attitude toward the Aristotelian "goods," Clement found it useful to employ the categories of the bodily and external goods against the Gnostics. We are told that the enjoyment of necessary external things was not injurious in quality but only in quantity, when in excess;[6] this statement reminds us of the criterion of the mean. In Stromateis iv,4, Clement launched an argument against those who deprecated the body; by chapter five, he is convincing us that health and an abundance of necessaries keep the soul free and unimpeded, for in many people, disease or poverty produce the inability to endure. Clement may have had Aristotle directly in mind when he wrote this passage, for a few lines later, Clement had Aristotle agree with the skolion of Simonides[1] that health is best, next to be handsome, and then rich.[2]

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[1] Str. ii,7,34,1.

[2] Str. iv,26,266,1.

[3] Str. ii,21,128,5.

[4] Paed. iii,12,86,2.

[5] Str. iv,6,39,3.

[6] Str. vi,12,99,6.

Basilides had argued that the elect were strangers to the world. Clement replied that the elect man does not reject the world, but indeed uses the threefold good things of the Peripatetics. We shall discover other examples of this line of argument when we discuss Clement's concept of "life according to nature."

One of the "goods" of life discussed at length by Aristotle was friendship. Some of his distinctions were repeated by Clement, although the subject was not of great importance for his theology. A friend, said Aristotle, is one who does for another what he thinks is advantageous to him.[3] The fullest friend is one who wishes the good for the friend's sake.[4] Such a friend is "another self."[5] There are three forms of friendship, through utility (chrēsimos), through pleasure (hēdonē), and through virtue (aretē), the last type of which is best.[6] The Aristotelian opinions on friendship are preserved in such places as the account of

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[1] This skolion is attributed either to Simonides or to Epicharmus and was often quoted in later antiquity (e.g., Athenaeus The Deipnosophists xv,694,7.

[2] Str. iv,5,23,2.

[3] Rhetoric i,5,16,1361b.

[4] Nicomachean Ethics viii,3,6,1156b9-12; Aspasius Commentary, p. 167.

[5] Heteros egō is found only in the Magna moralia ii,15, 1213a23; allos autos is found in the Eudemian Ethics vii,12, 13,1245a30.

[6] Nicomachean Ethics viii,3,1,1156a6-b32; Aspasius Commentary, pp. 164-167.

Arius Didymus, in which the three ends of friendship are listed as goodness, expedience and pleasure.[1]

Clement retained a number of these definitions. Benevolence (*eunoia*) is the wishing of good things or doing of good things for another for his own sake.[2] Such an associate is like another self (*hetairos heteros egō*).[3] There are three forms of friendship: that based on virtue (*arētē*), that based on recompense (*amoibē*), and that based on intimacy or pleasure (*hēdonē*).[4]

A further problem associated with the "goods" is the question whether or not the development of virtue takes time and whether there can be degrees of virtue. Aristotle made it clear that virtue and therefore happiness take a complete lifetime.[5] The Stoics and Epicureans took up battle against this concept, declaring that happiness cannot be increased by length of time.[6] Cicero wrote against their position that the end of every philosophical system is the attainment of happiness, and a life can be spoken of as happy only with reference to the finished and completed product, not one part.[1]

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[1] Stobaeus *Eclogae* ii,p. 143 Wachsmuth. Several early Peripatetics also wrote treatises on friendship: Praxiphanes (Wehrli, *Schule* ix,frag. 7), Clearchus (iii,frag. 17-18). That Theophrastus wrote a treatise on friendship which was used by Cicero is related in Aulus Gellius *Attic Nights* i,3, 10 & 11.

[2] *Str*. ii,6,28,3; *Paed*. i,11,97,3.

[3] *Str*. ii,9,41,2. Note that this phrasing is found only in the *Magna moralia*.

[4] *Str*. ii,19,101,3. This classification does not exactly coincide with Aristotle's utility, pleasure, and virtue. The "recompense" may be a Stoic term; see Chrysippus, *SVF* III, frag. 723.

[5] *Nicomachean Ethics* i,9,10 & 11,1100a2-9; i,7,16,1098a 18-30; Aspasius *Commentary*, pp. 19,27-28.

[6] *SVF* III,54; Cicero *De finibus* i,19,63; iii,14,45.

Clement understood that the idea of happiness taking time was Aristotelian,[2] and he agreed that the perfect life took time. The true Gnostic, he wrote, will begin by conducting himself rightly, but it will take a whole lifetime to show that his work is perfect.[3] Those who wish to reach the goal must pass over "the whole narrow way."[4]

The question of whether there can be degrees of virtue does not appear to have been a major philosophical issue in Aristotle's day; he seems to have accepted that men are good or bad in different degrees. It was a cardinal tenet of the ancient Stoics that virtue did not admit of degrees, nor did vice. All good actions are equally good and all bad ones equally vicious.[5] There is no mean between virtue and vice.[6] Plutarch mocks those who accept the doctrine: even those who are proceeding toward virtue are branded as fools and vicious by the Stoics; all those who are not wise are equally wicked and unjust.[7] It is against common opinion that a wise man is instantly changed from extreme vice into extreme virtue, yet remains unmoved by the change.[1] Chrysippus tried to maintain that men could make moral progress, but such a man was not happy or wise.[2] Posidonius also held that there were men who made moral progress as well as immoral men and wise men.[3]

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[1] De finibus ii,27,86 & 87. [2] Str. ii,21,128,3 & 4.

[3] Str. iv,21,130,5. [4] Str. iv,22,138,4.

[5] Cicero De finibus iv,27; Diogenes Laertius Lives vii, 101,120; SVF III,527,529,539.

[6] Diogenes Laertius Lives vii,127.

[7] Plutarch De communibus notitiis 10,1062E,1062F.

Clement could not accept any doctrine which did not give ample room to the concept of gradual improvement of character based on free choice. The Stoic categories of wise man and fool were too close to the heretical division of men into hylic, psychic and pneumatic.[4] Although everyone is born with an aptitude for virtue, there are different degrees of attainment; some only attain to "something like" perfect virtue.[5] In an anti-Gnostic passage, Clement emphasizes that Paul's perfection did not consist in having reached a perfect state, but was an "aspiration after perfection."[6] Various degrees of virtue are upheld in Clement's exegesis of the stories of the "many mansions" in heaven and the reward of the workers.[7] The unequal number of hours they worked indicates the differences in virtue according to merit. It is implied that those who worked a longer period of time, that is, attained a higher degree of virtue, were ushered into the "higher" mansions. Lastly, Clement rails against the "philosophers" who say that only the perfect man is worthy of praise and the bad man of blame. Praise and blame, Clement holds, are essential to all men, for it is by these measures that men grow.[1] Likewise, the Stoic doctrine of the equal perfection of man and God is attacked. It is impossible for anyone to be as perfect as God; our perfection consists in living in accordance with the Biblical precepts.[2]

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[1] Plutarch De communibus notitiis 8,1061E.

[2] SVF III,510.

[3] Diogenes Laertius Lives vii,91.

[4] Clement gives the Gnostic division in Excerpta ex Theodoto 56,2.

[5] Str. vi,12,96,3.

[6] Paed. i,6,52,3.

[7] Str. iv,6,26,3-5. Clement's exegesis is based on Matthew 20:1-16 and John 14:2.

These texts indicate that Clement rejected vigorously any attempt to divide mankind into categories of the sage and fool, with the Stoics, or the hylic and pneumatic men, with the Gnostics. Gradation in virtue and vice was essential to Clement's ethics, as we shall see again when we discuss the voluntary character of ethical action.

A last topic to be considered is Clement's concept of "life according to nature." This phrase had been popularized by the Stoic school, but the Stoics had meant by the phrase, life in accordance with virtue,[3] the virtuous life of reason. Seneca had written that there was no good except virtue, for virtue alone was according to nature.[4] Musonius had held the same view: for man, virtuous conduct alone is according to nature.[1]

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[1] Paed. i,10,93,2-94,1. [2] Str. vii,14,88,5 & 6.

[3] SVF I,179; III,4. Chrysippus emphasized that "nature" meant one's own nature as well as the nature of the universe.

[4] Seneca Epistle 121,5f.,10,11; Vita Beat. 3,3, cited in Zeller, Eclecticism, p. 226.

The content of the life according to nature was modified in the later Stoic school, perhaps under the influence of Arius Didymus, who used the phrase kata physin in describing Peripatetic ethics and included health and pleasure in the meaning of the phrase.[2] Also for Antiochus, being in accord with nature included the threefold goods of Aristotle.[3] The Stoic Panetius appears to have included earthly goods and health as well as virtue in his account of what was according to nature.[4] This attitude, however, represents a relaxation from the old Stoic position.

Clement's use of the phrase "life according to nature" is most interesting, in that he takes a formula which is usually associated with the Stoics and fills it with Aristotelian meaning. What is "according to nature" is that which veers neither toward excess nor deficiency; the phrase is a criterion of the mean. Be content, wrote Clement, with desires which are measured according to nature (kata physin), which do not pass the limit of those which are in accordance with nature, by going to excess or going against nature (para physin), in which the possibility of sinning arises.[5]

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[1] Musonius, in Stobaeus Florilegium 117,8,p. 88, cited in Zeller, Eclecticism, p. 249, note 3.

[2] Stobaeus Eclogae ii, p. 118 Wachsmuth.

[3] Cicero Academia I,5,9.

[4] Van Straaten, Panetius, frag. 112, 110.

[5] Str. ii,20,109,1. The notion of the limitation of the desires is from Epicurus. Note, for example, Epicurus Letter

The advice to regulate rather than eradicate desires is definitely of Platonic-Aristotelian origin, rather than Stoic. We are instructed that the things which are natural (physika) to men must not be eradicated but on them should be imposed limits (metron) and suitable times.[1] The criterion of what is "according to nature" Clement applies to the whole realm of human behavior. Thus man is allowed to laugh because it is according to his nature (physika) to be a laughing animal, but laughing perpetually is going beyond the mean or limit (metron).[2]

More important usages of the phrase "according to nature" can be found in the anti-Gnostic passages. Clement refutes those who have called the Christians "psychic men," writing that, in accordance with "natural appetite" (physikēn orexin), things which are not hindrances are to be rightly used, avoiding all excess.[3] Clement chastizes Basilides for saying that the elect are strangers to the world. No one can be a stranger to the world by nature (physei), wrote Clement, for all things were from one God. How is this being at home in the world "by nature" to be manifested? By using the threefold good things of the

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III,127: Within the category of desire, some of the desires are natural and some are "empty". Of those that are natural, some are necessary and others are only natural. Of the necessary desires, some are necessary for happiness, some for the freedom of the body, and some for life itself. Compare Vatican Sayings 21.

[1] Paed. ii,5,46,1.

[2] Paed. ii,5,46,1 & 2.

[3] Str. iv,13,94,4.

Peripatetics![1] Clement's complaints about Marcionites and Encratites who were forever downgrading the products of material creation, marriage and reproduction, can also be seen in this light: they do not understand the proper use and regulation of the things natural to men. In fact, Clement's statement that "some say" that "nature makes us fit for marriage" appears to have an Aristotelian ring.[2]

Clement's use of Aristotelian ethics in his description of the good life is in all cases based on the commonsense, "realistic" attitude of Aristotle towards the use of our faculties and things of the world in order to achieve a goodness which veered neither to excess nor deficiency. Clement himself may have preferred a more ascetic, "otherworldly" mode of life than the one Aristotle described, but in ethics as in epistemology, he refuses to denounce the validity of the "lower way." The Aristotelian ethic held a significant place in the moral education of Christians. The ethics of the Stoic sage were very similar to those of Clement's Christian Gnostic, but the Stoic ideal of ancient times could have been interpreted in dangerous ways by heretical Gnostics. The Aristotelian ethical teachings were a useful counterbalance when the Gnostic claims went too far. Clement could use Aristotle's opinions to combat those who thought that their natural endowments put them beyond the realm of good and evil.

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[1] Str. iv,26,165,4 - 166,1.

[2] Str. ii,23,139,3; compare Aristotle Politics vii,14, 1334b29ff.

Section II: Volition[1]

One of the most important topics in Clement's ethics is his analysis of the voluntary and the involuntary, the virtue or vice associated with deeds done in these manners, and the praise or blame applicable in various instances. Clement was more dependent on Aristotle's discussion of these topics than he was for any other subject.

Aristotle set forth the trilogy of *orexis*, *prohairesis* and *dianoia* as the concepts around which the voluntary and involuntary were to be discussed.[2] He ruled out *orexis* and *prohairesis* as strict definitions of the voluntary (*hekousios*) and decided that voluntariness (*to hekousion*) consisted in acting with some kind of thought (*en tō dianooumenon pōs prattein*).[3] The distinction seemed to be that a man might act voluntarily without wishing (for men do not wish for what is bad), and a man might act voluntarily without deliberating, which is the key to *prohairesis*. Aristotle leaves the phrase "some kind of thought" vague in this context, but in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he tells us what he means. A man is acting voluntarily if he is aware (*eidei*) of what he is doing;[1] acting voluntarily (*hekonta*) means knowing (*eidota*) the person affected, the instrument, and the manner of injury.[2] In other words, the knowledge required for an act to be voluntary is of the particulars of the situation.

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[1] See the note at the end of this chapter for a schematic summary of the Aristotelian doctrine.

[2] *Eudemian Ethics* ii,7,2,1223a23. This trilogy is found *only* in this ethical work.

[3] *Ibid*. ii,8,2,1124a8. Compare *Magna moralia* i,16,1, 1188b25-28: the voluntary is *only* that done *ek dianoias*.

Aristotle defined choice (*prohairesis*) as voluntary action preceded by deliberation, since choice involves reasoning and some process of thought.[3] In another place, he defined choice as the deliberate desire (*bouleutikē orexis*) of the things in our power (*eph' hēmin*),[4] for we deliberate, select, and fix our desires according to the result of our deliberation.[5] Joachim explains choice as that kind of voluntariness "which deliberation has marked out before the agent's *orexis* or appetition adopts it. An action or course of action is said to be *prohaireton* when the agent decides to do it after, and as a result of, a process of deliberation."[6] It should be clear at the outset that "choice" and the "voluntary" do not mean the same thing for Aristotle. *Hekousios* is a wider term than *prohairesis*; all choice is voluntary but not everything voluntary is done with choice. Anything we do which lies within ourselves and we do not do out of ignorance, we do voluntarily (hekōn), yet we can do these things without deliberation (bouleusamenoi) or forethought (pronoēsantes).[1]

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[1] *Nicomachean Ethics* iii,1,13,1110b21.

[2] *Ibid*. v,9,4,1136a32-33; v,11,2,1138a9.

[3] *Ibid*. iii,2,17,1112a15-16; Aspasius *Commentary*, p. 71.

[4] This part of the definition is also found in the *Eudemian Ethics* ii,10,17,1226b17.

[5] *Nicomachean Ethics* iii,3,19,1113a9-13.

[6] H.H. Joachim, *Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. D.A. Rees (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 100.

It is voluntariness (hekousios) which is the key to praise and blame.[2] All actions of which man is the first principle can happen or not. Praise and blame, virtue and vice, have to do with things in which man is the cause of his actions; such actions are called voluntary (hekousios).[3] Strictly speaking, we should praise or blame men according to their choice (prohairesis) rather than with regard to their actions,[4] which may have been done from compulsion. Since we cannot always tell a man's choice, we usually judge a man's character from his actions.[5] In the same manner, praise should really only be given for actions performed out of choice, not for those done from impulsive appetite. Aristotle concludes that activity is more desirable but choice more praiseworthy.[6]

That which is not voluntary causes more difficulties. The involuntary (akousion) is that which is done through ignorance (di' agnoian), which causes the agent regret afterwards, whereas the "nonvoluntary" (ouch hekousion) is also that done through ignorance but for which the agent was not sorry afterwards. Such as act cannot be called voluntary, for the agent was not aware of his action, yet it cannot be called involuntary since he was not sorry for it.[1] Errors which are not merely committed in ignorance (agnoountes) but are caused by the ignorance (di' agnoian) are pardonable.[2]

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[1] Eudemian Ethics ii,10,20,1226b31-36.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics iii,1,1,1109b30-31; Aspasius Commentary, p. 58.

[3] Eudemian Ethics ii,6,9-11,1223a5-20.

[4] Thus stricter definition is the result of Aristotle's distinction between choice and the voluntary.

[5] Eudemian Ethics ii,11,11-13,1228a12-18.

[6] Ibid.

Aristotle's chief example of involuntary deeds, those done through ignorance but which later cause the agent regret, should be given in full, for this passage is the most explicit proof of Clement's dependence on Aristotle. In the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle had concluded that involuntary (akousios) action is done through ignorance of the act, the means or the person acted on.[3] This statement he develops, giving examples, in Nicomachean Ethics iii,1,15-18, 1111a1-21. The ignorance involved in involuntary acts is that of particular circumstances (hē kath' hekasta). The circumstances to be considered are the agent, the act, the thing that is affected or is the sphere of action, the instrument, the effect and the manner. Aristotle continues:

> Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet, of the agent--for a man must know who he is himself. But a man may be ignorant of what he is doing, as for instance when people say "it slipped out while they were speaking," or "they were not aware that the matter was a secret," as Aeschylus said of the Mysteries; or that "they let it off when they only meant to show how it worked,"

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[1] Nicomachean Ethics iii,1,13,1110b18-25; Aspasius Commentary,p. 63.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics v,8,12,1136a9.

[3] Eudemian Ethics ii,9,2-3,1225b7-8.

> as the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case. Again a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does; or mistake a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or one might kill a man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or in loose wrestling hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand. Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance (*agnoēsas*) of any of them is held to have acted involuntarily (*akōn*).[1]

Aristotle further distinguished acts done *through* ignorance from those done *in* ignorance. The latter included two types of action. The first type are acts done while drunk or in a rage; the agent acts without knowing.[2] Evil done through emotional weakness is, like involuntary action, committed in a state of ignorance, but Aristotle makes a man responsible for actions done in such a state and for the ignorance which caused it. Actions done in ignorance caused by unnatural or inhuman passion are unpardonable.[3] The difficulty then becomes to ascertain what passion for Aristotle is natural and what is not. It is on this point that Clement will have a different evaluation of praise and blame than Aristotle.[4]

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[1] Aspasius *Commentary*, pp. 64-65, differs very little from Aristotle's description. The only points in which Aspasius differs are as follows: Merope is not mentioned in the example of mistaking an enemy and a son. The example of being ignorant of the effect is somewhat fuller: what is done is called *to pharmakon dous*, to give a drug in order to save, not knowing that it was deadly. The giver aided in the killing without *intending* to poison. The example for the manner has the same image, although Aspasius words his comments slightly differently. Aspasius lists all six of the divisions Aristotle covered.

[2] *Nicomachean Ethics* iii,1,14,110b25-30; Aspasius *Commentary*, p. 63.

[3] *Nicomachean Ethics* v,8,12,1136a9; *Rhetoric* i,13,1374b16.

[4] Joachim, *Aristotle*, p. 158, writes that such acts can be considered as involuntary in so far as the doer is below

A second type of action "in ignorance" is the act of the wicked man ; these acts are voluntary since the agent either knew or could have known the circumstances.[1]

The discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary is connected with Aristotle's classification of the injuries for which one is responsible. There are three types of injuries: error (hamartēma), misfortune (atuchēma), and crime (adikēma). An injury is an hamartēma when the cause of ignorance lies in oneself, when the act was done without evil intent but when the results were not contrary to what might have been expected. When the cause lies outside oneself, the injury happens contrary to expectation and is an atuchēma. Adikēma does not necessarily mean injuries done out of choice, although they are done "knowingly," but includes injuries done through anger or passion; in the latter case, Aristotle considers the actions unjust but not the agent, for the injury was not done from choice. When the action is done from choice, the agent as well as the act is unjust.[2]

Aristotle's discussions of the akratēs and the akolastos [3] are of interest in helping us understand how men fall into licentiousness. The akolastos does so deliberately, the akratēs, against his better judgment. It is the particular

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the level of moral responsibility; he cannot be considered a responsible human agent.

[1] Nicomachean Ethics iii,1,14,1110b25-30; Aspasius Commentary, p. 63.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics v,8,6-12,1135b12-1136.

[3] Ibid. vii,3,1 & 2,1146b8-24. See Joachim, Aristotle, p. 222.

premise of a moral syllogism, not the universal principle, which a man in the state of moral weakness mistakes.[1] It is because the particular premise is related to the sense world and thus is affected by appetite that the premise can be mistaken.[2] "Appetite can cause a man to lose his understanding of a particular premise, and this is the explanation of akrasia. What appetite cannot do is affect the understanding of the universal premise, and since the epistēmē which Socrates denied could be dragged about like a slave is such universal knowledge, Socrates was right."[3]

The limited amount of information dealing with volition which is left to us from Middle Platonic and Stoic authors makes our task of determining Clement's sources a difficult matter. Some points can be found in authors such as Albinus, however. If everything were determined by fate, he wrote, what is "up to us" (to eph' hēmin) would disappear, as well as praise and blame.[1] Involuntary (akousia) bad actions may be punishable in some cases, since a thing can be done involuntarily in ignorance (en agnoia) or through passion (pathei).[2]

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[1] Nicomachean Ethics vii,3,6,1147a1-5; vii,3,7,1147a10-18; vii,2,2,1145b30; vii,2,10,1146b1-12.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics vii,3,9-14,1147a24-b19; Magna moralia ii,6,15-17,1201b24-1202a8. See Joachim, Aristotle, pp. 228-229.

[3] James J. Walsh, Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 104. Besides the discussion in Walsh, see Joachim, Aristotle, pp. 221-229; Franz Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Nikomachishe Ethik (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), p. 481; Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1866, 2nd ed. revised), vol. II, pp. 202,216.

Socrates' position is reported by Xenophon in his Memorabilia iii,9,5: "He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of virtue is sophia."

Philo also connected deliberate choice (prohairetikais) with praise and blame.[3] It is the previous thought (pronoias) which gives worth to actions. Thus voluntary good deeds are of greater worth than involuntary, and involuntary sins are less weighty than voluntary ones.[4] No praise is due a deed done through fear, for praise is recorded only for voluntary (hekousios) good deeds.[5]

Plutarch's account in De virtute morali is of interest for the discussion of akrasia and akolasia. Incontinence is less than a vice, whereas incorrigibility is full-fledged vice since it has both an evil pathos and an evil logos. The incontinent man preserves the power of judgment but his passions are stronger than his reason, which is swept along against its judgment. In incontinence, reason is worsted by passion; in incorrigibility, reason does not even fight.[6]

For Clement, what is virtuous and praiseworthy must be voluntary (hekousion).[7] Clement repeats the trilogy of concepts around which the voluntary is to be discussed: orexis, prohairesis, and dianoia.[1] Clement retains the strong intellectual emphasis of Greek ethics. Willing (thelēsis) is a movement of the self-determining mind;[2] it is something which belongs to the nature of the rational creature.[3] Choice is exercised according to knowledge;[4] the impulse to action comes after knowledge of the action has been given.[5]

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[1] Albinus Didaskalikos xxvi,1. [2] Ibid. xxxi,2.

[3] Quod Deus immutabilis sit 10,47.

[4] De posteritate Caini 3,11. [5] De Abrahamo 34,186.

[6] Plutarch De virtute morali 445D-446C.

[7] Str. vii,3,19,3.

Virtue must be the object of "willing" choice (haireisthai ton bouloumenon).[6] Rewards are given on the basis of choice, for we have it in our power to live nobly.[7] Virtue through choice becomes the criterion of salvation. We are saved by voluntary choice (hekousiō prohairesei).[8] Salvation runs parallel with sincere willingness; choice (prohairesis) and life are yoked together.[9] The emphasis on "self-salvation" through virtuous choice puts Clement in a difficult position to explain the role of divine grace. To save the unwilling (akontas), Clement concluded, would be the part of one exercising compulsion,[1] and God does not compel. [2] To save those who choose (hairoumenous) is the part of one showing grace; [3] the gift ultimately depends on God. [4] Thus the Word is represented as the "master of free choice" (prohairesis). [5]

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[1] Str. ii,15,6,2. This exact phrasing is found only in the Eudemian Ethics.

[2] Frag. 40 Stählin. Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1948), vol. I, p. 419, cites this fragment as proof that the will was an autonomous function for Clement. The text says only that the mind is self-determining, and the rest of Clement's thought does not bear out Pohlenz' interpretation.

[3] Frag. 40 Stählin.

[4] Str. iv,5,22,4.

[5] Str. vi,8,69,1 & 2.

[6] Str. vii,2,9,4.

[7] Pro. 10,90,1 & 3.

[8] Paed. i,6,33,3.

[9] Pro. 11,117,2.

Involuntary goodness is not praiseworthy for Clement. Virtue by nature (physei) is ruled out, for it would not be voluntary (hekousion) and thus not praiseworthy.[6] Nor can virtue by necessity come within the sphere of the voluntary (hekousion); [7] goodness from fear is contrasted with voluntary kindness. [8] It would appear that virtue must be more than voluntary; it must be chosen. Virtue, writes Clement, must be the object of "willing" choice (hairesthai ton bouloumenon).[9] Actions are judged not just by effect, but by the element of choice (prohairesei) in each. [10] It is through acting by choice (prohairetikoi) that we grow by praise. [11] It is things which depend on prohairesis which are the subjects of judgments. [12] And sins which are not the effect of prohairesis are not reckoned. [13] Thus virtue must be chosen and not happen on impulse to be praiseworthy.

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[1] Qds 21,2.
[2] Qds 10,1.
[3] Qds 21,2.
[4] Qds 10,1.
[5] Paed. i,6,31,1.
[6] Str. vii,3,19,3. Compare SVF III,224.
[7] Str. v,13,86,2.
[8] Str. iv,22,143,5.
[9] Str. vii,2,9,4.
[10] Str. ii,6,26,5.
[11] Paed. i,10,94,1.
[12] Str. ii,14,61,2.
[13] Str. ii,15,66,1.

On the side of sin and evil, Clement's discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary is much more problematic, as was Aristotle's. Clement on a few occasions repeats the Socratic evaluation of the role of ignorance in involuntary evil. No man in his senses would turn his back on the good and attach himself to evil.[1] No one prefers evil as evil, but imagines it to be good and desirable; thus involuntary (akousion) evil arises.[2]

Clement does not usually accept the simple Socratic notion of sin as ignorance in its crude form, however. He believes that there are people who may have knowledge and be instructed about the right principles, but still act contrary to what they know.[3] There are those who condemn their own actions and yet do them voluntarily (hekōn).[4] Men are enslaved to evil custom by their own choice.[5] It would seem to be this type of sin which Clement had in mind when he criticized Basilides' statement that the only sins forgiven by God are involuntary (akousious) and performed in ignorance (agnoian). Basilides would be correct, Clement wrote, if it were a man and not God who gave the boon.[6] Thus sin would appear to be more than a matter of having "wrong knowledge" about moral principles.

There is one very interesting passage[7] which reflects

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[1] Pro. 10,92,3.

[2] Str. i,17,84,4 & 5.

[3] Pro. 10,100,2.

[4] Str. ii,13,58,1.

[5] Pro. 10,101,1.

[6] Str. iv,24,155,3.

[7] Str. i,8,42,3 & 4.

Clement's indecision. It would appear that Clement is trying to reproduce Plato's discussion in *Republic* iii,413 A-C. Men are deprived of the good unwillingly (*akousiōs*) writes Clement. This may be for four reasons. The first three are those stated by Plato: by deceit, the good having been "stolen" (*klapentes*); by being beguiled (*goēteuthentes*); or by compulsion (*biasthentes*). To these three reasons given by Plato, Clement adds a fourth: rashly believing (*eikē pisteusantes*). The one who rashly believes has already made himself a captive *voluntarily* (*hekōn*). This is the very opposite of what Plato was trying to show. Clement concludes, all these are *involuntary* (*akousioi*) changes, and so he considered the three he took from Plato, but the fourth one he has himself said was voluntary. This text is a fine example of Clement's confusion of how to reconcile his beloved Plato with another ethical position whose validity he also upheld.

Clement hedged on the question of whether ignorance was blameworthy. Sometimes he wrote as if he thought it was. Those who fall into sins through ignorance (*di' agnoian*) after baptism so as to be "carried away" are rejected by God.[1] If we do not recede from the ignorance of mistaken judgment, we deserve punishment.[2] It is up to us to free ourselves from ignorance.[3] That which is done in ignorance is still considered sin.[4]

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[1] *Qds* 39,1.

[2] *Str*. i,17,84,2 & 3.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Str*. ii,13,56,1.

A fuller discussion of the roots of sin is found in Stromateis vii. The two sources of sin[1] are ignorance (agnoia) and weakness (astheneia). Both of these are "up to us," depend on ourselves (eph' hēmin) inasmuch as we will not to learn nor restrain lust. The consequence of sin through ignorance is that one does not judge well, and of sin through weakness, that one cannot comply with right judgment. For neither will one who is "deluded in mind" be able to act rightly, though perfectly able to do what he knows; nor, though capable of judging what is required, will he keep himself free from blame if he is destitute of power in action.[2] The criterion for the blameworthiness of evil states seems to be whether or not we are to blame for being in that condition. For example, to take fever is involuntary (akousion) yet if it is through our own fault that we are in that condition, we are to blame.[3] Since both conditions, ignorance and moral weakness, are "up to us," we are to blame for them.

Clement does have an understanding of types of involuntary evil, however. He repeated the threefold Aristotelian distinction of hamartēma, atuchēma, and adikēma.

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[1] Clement's description would seem to correspond in meaning to Aristotle's distinction between the akolastos who holds false opinions about what is good, and the akratēs, who retains the correct general principle but through desire is unable to carry it out.

[2] Str. vii,16,101,6 & 7.

[3] Str. i,17,84,2. Compare with Nicomachean Ethics iii,5, 15-16,1114a25-30, where Aristotle writes that we are to blame for bodily defects which we bring on by our own action. Arnim attributes the example of taking fever to Chrysippus, SVF III,236.

The characteristic of *hamartēma* is that it is involuntary (*akousios*).[1] This distinction, which sounds foreign to the common language of Christianity, makes us suspect that we should examine more closely Clement's discussion of the involuntary. We find that he borrows a long section from the *Nicomachean Ethics* iii,1,15-18,1111a1-21. The section in Clement's writings in which the Aristotelian passage is found is *Stromateis* ii,14,60-61, and concerns the ways in which ignorance of particular circumstances can lead to involuntary wrongdoing:

> For how will you judge concerning those who are said to sin in involuntary (*akousion*) modes? For neither one knew not himself, as Cleomenes and Athamas, who were mad; or the thing which he does, as Aeschylus, who divulged the mysteries on the stage, who, being tried in the Areopagus, was absolved on his showing that he had not been initiated. Or one knows not what is done, as he who has let off his antagonist, and slain his domestic instead of his enemy; or that by which it is done, as he who, exercising with spears having buttons on them, has killed some one in consequence of the spear throwing off the button; or knows not the manner how, as he who has killed his antagonist in the stadium, for it was not for his death but for victory that he contended; or know not the reason why it was done, as the physician gave a salutary antidote and it killed, for it was not for this purpose that he gave it, but to save. The law at that time punished him who had killed involuntarily (*akousiōs*), as for example, him who was subject involuntarily (*akousiōs*) to gonorrhea, but not equally with him who did so voluntarily (*hekousiōs*). Although he shall be punished as for a voluntary action, if one transfer affection into truth. For in reality, he that cannot contain the generative word is to be punished, for this is an irrational passion of the soul approaching garrulity....Things, then, that depend on choice (*prohairetika*) are subjects for judgment.

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[1] *Str.* ii,15,62,2; 64,3-5, reading *akousios* with Stählin, whose choice is confirmed by the text: *adikia alone* is *hekousios*.

In this passage,[1] Clement has lumped together the cases which Aristotle calls of action through ignorance of the particular circumstances with an example which Aristotle would have considered to have arisen "in ignorance," for the disease would have come about from a state of passion for which we would be responsible. It is this case which must be punished "as for a voluntary action." Aristotle might agree that the case is punishable, but would not say that the state had come about through choice, although living intemperately was a voluntary action.[2] All these cases listed under the Aristotelian **divisions** illustrate for Clement how sin can be involuntary, and all of them involve ignorance of the particulars of a moral situation. The basic moral principles themselves (e.g., that it is wrong to kill) are approved; the wrongdoer never intended to break these principles.

Clement has said that the other cause of sin, besides ignorance, is weakness, which is "up to us" (eph' hēmin) inasmuch as we do not restrain lust. This person is capable of making a correct judgment but cannot carry it out[1] due to the interference of passion. Such a man is the counterpart of Aristotle's akratēs, who has knowledge of the universal premise of a moral syllogism but whose appetites lead him astray on the particular premise which is activated by sense.

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[1] Bernays' ("Zu Aristoteles...") conclusion is that Clement used a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, perhaps the one by Adrastus, for this passage (p.312). (Bernays does not credit Clement with being original enough to think of the examples not given in the Aristotelian text, and hence insists he must have gotten them from someone else.) Bernays makes this point only in passing; his real purpose is to show that the Bekker text should be emended to read pisas not paisas in the example concerning giving poison, and cites Clement as an example of an early reader of Aristotle who must have had the reading of pisas before him in the text.

[2] Nicomachean Ethics iii,5,15-16,1114a25-30.

It is of interest to notice that the word used to describe the situation of moral weakness, astheneia, carries definite connotations of physical weakness. Clement also mentions a physical image to describe the condition of weakness: a man's inability to leap across a ditch through feebleness of body. But Clement refuses to leave us with the impression that we cannot be blamed for such weakness. Application to the training of ourselves and subjection to the commandments is in our power; if we refuse to train ourselves but abandon ourselves to passion, we sin.[2] We ourselves are to blame since we can be strong. Why people are morally weak is related to their evaluation of pleasure. The weak cannot endure the austerity of salvation and delight in sweet things, prizing them for the pleasure they yield.[3] Why is it that the pleasant wins out over the good? Clement gives us only two clues. The mind can be carried away by pleasure (metagetai...hypo hēdonēs), the unsullied principle of reason sliding down into licentiousness.[4] The fleshly lusts spread darkness (episkotousi) over the light of the intelligence.[1] The last image is particularly revealing in that it metaphorically describes the "blindness" of such moments. The intellect is able to know the proper principles of action, but at the stage of the application of the universal judgment to some particular thing, a blurring of the mental processes occurs so that what is seen as good is not carried out as intended in a particular circumstance. Thus weakness is also a form of ignorance. As in the case of ignorance proper, the intention is correct but the result wrong. Clement made us responsible, in the case of ignorance, for those situations in which it would have been possible for us to have knowledge if we had taken the proper steps. So here, we are responsible and hence blameworthy for deeds resulting from moral weakness since Clement feels that we had it in our power to resist our fleshly desires. The deed is blameworthy in so far as we did nothing to alter the circumstances although we could have done so, yet it is unchosen in that the effects were not premeditated, no mental decision was taken to achieve them, and we were sorry afterwards.

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[1] Str. vii,16,101,6 & 7.

[2] Str. ii,15,62,3.

[3] Pro. 10,109,1.

[4] Paed. iii,2,14,1.

As in the case of the doctrine of the mean, we are correct in suspecting that Clement could use his analysis of choice and volition to refute heretical Gnostics. We have seen that he is adverse to any predestinarian theories of salvation or even ones which lessen the importance of personal effort. His exegesis of the story of the workers who put in the greater number of hours at work receiving the better mansions is an excellent example of Clement's "do-it-yourself" attitude toward salvation.[1]

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[1] *Str*. ii,20,115,3-116,1.

It is likely that Clement knew that such Gospel stories could be interpreted in other ways; it is improbable that he was totally ignorant of the thrust of Pauline theology. But Clement knew, as Paul had, that predestinarian emphases could be used in the wrong way. Many of Clement's anti-Gnostic passages are based on correcting Gnostic interpretations of Pauline texts.[2] It is likely that Clement rejected such parts of Pauline theology in an attempt to uphold the voluntary character of virtue and vice against various Gnostic groups. We are not born by nature possessing virtue nor does it grow naturally, he wrote, since then it would be neither voluntary (*hekousios*) nor praiseworthy.[3] Adam was not perfect in his creation, but only adapted for the reception of virtue, for it was intended that we should be saved by ourselves (*ex hēmōn*).[4] The precepts of the Old and New Testaments would be superfluous if we were saved by nature, as Valentinus thinks, or if we were elect by nature, as Basilides holds.[5] Of what use then would be right conduct and mortification of the flesh?[1] To become manly and put away childish things (I Corinthians 13:11) refers to us who are saved by voluntary choice (*hekousiō prohairesei*).[2] The Marcionites do not deserve praise for their continence, for it is not of free choice (*prohairesei*).[3]

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[1] *Str*. iv,6,36,1,37,1.

[2] A good example is the discussion of "putting away childish things" from I Corinthians 13:11, in *Paed*. i,6.

[3] *Str*. vii,3,19,3.

[4] *Str*. vi,12,96,2.

[5] *Str*. v,1,3,3. In the *Excerpta* (56,2 & 3), Clement reports the three Gnostic classes of men, *hylikoi*, *psychikoi*, and *pneumatikoi*. They say that the *pneumatikoi* were saved by nature and that the *hylikoi* perished by nature; only the middle class, which did not include very many men, had any choice about its salvation.

On the other hand, Clement testifies that some Gnostics felt they were not blameworthy for the sins they had committed. The Basilidians, for instance, supposed either that because of their perfection they had the power to commit sin or because of their innate natural election, they would be saved by nature.[4]

It is interesting to note in passing that Clement's emphasis on choice was turned against others besides the Gnostics. The concept of sin being caused by "demons" had been accepted by earlier Greek Apologists. Clement attacked this point briefly, and his attack is based on the same grounds as his criticism of the Gnostics: a man would be guiltless if the demons were responsible.[5] Clement's analysis of sin has a much stronger emphasis on man's own responsibility in general than that of the Apologists, who pictured man as subject to all sorts of evil powers lurking in the universe at large. To be sure, freedom from such powers was to be desired, but the writers in question used nothing as forceful as Clement's notion of the voluntary, praise and blame, with which to fill in the somewhat empty concept of freedom. Clement's position was strong because it was backed by a philosophical analysis more complex and more realistic than the Socratic, in that it took into account that in fact men act counter to the moral principles which they know. Without doubt his philosophical props came from Aristotle. Clement, out of his conviction that Christianity gave men superhuman power, attributed to man a greater ability to control his emotions and a greater responsibility for his own ignorance. He demanded more of a man.

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[1] *Str*. iv,12,85,3.

[2] *Paed*. i,6,33,3.

[3] *Str*. iii,3,12,2; 4,25,3.

[4] *Str*. iii,1,3,3.

[5] *Str*. vi,12,98,1.

Note: Summary of Aristotle's Teaching on Volition

I. The Voluntary (*to hekousion*): includes (in the *Eudemian Ethics*)

   1. Desire, wishing (*orexis*)
   2. Choice (*prohairesis*)
   3. Thought (*dianoia*): the widest definition of the three. The *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Magna moralia* agree on this definition, and take it to mean knowledge of particular circumstances. Strictly speaking, praise and blame should be based only on *prohairesis*, but we have to rely on results, the whole scope of voluntary action, since we cannot always tell a person's choice.

II. Mixed Actions: are said to be more voluntary (*hekousia*) than not, although they are done through fear of a greater evil or hope of a greater good. Their results are often pitied.

III. The "Not Voluntary": acts done *through* ignorance; ignorance is the cause of the action.

   1. The involuntary (*akousion*): these acts are regretted afterwards, and are given lenient judgments. They are caused by ignorance of particulars and in some cases are pardonable. If the actions occur contrary to reasonable expectation, they are *atuchēma*. They can in some sense also be classified as *hamartēma*, since they were done unknowingly, although this term is usually reserved for the cases in which the cause of ignorance lies in oneself.
   2. The non-voluntary (*ouch hekousion*): these acts are not regretted afterwards. They cannot be classed as voluntary since the agent was not aware of his action, yet they are not involuntary since the agent does not regret the action after having been informed of what he has done. Aristotle has little to say about this type of action.

IV. Acts done *in* ignorance: this class includes both acts caused by temporary oblivion, such as drunkenness, and standing moral ignorance or oblivion. In all cases in which we are responsible for our action *and* for the state of "ignorance" which caused it, we are blameworthy. These *acts* are *hamartēma* in so far as the cause of the ignorance lies in oneself. The act is *adikēma* when it is done knowingly but not by choice; the agent *himself* is wicked if choice was involved.

V. Compulsory Acts: those done in which the cause of the action lies in things outside the agent; the agent contributed nothing.

CONCLUSION

It has become apparent that the Aristotle known to Clement and most of his predecessors is neither the Aristotle known to us from his extant treatises nor the Aristotle known to the medievals. Nor have we found, contrary to what the thesis of Jaeger led us to expect, that Clement was greatly dependent on the Aristotelian dialogues and other works lost to us except for fragments. If the "Platonic Aristotle" made much of an impact on Clement, we can not separate his influence from that of Plato himself. The scholarship of Jaeger and his followers has been of help chiefly in calling our attention to the fact that the Aristotle of the treatises was not the only or the best-known Aristotle to later Hellenistic writers.

Clement's knowledge of Aristotle seems in many cases to have come through the writings of philosophers not usually considered to be Aristotelians, such as Philo, and through manuals and compilations such as those of Aetius and Arius Didymus. The use of manuals accounts for some of the distorted opinions about Aristotle current in the writings of later antiquity. Clement seems to have been more familiar with Aristotle as an historian and collector of scientific information than with Aristotle the metaphysician; this fact is also revealed by Clement's tendency to attribute many things which we might consider to be of Aristotelian origin to Plato or the "Hebrews."

Clement knew the formulas and definitions of the Peripatetics, especially those singled out for criticism by the rival schools of Stoicism and the Academy, but his theology was not affected at a very deep level by Aristotle's writings themselves. Although Clement did not accept Aristotle's philosophy as the highest or best type, he found it useful in two ways: in battling Gnostic groups, especially on ethical and epistemological issues, and in correcting the anthropomorphic doctrine of God among his pagan converts to Christianity.

We saw that Clement knew a number of Aristotelian definitions in the fields of logic and rhetoric. He recited Aristotelian definitions of syllogism, induction, definition, and called on Aristotle for support in his attack on sophistry. A few of the Aristotelian categories he adopted as criteria for the mean, as ways of judging the correct behavior under varying circumstances. It was not apparent whether Clement knew these defintions from the writings of Aristotle himself or from logical textbooks. Since Clement had studied under half a dozen philosophers, it is possible that he recalled the schematic logical definitions he knew from lectures he had heard during his years as a student.

In the area of physics, we noted that Clement knew such Aristotelian definitions as the grades of nature and the distinction of actuality and potentiality, but it was only the doctrine of causes and the later interpretations of the Aristotelian formulation by such thinkers as Philo that influenced Clement's theological explanations.

The account of God in the *Metaphysics*,Book Lambda, appears to have been unknown to Clement. The concept of God as an unmoved mind passed into the Platonic teaching and thus Clement attributed the idea to Plato. The first God as physically and emotionally unmoved but as the source of all motion is a notion found in Albinus, Numenius and others. Creation is attributed to the second divinity; this philosophical conception coupled with that of Philo that the Logos is the *organon* of creation can be seen in the writings of the Apologists and Clement. The notion of the ideas as the thoughts of God was another doctrine of this eclectic era which Clement insisted on attributing to Plato and "Moses", whereas the concept really combines elements various sources: the Platonic ideas,Aristotle's God conceived of as a *Nous*,and his image of the artisan containing the *paradeigma* of his creation in his soul, and the Stoic reduction of the Platonic ideas to the status of human thoughts. The ideas were interpreted as a fifth cause added to Aristotle's four, or as the Aristotelian formal cause. Clement took the concept of the ideas as the Logos directly from the writings of Philo, and the way was open for the interpretation of the Logos as the archetype of creation, in whose image man is said to have been created.

In the chapter on psychology we pointed out that Clement seemed totally unaware of the teaching of the *De anima*.

Clement's rejection of the Platonic theory of recollection and pre-existence made us suspect that his epistemology might contain a higher evaluation of the sensible world than Plato had held. The Platonic concept of the natural immortality of the soul was also rejected. Clement knew the principle of sensation as the basis of knowledge to be Aristotelian. Likewise, he upheld the concept that there is no infinite regress in knowledge. The first principles which Aristotle insisted must be accepted without demonstration, Clement identified with God. The meaning of "faith" as an acceptance of an undemonstrated first principle underlies Clement's religious use of the term. We questioned Wolfson's conclusion that "faith" meant "intellectual judgment" for either Aristotle or Clement, and suggested that Aristotle's high estimate of the sense world did not necessarily imply that he gave a higher status to faith than Plato, because Aristotle did not rigidly follow the Platonic correlation of the modes of knowing with specific subject-matters. Although Clement personally favored placing knowledge above faith, he did not hold faith to be just a kind of doxa which is to be superseded; there is a state of faith appropriate also to knowledge. It seemed likely that Clement got the Aristotelian elements of his epistemology from the same source as he got his logical material, for such concepts as the denial of the infinite regress in knowledge were found in the logical works. The probability that Clement knew some of the logical writings is increased by the fact that he cited so many of the epistemological principles to be found in these works.

It was in ethics that Aristotle's influence on Clement stood out most clearly, and in many cases, Clement specifically attributed the concepts to Aristotle or to other Peripatetics. We might have thought that Clement derived his ethical information from a handbook, but the long section in Stromateis ii,14,60-61 is based on the Nicomachean Ethics itself or on a detailed commentary on that work. Thus we can state with a fair degree of assurance that Clement had first-hand knowledge of the Nicomachean Ethics. Clement used Aristotle's definitions of the good life and happiness. He did not explain the doctrine of the mean theoretically but put it to use in discussing many practical issues. The mean and moderation of desire he correlated with the action of the simple Christian believer, the Stoic ideal of apatheia with the true Gnostic. As faith is retained as valid even when a state of knowledge is reached, so the mean is held to be a lower but correct way of action. The threefold goods of the Aristotelians, Clement used against the Gnostics who deprecated the material world. The Stoic formula of "life according to nature" he filled with the Aristotelian meaning of the threefold goods. Of these goods, friendship was especially praised and Clement cited Aristotle on the topic, including the definition of a friend as "another self" from the Magna moralia. A scale of moral progress, degrees of virtue and vice, was upheld against the Gnostics and in opposition to old Stoic theory.

Clement followed the Aristotelian division as found in the Eudemian Ethics of the voluntary into that by choice, desire, or thought. Choice was held as the truest guide to praise and blame. Clement also held the Aristotelian division of sin, misfortune and crime; it is in this context that the section on the ignorance of particular circumstances is set. Both Clement and Aristotle retained an appreciation for the Socratic explanation of sin as ignorance, but explored more thoroughly the problem of sin through moral weakness where the right universal principle is not lost.

Clement's interest in the subject of volition stems from his insistence that we must be able to assign praise and blame to action. His rejection of the Pauline predestinarian emphases is directed toward combatting Gnostics who thought they could live in a realm beyond good and evil. Clement differs from the Aristotelian analysis chiefly in his Christian understanding of what it is to be a man. Superhuman ability to control his emotions has been added to man's natural capacities. Since we have been enlightened by the Word of God, we are responsible for our own ignorance and weakness.

The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate what ideas of Aristotle, whether derived from his writings themselves, from manuals, or through other philosophers, would be attractive to a Christian writer like Clement, That Aristotelian doctrine could be employed to champion a "true Gnosticism" against a false one, or to combat anthropomorphism among the ranks of the simple, demonstrates a use peculiar to Clement's situation and era. This thesis confirms the principle often observed in the theory of the history of dogma, that no concept is transmitted without change. There is no one "Christian thought" but only an assimilation of ideas divorced from their original philosophical and historical contexts and infused with new meanings for the edification of later ages.

Historians of the early church, especially those of conservative theological persuasion, have tended either to belittle or to ignore the role played by Greek philosophy in the creation of Christian dogma. Today most scholars acknowledge that such theological doctrines as that of the Trinity and the person of Christ would not have received the form they did without the impact of Greek philosophy on Christianity. Yet it is not only the language or form, but the very presuppositions of thought which were determined for the Church Fathers by classical philosophy. The patristic discussion of the person of Christ, for example, was based on questions posed and answered by the various schools of philosophy. (Of what elements is man composed? What human action is praiseworthy? Through what faculties do we know? Is unity better than plurality?) We must look beyond similarities of form to those of content.

Other church historians have acknowledged the importance of Greek philosophy in the development of patristic theology, but have appealed to the wrong sources to document their opinions. The course of Hellenistic philosophy after Aristotle is a little-known subject. The development of the Academy in the centuries between Plato and Plotinus has been largely neglected. The term "neo-platonic" is too often used as a coverall for any indefinite metaphysical notions of the early Christian era which need a philosophical description. The variety of opinion reflected in the teachings of, for example, Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon and Arcesilaus, all of whom considered themselves to be the perpetuators of the teachings of Plato, is overlooked.

The treatment of Stoicism is equally deplorable. Those who do not discount the importance of the teachings of this school for early Christian writings, consider only the later Stoics to have exerted influence on Christian thought. The formulators of classical Stoic theory, especially Zeno and Chrysippus, are ignored. Such books as Michel Spanneut's Le Stoïcisme des pères de l'église de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie[1] are needed to correct the misconceptions concerning Stoicism's role in the evolution of Christian thought.

Aristotelian influence was negligible in the early patristic period; Aristotelianism was at best the third-ranking philosophical current of those centuries. Clement, we have seen, was reluctant to claim the Stagirite as one of his philosophical forebears. Aristotle did not become "the philosopher" for Christianity until a much later period, and his importance for the early Church Fathers should not be overstressed.

It is true that many philosophical writings of the Hellenistic era are lost to us, and that only snippets are left from hundreds of others. We may deplore the losses, but we are not excused from becoming familiar with the books and fragments which remain. The sweeping generalizations and half-truths which are passed from one generation to another must be questioned; the philosophical issues of antiquity and their lines of transmission must be brought into sharper focus. This study of the Aristotelian influence on Clement of Alexandria has been pursued in the hope that the perspective gained from the detailed examination of one small problem may benefit the author in further studies of the assimilation of Greek philosophy by early Christianity.

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